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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE MELTING POT OF NONPARTISAN ACTORS IN LOCAL POLITICS  
Local party systems in Western democracies are highly politicized with a dominant 
position of national party branches in the local political arena. Yet, these local chapters 
of national parties have not acquired an absolute monopoly over local politics as they 
are still challenged by independent or nonpartisan actors in the competition for local 
powers. This localist dimension of local politics can crystalize into independent 
candidates in single-winner voting systems, while proportional representation systems 
generate independent local candidate lists. This research project deals with the latter 
and aims to contribute to our academic understanding of the role of independent 
candidate lists in local politics. 
The presence and success of independent local candidate lists varies between and 
within countries, but comparative research has demonstrated that these lists have 
gained influence throughout Europe in recent decades (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008). 
This observation is beyond academic expectations as independent lists have long been 
considered as relicts of an old-style political system, bound to disappear with the entry 
of nationally organized parties in the municipal electoral arena (Rokkan, 1966). 
Consequently these lists have long been neglected or merely treated as a residual 
category by political scientists considering the party political offer in local elections. 
Only recently, they are given some more academic consideration and their persistent 
presence and success is increasingly considered as an indication for the 
incompleteness of the party politicization process as envisaged by Rokkan (Aars & 
Ringkjob, 2005; Reiser & Holtmann, 2008).  
Reiser and Holtmann (2008) meritoriously assembled the dispersed theoretical and 
empirical research on independent local lists in Europe providing a comprehensive 
overview of the existing state of knowledge in this nascent research domain. In 
addition to their conclusion that these lists have gained influence in local politics 
across Europe, they suggest two main explanations for this evolution. On the one 
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hand, the success of independent local lists is interpreted as a reaction to the alleged 
party crisis. Political parties have fundamentally evolved over time and are no longer 
the mass parties they once were. Traditional parties are gradually losing public support 
and increasingly fail to assume some traditional linkage function between society and 
government. They increasingly converged with the state and alienated from the 
citizenries, which is often associated with a decline of political parties. In local politics, 
independent candidate lists can seize the political disenchantment of the electorate 
and provide a local alternative for the maligned established parties. A second 
explanation of the success of independent local candidate lists refers to the emergence 
of post-materialist political values (nature protection, active social protection …), 
especially in urbanized regions. Traditional political parties insufficiently succeed to 
adopt these new values and independent lists can fill this policy void as local political 
extensions of the new social movement (Reiser, 2008).  
Despite this recent awareness of the persistent presence and success of independent 
local candidate lists and the assumptions concerning its causes, academic 
understanding of the meaning of these lists for local politics remains confined. Some 
authors consider them as short-term instances with little representative accountability 
(Soos, 2008; Steyvers, Reynaert, De Ceuninck, Valcke, & Verhelst, 2008), while others 
argue that these lists introduce new political cleavages in local politics and add value 
to local democracy (Boogers & Voerman, 2010; Breux & Bherer, 2013; Elmendorf & 
Schleicher, 2012). These ambiguities and uncertainties indicate the need for further 
research in this field. This dissertation addresses this lacuna and aims to pave the way 
for a more profound and refined academic comprehension of the role of local lists in 
local politics by studying these lists in the multi-partisan context of the Flemish region 
in Belgium. 
The underdeveloped research field of independent local candidate lists however faces a 
number of critical conceptual and methodological problems. For their comparative 
purpose, Reiser and Holtmann suggest to identify independent local lists based on two 
criteria: 1) their focus on one and only one local jurisdiction and 2) their (nominal) 
independency of national (or supra-local) parties. Although the authors are well aware 
of the vast internal variation concealed by this minimal definition, methodological 
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concerns (comparability, aggregated perspective, lack of classification models) impel 
them to deal with local lists as a homogenous category in contrast to local divisions of 
national parties. Yet, this binary distinction between independent local lists and local 
party branches neglects a variety of border cases as several scholars have referred to 
the occurrence of pseudo-local lists, hidden party lists or other concealed sub-species 
(Dudzinska, 2008; Göhlert, Holtmann, Krappidel, & Reiser, 2008; Steyvers et al., 2008). 
Moreover, most scholars agree that the general label of independent local lists covers a 
highly varied content and treating them as a uniform group hampers academic 
knowledge-building on their role in local politics. Reiser (2008) concludes that the 
question of definition and criteria as well as the need for practical classification models 
to differentiate independent local lists are the most pivotal methodological challenges 
for further (comparative) research. She suggests two critical dimensions to 
differentiate local candidate lists in further research: 1) the actual degree of 
independence from national political parties; and 2) the degree of localization and 
geographical coverage of local lists1 (Reiser, 2008).  
Additionally, Steyvers et al. (2008) identify the notion of partisanship as a critical 
differentiating dimension as they perceive a partisanship-continuum in local lists. On 
the one end of this continuum they situate local lists behaving like genuine local 
parties, while the other end locates ‘constituencies of independents’ merely applying a 
party-like form as an electoral device to gain representative power without performing 
any other societal functions.  
A quick review of the variety of labels used to refer to this widespread but poorly 
delineated local political phenomenon clearly illustrates the conceptual confusion 
concerning both their independent and their partisan character. Boogers, Soos and 
Worlund refer to local parties (Boogers, 2008; Soos, 2008; Wörlund, 2008), while 
Dudzinska and Aars et al. speak of non-party and nonpartisan lists (Aars & Ringkjob, 
2008; Dudzinska, 2008). Other authors explicitly refer to the independent character of 
these lists, without any reference to their supposed partisan character using terms like 
                                                     
1
 The geographical coverage of a local candidate list can be confined to only one municipality, or comprise various 
(or even all) municipalities in a country.  
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independent coalitions (Jüptner, 2008) or independent local lists (Kopric, 2008; Pettai, 
Toomla, & Joakit, 2008). Still others merely denote the restricted territorial character 
of these lists by speaking of local lists (Göhlert et al., 2008; Steyvers et al., 2008) or 
emphasize the role of citizens by using terms like citizen electoral alliances, citizens 
groups or liste civiche (Pettai et al., 2008; Pires de almeinda, 2008). This conceptual 
ambiguity confirms the need for a more systematic approach to differentiate local 
candidate lists.  
To address the above mentioned methodological and conceptual pitfalls, I will further 
use the term ‘non-national lists’ to refer to ‘all candidate lists participating in local 
elections with a label that deviates from the labels used by nationally organized parties’. 
The prefix ‘non-national’ thus refers to their nominal dissociation from national parties 
without a priori assuming independence from national parties. The term ‘lists’ likewise 
makes no a priori assumptions about the extent to which these lists behave like 
political parties. This wide definition allows to involve all intermediate cases between 
national party branches and independent local lists enabling further differentiation. I 
will also use the broader term of ‘local candidate lists’ to refer to all candidate lists that 
participate in local elections, thus including the traditional party lists submitted by 
national party branches.   
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The broad denominator of non-national lists thus covers a highly variegated load. The 
default local-national dichotomy is an unwarranted and oversimplified representation 
of the local political reality and leaves little scope for internal differentiation and 
exhaustive knowledge-building. To develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
the multifarious phenomenon of non-national candidate lists and their role in local 
politics, empirically founded knowledge-building is needed based on practicable and 
relevant classification tools. The main aim of this research project is to examine the 
differentiated role of non-national lists in local politics in Flanders, but realizing this 
ambition requires a classification model to differentiate non-national lists.   
Hence a first research question of this project can be formulated as follows: 
General Introduction 
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1) What is a relevant classification model to differentiate non-national lists?  
To further establish the role of non-national lists in Flanders the analysis will focus on 
two main features which have been identified as crucial differentiating dimensions in 
scholarly literature: their actual independence from national parties and their partisan 
character. Accordingly, the two main research questions of this project are: 
2) How independent are non-national lists in Flanders?; and  
3) How partisan are non-national lists in Flanders? 
Generally a binary distinction is made between independent local lists and national 
party lists in local elections. However, political reality suggests that non-national lists 
are not all as independent as this label suggests. A local name can disguise more or less 
strong relations with a national party, as also suggested by Ackaert (2006, p 105-108). I 
will therefore consider the actual links between non-national lists and national parties 
to differentiate non-national lists and refine current academic insights concerning 
their political relevance and to substantiate the academic discussion on local party 
politicization.  
Additionally, non-national lists are often characterized as ‘nonpartisan’ but at the same 
time they are assumed to act as functional equivalents of local parties. Empirical 
evidence to support this functional equation between non-national lists and local party 
branches is lacking and the extent to which they behave like political parties is 
generally left nebulous. Moreover, their assumed traditional, nonpartisan conception 
of local politics might even suggest a different functional behaviour of non-national 
lists in the local political arena as they perceive themselves as nonpartisan alternatives 
to political parties. Hence, I will examine the extent to which non-national lists in 
Flanders implement the functions generally associated with political parties. 
This research project thus aims to establish the differentiated role of non-national lists 
in local politics by analysing their actual independence from political parties and their 
partisan character. Political parties serve as main yardstick for these research questions 
and theoretical insights on the nature and functions of national and local parties 
provide a solid theoretical framework. Yet political parties are no consistent yardstick. 
Chapter 1 
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They have faced severe challenges in recent decades and their functions have altered 
substantially, complicating the analysis of non-national lists. Moreover, the presence of 
non-national lists has been related to these system-level party changes, although the 
repercussions of national party evolutions on local political actors remain unclear. 
Therefore, this dissertation not only examines the variation in the independent and 
partisan character of non-national lists in Flanders but also aims to link these findings 
with current academic insights on party change and the fourth research question reads 
as follows: 
4) How are non-national lists related to party change 
Figure 1.1. below summarizes this analytical framework to study the role of non-
national lists in local politics in Flanders. 
Figure 1.1: Analytical framework to study the role of non-national lists  
 
The added value of this research project can be situated at different levels. First of all, 
it contributes to the conceptual refinement of non-national lists in local politics and 
responds to the call for classification tools to study this local political phenomenon. 
Secondly, this study provides a thorough analysis of the actual independence and 
partisan character of non-national lists in the Flemish region of Belgium based on a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. This mixed methods 
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approach allows to develop a versatile perspective on the differentiated role of non-
national lists in Flemish municipalities and add empirical evidence to this nascent 
research field. Lastly, this dissertation offers an innovative and relevant perspective on 
non-national lists by relating the role of these lists to system-level party changes.  
1.3 OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK 
Political parties are the main reference point to analyse the role of non-national lists in 
Flanders. Hence, the following theoretical chapter reviews the relevant concepts and 
insights on party functions and party change and relates these to local parties and non-
national lists. Subsequently, chapter three justifies the adopted research design based 
on a mixed methods approach, while chapter four elaborates on the institutional 
context of Flanders to assess the transferability of the findings to other settings. The 
ensuing empirical analysis consists of two main parts. The first part addresses the 
actual independence or decisional autonomy of non-national lists in Flanders. Chapter 
five proposes an innovative classification tool to differentiate local candidate lists 
based on their vertical and horizontal autonomy and applies this classification tool to 
local candidate lists in Flanders to establish the prevalence and political relevance of 
the different types of local candidate lists. Chapter six considers the decisional 
autonomy of local candidate lists in a longitudinal perspective and aims to reveal the 
rationale behind the different types of non-national lists in Flanders. This first 
empirical part on actual independence concludes with chapter seven where the 
theoretical implications of this refined conceptualization of local candidate lists for the 
academic insights on local party system nationalization are considered.  
The second empirical part of this book concerns a functional analysis of non-national 
lists to establish their partisan character. Three key party functions are considered, 
examining for each if and how non-national lists differ from local party branches in 
assuming these functions. Chapter nine discusses the specific methodological aspects 
of this functional analysis based on a combination of survey and interview data, while 
the three ensuing chapters successively deal with candidate selection (chapter 10), 
organizational strength (chapter 11) and programmatic priorities (chapter 12) of non-
national lists. In a final concluding part (chapter 12), the research findings are 
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integrated and re-linked to the analytical framework and suggestions for further 
research are formulated. 
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2 ON PARTIES AND PARTY CHANGE 
This research project aims to refine our understanding of the role of non-national lists 
in local politics by analysing their actual independence and their partisan character in 
a Flemish context. As political parties are the main point of reference in this analysis, 
party theory can provide us with relevant concepts and theoretical models to guide our 
research. However, providing an extensive overview of the academic knowledge on 
political parties is a mission impossible as scholarly research has resulted in an 
enormous body of party literature with numerous sub-fields. The present theoretical 
chapter will therefore review the relevant theoretical insights concerning the nature 
and functions of political parties and their altering role in contemporary politics and 
relate these insights to local parties and non-national lists.   
2.1 PARTY DEFINITIONS AND PARTY FUNCTIONS  
Political scientists and analysts generally agree that political parties are indispensable 
in modern democracy. Parties bridge the gap between voters and government and are 
considered as the ‘only workable mechanism to ensure that the institutions of 
democracy can work in practice in the modern state’ (Müller & Narud, 2013). Yet, 
defining a political party seems a challenging endeavour. Scholarly literature provides a 
variety of party definitions and functional descriptions, all stressing different features 
of political parties. One of the oldest party definitions often referred to is Burke’s, who 
emphasizes the ideological roots of parties and the joint pursuit of the general interest: 
‘[A] party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national 
interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed’ (White, 2006). 
Other definitions stress the pursuit of governing power (Downs, 1957), or accentuate 
the electoral means of political parties (Sartori, 2005). A single, commonly agreed upon 
party definition remains illusory for the boundaries between political parties and other 
institutions in society are complex and blurred and each definition seems to exclude 
some other manifestation which could also be argued to be a party (Ware, 1996).  
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Therefore, a political party is often considered as an ideal type rather than a clearly 
delineated category and many authors prefer to focus on some key features of political 
parties which are common to many party definitions but not necessarily all occur 
simultaneously. Alan Ware for example proposes a more open definition to include 
divergent cases: ‘A political party is an institution that a) seeks influence in a state, often 
by attempting to occupy positions in government, and b) usually consists of more than a 
single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to “aggregate interests”’ 
(Ware, 1996). Similarly Katz portrays political parties by a selection of key features 
without considering these features as vital conditions. He characterizes political 
parties by their objectives (gaining control over government), their methods (electoral 
and governmental), the competitive and free aspect of the party system and the 
minimal level of organization and unity of political parties (Katz, 2011). Hence, 
empirical phenomena can correspond to a greater or lesser extent to these theoretical 
conceptions of a political party.  
In addition to the more or less discriminating party definitions, a more functional 
approach focusses on the range of activities and functions performed by political 
parties. King for example identifies six core party functions: they 1) structure the vote 
by competing in elections and simplifying and contextualizing the political 
alternatives, 2) they integrate and mobilize the people by giving them a trusted voice in 
the world of politics; 3) they recruit political leaders at different levels and for various 
positions, 4) they organize the political institutions and control government; 5) they 
influence the directions and contents of public policy, and 6) they aggregate interests in 
society (Müller & Narud, 2013). Along with King’s often cited list of party functions, 
countless other enumerations of specific party activities and party functions can be 
found in literature. Fiers (1998) has reviewed a broad range of these functional 
approaches and identifies 19 different – although often intersecting - party functions, 
which he clustered into three main groups. The programmatic functions relate to the 
substantive policy preferences of political parties and their role to - proactively or 
reactively - articulate interests and prioritize public demands into a coherent policy 
program, identify policy solutions for these demands and defend these policy solutions 
in government and society. The positional functions of political parties are related to 
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the provision of political personnel. Parties seek to acquire political power and recruit 
and select people to occupy power positions in different segments of society. 
Furthermore this political personnel needs to be trained, steered, coordinated and 
consolidated. The civic party functions finally concern the relationship between parties 
and civil society. Parties interact with their members and with the broader electorate 
to bridge the gap between citizens and policy. They aim to mobilize and unify their 
sympathizers and convince them to participate in political activities. By providing 
information and socialization channels to civil society, they elucidate and legitimate 
the institutional arrangements and contribute to the stability of the political system 
(Fiers, 1998).  
As these diverse party functions can be linked to different actors and arenas, political 
parties are also considered as ‘tripartite systems of interactions’. They engage in three 
distinct realms, each involving a variety of activities, actors and rationales: the party-
in-government comprises the party representatives in public office and relates to the 
role parties play in managing and structuring government affairs. The party-in-the-
electorate involves the voters and their linkages with the democratic process; and the 
party-as-organization concerns the formal machinery of internal party life and the 
processes within the organization (Fiers, 1998; Key, 1964; King, 1969; Sorauf, 1972; 
White, 2006).  
A similar – though not identical - division is made by Katz, who distinguishes between 
three organizational faces in European membership-based organizations: the party-in-
public-office (PPO) involves the party in government and in parliament; the party-in-
central-office (PCO) constitutes the permanent bureaucracy and national executive 
organs; and the party-on-the-ground (POG) concerns the organized membership 
(Katz, 2005). Moreover, Katz and Mair have examined how these different 
organizational faces relate to each other and established that the salience of the 
different party functions and the rapport between these faces varies in time and space 
(Katz & Mair, 1994).   
In addition to the range of different party functions, Fiers also mentions a number of 
dysfunctions of political parties. He argues that parties are able to disintegrate society 
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by dividing the citizens between supporters and opponents. Moreover, they tend to 
politicize non-political instances and reduce pluralism in society by acting as 
gatekeepers for policy formulation (Dewachter, 1970; Fiers, 1998). In Belgium political 
parties play an exceptional dominant role in society. They have a structural 
preponderance and shape the decision-making process much more than other 
components of the political system (parliament, government, administration, judicial 
powers, …). Hence, Belgium is often referred to as a partitocracy (Dumont & De 
Winter, 2006). 
2.2 PARTY MODELS 
The common notion of a political party in Western democracies and the associated 
party functions are generally based on the traditional mass-party model with a broad 
membership base, a clear ideology and a strong party discipline. Yet, the mass party is 
but one of several party models that have been described in party literature. Numerous 
typologies have been elaborated to differentiate political parties, though often from 
different theoretical angles and using different classification dimensions or operational 
criteria. Hence, cumulative theory-building on the nature and evolution of political 
parties remains underdeveloped (Montero & Gunther, 2002). Krouwel (2004) aimed to 
provide a more general theory on party transformation in the 20th century. He 
identified more than 50 – often overlapping - party models in literature and clustered 
these into five generic party types based on clear and practical criteria concerning the 
origin and organizational, electoral and ideological features of parties. He 
discriminates between five chronologically linked party types which will be discussed 
in more detail below: 1) elite/caucus/cadre parties; 2) mass parties; 3) catch-all parties; 
4) cartel parties; and 5) business firm parties.  
Before the 19th century, the concept of party was generally equated with objectionable 
factions within politics, pursuing private gains and threatening the general interest 
(Scarrow, 2006). Political parties as we know them today emerged in the 19th century 
in parallel with the maturing of parliamentary democracy and the suffrage expansion. 
The eldest political parties are identified by Krouwel as elite/caucus/cadre parties. 
These originated in proto-democratic parliamentary systems before universal suffrage 
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was introduced. These parties were first described by Duverger as partis de creation 
intérieur or parties of parliamentary origin (Duverger, 1964). These parties have been 
created to secure the legislative power of existing MP’s and consisted of only a small, 
privileged elite in parliament. Extra-parliamentary organization was limited and 
organizational structures were undue. In an era of restricted suffrage, the electorate of 
these parties was limited to a wealthy bourgeoisie and electoral mobilization was based 
on patronage and pork barrelling.  
In the same period, a very different type of party arose in reaction to this privileged 
political class. The mass parties originated outside parliament aiming to integrate 
excluded groups into the political system. These parties were based on large-scale, 
extra-parliamentary mass mobilization and have been very effective in their struggle 
for expanded suffrage. Mass parties had a clear ideological profile, pursuing radical 
change and redistribution in favour of their ‘classe gardée’. Mass parties fulfilled a clear 
class-based representative function and with a wide network of ancillary organizations 
and service providers they penetrated their member’s daily lives and established a high 
degree of party loyalty and party discipline. These large member-based parties required 
an extensive organizational structure, characterized by a comprehensive and 
centralized national bureaucracy with stringent internal hierarchy. Although internal 
democracy was highly valued and members were involved through a National 
Congress, the central party pulled the strings in these mass parties.  
Over time, both elite parties and mass-parties evolved into a new converging party 
model influenced by the expansion of the welfare state and the flattening of religious 
and class-based cleavages (Bardi, Bartolini, & Trechsel, 2014). These societal 
transformations and the modified attitudes and political expectation of citizens 
weakened the privileged liaison between particular social strata and their 
corresponding parties, resulting in catch-all parties as first described by Kircheimer 
(1966). Catch-all parties are characterized by more moderate ideological stances and 
converging party programs as well as by substantially different relationships between 
the party and the party members. Forced by the electoral success of mass parties the 
elite parties aimed to broaden their electorate in order to retain their position in 
parliament. They adopted a similar membership structure, albeit the traditional elites 
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of these parties (parliamentary group) retained their dominant role. The increased 
competition for the general electorate incited mass parties in their turn to abandon a 
strict class-based representation profile and appeal to a broader range of voters. Party 
competition narrowed down to technical and personal issues and the widespread use 
of mass media enabled politicians to engage in more direct links with their electorate. 
The party centre professionalized and party leadership became more autonomous and 
powerful. While party members still played a crucial role in traditional mass parties as 
voluntary workforce (to contact and mobilize voters, implement national campaigns, 
adopt local mandates, provide input at conferences ...), this role was strongly reduced 
in favour of the party-in-public-office and the party-central-office in catch-all parties.  
Increasing societal pressures on catch-all parties led to further adaptations in the 
relations between parties, civil society and the state. Katz and Mair conceptualized the 
cartel party as a new emerging party model, characterized by ‘the interpenetration of 
party and state and a pattern of party collusion’ (Katz & Mair, 1995). Mainstream (catch 
all) parties increasingly joined forces and collaborated to protect themselves from 
electoral risks. They gradually merged with the state institutions to guarantee the 
necessary resources for survival and maintenance of power. Political parties became 
‘agents of the state’ rather than ‘agents of society’ and electoral competition was 
further limited by the erection of legal barriers to avert new parties from electoral 
competition. Cartel parties collectively withdrew from society and state subsidies were 
employed for further professionalization of the party-elite in parliament and 
government. The distinction between party members and non-members became 
blurred as parties increasingly involve non-member supporters in party activities and 
decisions. Moreover, party membership is increasingly atomized in cartel parties and 
local autonomy in encouraged, resulting in stratarchical party structures (Katz & Mair, 
1995).  
Katz and Mair also indicated that the self-protective mechanisms installed by cartel 
parties are subject to internal contradictions. The growing interpenetration of parties 
and the state and the increasing gap between parties and the wider society has 
contributed to provoking popular mistrust and disaffection and generated a populist 
anti-cartel rhetoric. Katz and Mair identified challenges to the cartel party in the form 
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of new parties seeking to break into the system (Katz & Mair, 1995). Several other 
authors equally established that anti-party rhetoric became a common element of 
political discourse in many modern party systems. Both on the left and on the right 
new parties have tended to use anti-party arguments as electoral appeal (Bolleyer, 
2008; Ignazi, 1996). 
A last generic party model identified by Krouwel is the business-firm party. In reaction 
to the party monopolization of the state, affluent private entrepreneurs have 
established new parties aiming for broad electoral support based on populist claims of 
good governance. These parties have no clear ideology and their programs are mainly 
demand-driven. Extra-parliamentary party organization and grass-roots membership is 
limited as the business-firm party is centred around charismatic leadership and media 
exposure to appeal to a volatile electorate. Resources are generated through the private 
sector and essential tasks are outsourced. Forza Italy from Berlusconi and Pim Fortuyn 
in the Netherlands are often cited as examples of these business-firm parties (Krouwel, 
2004).  
Although these ideal-types are situated in a sequential model, Krouwel and other 
scholars warn for a too linear interpretation of party change. Different party models 
can co-occur and parties can combine several features from different ideal types. 
Though the identified party types are found predominant in specific era’s, remnants of 
older party types persist and the rise of new party models is often coupled with 
countermovements. Moreover, the authors point at the multitude of factors and 
dimensions involved in party change with sometimes contradictory evolutions and 
even circular movements of the historical phases.  
2.3 THE DECLINE OF PARTIES 
Katz and Mair’s cartel party model is most frequently referred to as the blueprint for 
contemporary political parties as cartel-like tendencies have been observed in many 
European party systems and beyond (Bolleyer, 2009). In recent years, the party decline 
thesis has entered scholarly literature entailing heated debates on the changing role 
and decreasing relevance of political parties and the - whether or not - harmful 
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consequences for democratic processes. Notwithstanding the adaptive character of 
political parties, they seem gradually less able to fulfil the traditional party functions in 
a changing macro-economic and societal environment (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; 
Mair & Van Biezen, 2001; Scarrow, 1996; Webb, 1995; Whiteley & Seyd, 1998). 
Traditional societal cleavages have blurred as technological innovation and economic 
modernization fundamentally transformed the social structure of the electorate. The 
sense of collective identity based on social class has waned and secularization similarly 
eroded religious identity. Globalization instigated new social cleavages (concerning 
immigration, environmental pollution …) and higher levels of individual resources and 
education prompted new values and expectations concerning citizen involvement in 
policy making. Political parties have generally failed to integrate these new values and 
expectations and seem trapped in old ideological cleavages. Moreover, modern 
techniques of mass communication created new direct links between citizens and 
politicians, bypassing traditional party structures and some of the traditional party 
functions have been adopted by new players (new social movements, mass media, 
unconventional forms of political participation,…). As a result of these interrelated 
evolutions ‘politics has become more and more about the competition between 
professionalized party elites and less about the mobilization and integration of socially 
distinct groups’ (Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014).  
By colluding with the state, parties have increasingly alienated from the citizens and 
are considered no longer able to perform their representative and legitimizing 
functions. Politicians are assumed to have shifted their focus on governing rather than 
representation and became a professionalized and insulated social cast (Enyedi, 2014). 
Hence, several scholars have argued that political parties are in deep crisis: ‘It may be 
that the institution of party is gradually disappearing, slowly replaced by new political 
structures more suitable for the economic and technical realities of twenty-first-century 
politics’ (Lawson & Merkl, 1988). Electoral volatility, increased anti-party sentiments, 
decreased electoral turn-out and increasing partisan dealignment are considered clear 
indications of this party crisis.  
More recently the academic discussion on party decline has been linked to the 
changing  nature of representation (Saward, 2008; Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014). 
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Saward (2008) argues that political parties do not so much represent – or fail to 
represent - rather they claim to represent and these representative claims can and have 
historically taken a variety of forms. He outlines three ideal-typical modes of party 
representation: 1) the popular representative mode of representation is associated with 
traditional mass parties which claim to speak as delegates of their constituencies that 
are rooted in pre-existing social cleavages. They act as bottom-up agents of politicized 
interests on the basis of a relatively fixed ideology. 2) more contemporary catch-all and 
cartel parties are argued to claim a statal mode of representation. As top-down state 
actors these parties present themselves as the trustees of depoliticized issue-based 
positions based on flexible ideologies and policy views. Additionally, Saward provides 
evidence for a third emerging mode of party representation, which he identifies as 
reflexive. Parties claiming this reflexive mode of representation present themselves as 
sympathizers of local and issue-based positions on the basis of pragmatic and flexible 
policy programs. They emphasize procedural values such as openness and 
responsiveness rather than ideological preferences. These open parties are flexible and 
responsive to new ideas and interests and forge local alliances around specific value-
driven goals aiming for connectedness and embeddedness in plural communities. This 
representative claim is reflected in decentralized party organizations with substantial 
autonomy for local figures, who include stakeholders and citizens in governmental 
decision-making.  
According to Saward, representative democracy has thus increasingly depoliticized 
with a more explicit focus on the general or public interest and the integration of non-
party actors. Although he argues that the different modes of representation are not 
necessarily more or less democratic, the legitimacy of political parties as vehicles of 
political representation is challenged both from within and from outside the electoral 
and parliamentary arenas and Saward predicts that ‘parties may become “mutants” or 
“hybrids” to the point where they are no longer recognized as such’ (Saward, 2008). Van 
Biezen & Poguntke (2014) confirm this transformation from a partisan mode of 
representation - based on ex ante bottom-up mandates - to a less partisan mode of top-
down representation which more explicitly focuses on some notion of the general or 
public interest. They also notice a growing interest in various forms of direct, 
Chapter 2 
18 
 
participatory and deliberative democracy ‘complementing conventional vertical and 
hierarchical modes of politics within an increasingly horizontalized society’  (Van Biezen 
& Poguntke, 2014).  
2.4 THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF LOCAL POLITICS 
In the previous sections, we have reviewed some theoretical insights concerning the 
(changing) roles and functions of political parties. As our research subject concerns 
non-national lists in a local political arena, these theoretical insights on political 
parties need to be related to the local context and hence this section focuses on the 
specific nature and (changing) functions of local parties.  
Geser expects local parties to ‘display similar activities and organizational 
characteristics as parties campaigning at the state or national level’ (Geser, 1999), yet it 
can be assumed that the implementation of traditional programmatic, positional and 
organizational party functions is strongly influenced by the particular features of local 
politics. Steyvers (2010) has discussed in detail the benefits of local politics, relating to 
freedom, democracy and efficiency. He argues that local self-government can be 
considered as a warrantee for freedom not only for it can counterbalance (arbitrary) 
decisions of the central government, but also for it is the best placed level to face 
political problems and challenges of the local community. The local level is the closest 
governmental level to the daily lives of the people granting it a unique democratic 
character with high participative potential. The local level is also considered as the 
most efficient level for public service provision because it has most knowledge 
concerning the local needs and demands and represents the optimal territorial 
connection between costs and benefits of and accountability for specific local services 
(Steyvers, 2010).  
Reiser and Vetter (2011) argue that in times of party decline - with a decreased 
legitimacy of political parties - local politics can safeguard a healthy relationship 
between the citizens and politics. Local government can be attributed a crucial role in 
democratic political systems as ‘it is on the local level in particular that there exists the 
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chance of turning citizens into more social individuals. It is there that the mental 
foundation is laid on which democracy can develop’ (Reiser & Vetter, 2011).  
Notwithstanding these democratic benefits of local politics, local parties adopt but a 
negligible place within the extensive party literature. They are generally interpreted as 
mere subunits of national parties, forming the gateway for new party members to enter 
a party. Local parties suffer first from the established declining membership figures 
and the alleged crisis of parties as they first and foremost geographically organize the 
national party-on-the-ground. Consequently, several authors consider local party 
branches as increasingly irrelevant in contemporary - highly centralized and 
professionalized - political parties (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001; Webb, 1995). Other 
authors however stress that - regardless of the decreasing number of party members - 
local parties adapt to societal challenges and continue to play a central role in linking 
the citizens with the process of (local) government. They still provide the national 
party with legitimacy and the impression of a large rank and file; they organize 
campaign activities for supra-local elections which cannot be replaced by a 
professional headquarter and media specialists (producing and delivering leaflets, 
canvass voters …); in between elections, they provide party members with benefits and 
incentives to encourage political participation and intra-party democracy. Moreover, 
local party branches socialize party members into the parties’ values and 
organizational structures and allow them to gain political experience and test their 
motivation and aptitude for higher-level office functions (Clark, 2004).  
These opposing views concerning the continued relevance of local parties reflect their 
Janus-faced character. Local parties assume two distinct political roles for which they 
need to look into opposite directions. They not only constitute the party on the ground 
of national parties - implementing a range of tasks to serve the national party goals – 
but also engage in local politics, which entails different - locally-oriented tasks. They 
recruit candidates to participate in local elections, aim to provide politicians for local 
government and engage in local policy-making (Clark, 2004; Geser, 1999). It can be 
assumed that the former role of local parties as party agency has changed substantially 
as the position of the party on the ground has altered in favour of the central party 
leadership. Yet, no indications point to a decline in the role of local parties as 
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participants in local politics. On the contrary, the relevance of this latter role is even 
argued to be on the rise as institutional reforms, combined with a shift towards 
governance networks, have increasingly politicized the local level (Geser, 1999). Copus 
and Erlingsson (2012) however, take a more critical stance and consider elitism and 
power concentration in local party groups as the local counterpart of the national party 
crisis. They argue that party members and citizens are gradually excluded from 
effective input to local politics as ‘local political power becomes concentrated in the 
hands of fewer party members and ultimately in the local elite of councillors’ (Copus & 
Erlingsson, 2012).  
Moreover, local parties seem to have acquired an increasingly autonomous position 
relative to the national party centre. While traditional party models defined parties 
essentially as hierarchical organizations - controlled by different dominant groups, 
several authors have referred to the weakening hierarchical relationships between the 
organizational entities of contemporary political parties. Eldersveld (1964) was the first 
to introduce the concept of stratarchical rather than hierarchical relationships within a 
political party. More recently, other authors equally argued that simple hierarchical 
paradigms no longer represent the reality of contemporary party structures which are 
characterized by a significant degree of autonomy for the respective organizational 
units (Carty, 2004; Katz & Mair, 1995, 1994; Mair, 1994). Mair (1994) argued that this 
tendency could result in completely decentralised party organisations in which mutual 
autonomy could develop ‘to a degree in which the local party will become essentially 
unconcerned about any real input into the national party (and vice versa), and will 
devote itself primarily to politics at the local level’. Carty on the other hand emphasized 
the mutual autonomy and interdependence of the organizational subunits and 
proposed a franchise model for thinking about stratarchical party structures (Carty, 
2004). His claim of a stratarchical imperative in contemporary parties has been 
substantiated by Bolleyer (2012) who analysed the available tools of conflict resolution 
and patterns of vertical interaction within new parties in West European democracies 
(Bolleyer, 2012). 
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2.5 NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN LOCAL POLITICS 
It is in this geographically confined arena of local politics that non-national lists enter 
the picture and compete with the above discussed local chapters of national parties. 
Notwithstanding their persistence and recent revival in many European countries, 
theoretical and empirical research on non-national lists remains sparse. Some scholars 
consider these lists as independent relics of a political past. They are depicted as 
historical artefacts reflecting the endurance of a non-political conception of local 
politics in municipalities that have not (yet) been completely politicized by 
parliamentary parties (Aberg & Ahlberger, 2015). Other authors on the contrary assume 
that non-national lists should be considered as heralds of a new and depoliticized 
system of (local) democracy, rather than as anomalies. In this latter tradition, Boogers 
and Voerman (2010) describe independent local parties as prototypes of a modernized 
party organization ‘spearheading the party change from membership organization into 
staff-type organization’. They demonstrate that these independent staff-type 
organizations have less problems than traditional party branches to fulfil an 
intermediary role between government and society in the Netherlands (Boogers & 
Voerman, 2010). Moreover, the dealignment of the electorate is considered a fertile 
ground for non-national lists to challenge the traditional cartelized parties at the local 
level and appeal to the disaffected voters (Aars & Ringkjob, 2008).  
This research aims to contribute to the academic understanding of the differentiated 
role of non-national lists in local politics and how they are related to more system-level 
evolutions of national parties. Are they the long-time assumed independent relics of a 
nonpartisan past or can they be more accurately depicted as heralds of the party 
decline?  
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3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH: PRAGMATISM AND 
MIXED METHODS 
The following study of the differentiated role of non-national lists in Flanders is based 
on a convergent mixed methods design, combining quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. Mixed methods research is defined as ‘the type of research in which a 
researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, 
analysis, inference techniques) for the purpose of breadth and depth of understanding 
and corroboration’ (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Mixed methods research 
has grown increasingly popular in recent decades and is even considered as a ‘third 
methodological movement’ (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007; D. L. 
Morgan, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). This combination was long unthinkable as 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches have been linked to 
incommensurable paradigms with opposing philosophical assumptions concerning 
‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ (Krauss, 2005; Kuhn, 1970). Quantitative research is generally 
associated with a (post-)positivist perspective based on a dualistic and objectivist 
approach to science, while qualitative research is linked to a constructivist or 
interpretative tradition in science based on the assumption that reality is socially 
constructed. Purists have installed a stringent dichotomy in social science between 
these objectivist and subjectivist worldviews and defended the incompatibility of 
qualitative and quantitative research (Guban & Lincoln, 1994; G. Morgan & Smircich, 
1980).  
Only recently, this ‘war of methods’ has been tempered and the ‘compatibility thesis’ 
has gained influence. Pragmatism has been put forward as a ‘third methodological 
paradigm’ redirecting academic attention to methodological rather than metaphysical 
concerns and promoting methodological eclecticism (Johnson & Leech, 2005; D. L. 
Morgan, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). Pragmatism values both objective and 
subjective knowledge and uses diverse methodological approaches based on ‘what 
works’ to address specific research questions. Rather than by ontological and 
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epistemological positions, pragmatists are guided by practical and applied research 
philosophy to make methodological decisions. 
Several authors stress the benefits and opportunities of a mixed methods approach 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Flyvbjerg, 2011; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2010). Qualitative 
methods allow a detailed understanding based on individual perspectives, while 
quantitative methods offer a more general picture based on the variance in values on a 
limited set of variables. Both methods have their merits and provide a different 
perspective but one data source may be insufficient to provide a more complete 
understanding of the research subject. Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) conceive of 
several situations where mixing methods is appropriate. The results of one method 
may require additional explanation, typically by qualitative research or a second 
(quantitative) method could enhance a primary qualitative method by generalizing 
exploratory findings. A second method might also be embedded within a primary 
method to enhance the study or a specific theoretical framework might require both 
qualitative and quantitative data. Finally, a research objective might involve multiple 
research phases and many components which need to be connected to reach an overall 
objective (Creswell & Clark, 2011).  
Flyvbjerg also emphasizes the complementarity between qualitative (case study) and 
quantitative (statistical) methods, arguing that ‘case study and statistical methods can 
achieve far more scientific progress together than either could alone’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
Table 3.1 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of both methods according to 
Flyvbjerg and illustrates how these can complement each other. 
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Table 3.1: Strengths and weaknesses of statistical methods and case study methods (Flyvbjerg, 2011) 
 Statistical Methods Case Studies 
Strengths 
Breadth Depth 
Understanding how widespread a 
phenomenon is across a population 
High conceptual validity 
Measures of correlation for 
populations of cases 
Understanding of context and 
process 
Establishment of probabilistic levels 
of confidence 
Understanding of what causes a 
phenomenon, linking causes and 
outcomes 
 
Fostering new hypotheses and new 
research questions 
Weaknesses 
Conceptual stretching, by grouping 
together dissimilar cases to get 
larger samples 
Selection bias may overstate or 
understate relationships 
Weak understanding of context, 
process, and causal mechanisms 
Weak understanding of occurrence 
population of phenomena under 
study 
Correlation does not imply 
causation 
Statistical significance often 
unknown or unclear 
Weak mechanisms for fostering 
new hypotheses 
 
The present research into the role of non-national lists in local politics can equally be 
situated in this pragmatic mixed methods research tradition. It combines quantitative 
and qualitative approaches to uncover various related facets of the actual 
independence and partisan character of non-national lists and enables to develop a 
polygonal view on the differentiated role of these lists in local politics in Flanders.  
The adopted research design can be defined as a parallel convergent design in which 
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis occurred concurrently, but 
independent from one another, merging the results into an overall interpretation 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Several primary and secondary data sources have been 
employed and analysed with customized analytical methods, each providing specific 
and complementary insights into the research subject: 
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- Primary data:  
o In-depth elite interviews with a selection of 22 list headers of non-
national lists in Flanders 
o Electronic survey among all list headers of non-national lists in Flanders 
- Secondary data: 
o Mediargus: digital press database, containing (local and national) media-
reports on individual candidate lists2 
o Electronic election database of the Flemish Agency for Internal Affairs3.  
o Electronic survey among all presidents of local parties in Flanders made 
available by the Belgian interuniversity Attraction Pole PARTIREP4 
I will briefly summarize here the rationale for the different methodological choices, 
which will be elaborated in more detail in the respective chapters. The first empirical 
part of this research project deals with the actual independence of non-national lists in 
Flanders. A classification model is proposed to differentiate local candidate lists based 
on their vertical and horizontal decisional autonomy. This classification model is 
applied to all local candidate lists which have participated in the municipal elections of 
2006 and 2012 in Flanders. The allocation of the candidate lists in this classification 
model is based on a combined nominal analysis of the list names and a content 
analysis of local news coverage. Linking these data to the electoral results of the 
candidate lists further allowed a quantitative assessment of the political relevance of 
the different types of local candidate lists in Flanders. This cross-sectional analysis is 
supplemented with a longitudinal qualitative analysis to reveal the rationales behind 
the different types of non-national lists. A multiple case analysis based on in-depth 
interviews with list headers of non-national lists allows to clarify changes in the 
decisional autonomy of these lists and to assess the role of different internal and 
external factors in these changes. Moreover, the refined conceptualization of non-
national lists and their decisional autonomy sheds new light on party system 
nationalization. Based on a refined nationalization index for local party systems a 
                                                     
2
 Now converted into www.gopress.be 
3
 www.vlaanderenkiest.be 
4
 www.partirep.eu 
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multiple regression analysis aims to account for the differences in local party system 
nationalizing in Flanders.  
The second empirical part of this research project aims to establish the extent to which 
non-national lists perform the functions generally associated with political parties. 
This functional analysis of non-national lists is based on survey data and interview data. 
The electronic survey among list headers of non-national lists in Flanders provides 
valuable quantitative data and offers a mainly descriptive image of how non-national 
lists assume the three selected key party functions. These general insights are related 
to the research results of (and - if appropriate the data from) the Partirep-project to 
benchmark the functional behaviour of non-national lists with local party branches in 
Flanders. These quantitative findings are clarified, nuanced or corroborated with 
qualitative findings based on the analysis of the elite interviews with list headers of 
non-national lists.   
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4 THE CASE OF FLANDERS 
This research project intends to contribute to a more generalized knowledge-building 
on non-national lists by analysing the role of non-national lists in the multipartisan 
context of the Flemish region of Belgium. The generalizability of these research 
findings to other settings depends on contextual congruence (Ritchie, Spencer, & 
O'Connor, 2003). This section therefore describes in detail the Flemish institutional 
context to assess the transferability to other settings.    
Belgium is generally considered as representative for the southern/Franco tradition 
and local government is commonly conceived as the eminence of local community 
(inducing territorial fragmentation) with a rather limited role in public service and 
direct access to central power. (Copus, C., Wingfield, M., Steyvers, S. & Reynaert, H.; 
2012). Belgium is also an example of consensual local democracy from a wider 
perspective. Proportional representation leads to a multiparty system, usually with 
various parties in government as well as in opposition. Hence, executive power is often 
shared in coalitions of different parties. Whereas elections only compose the council, 
monistic relations exist with an executive of the collegiate type (college of mayor and 
alderman) (De Rynck, Wayenberg, Steyvers & Pilet, 2010). 
Since the 1970s, Belgium has a regionalized party system. Due to the emergence of 
regionalist parties and the proceeding reform of the Belgian state towards a federal 
polity, former unitary national parties split into a Flemish and Walloon faction. The 
national electoral system is organized subsequently implying a regionalized space of 
party competition. Moreover, Belgium forms no exception to the general trend of party 
dealignment. This has been amply demonstrated by decreasing levels of party 
identification, increasing volatility of the voters and reduced predictability of voting 
behaviour and decreasing party membership figures (Dalton, McAllister, & 
Wattenberg, 2005; Steyvers, 2014; Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014; Van Haute, 2015). Yet, 
Steyvers (2014) argues that political parties continue to play a central role in many 
areas. He uses an interesting set of nautical metaphors to demonstrate how Belgian’s 
partitocracy has gradually transformed but definitely did not disappear as political 
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parties in Belgium remain important anchor points and are nothing like the empty 
vessels they have been associated with.  
Local elections in Belgium are held simultaneously in all three regions every 6 years 
and are characterised by a high permissiveness in terms of candidacy5. Although there 
is no formal electoral threshold and seats are distributed based on the proportionality 
principle, the Imperiali system slightly increases the factual electoral threshold and 
favours bigger parties or constellations. This quasi-proportional representation system 
makes it easy for (new) parties to (successfully) compete in local elections in Belgium 
(Copus, Wingfield, Steyvers, & Reynaert, 2012). Belgium is one of the few countries 
with compulsory voting and hence turn-out rates in elections remain high. As in other 
Western democracies, national parties play an important role in local politics in 
Belgium, but no clear evidence could be found for a systematic nationalisation of the 
local political offer (Wille & Deschouwer, 2007) and local candidate lists have always 
been and remain an important feature of local politics (Steyvers & De Ceuninck, 2013). 
Steyvers and his colleagues have examined local candidate lists in Belgium from a 
nominal perspective (in opposition to national candidate lists) and established that a 
majority of local party systems in Belgium is characterized by the presence of at least 
one such local candidate list. Moreover, one out of every five voters casts a vote for 
these lists which consequently also frequently participate in absolute or coalition 
governments (Steyvers & De Ceuninck, 2013; Steyvers et al., 2008). Furthermore, the 
authors established that the presence and penetration of these lists has increased in 
recent decades, although they assume that this rise can be attributed to a shift from 
the genuinely to the rather pseudo-types of local lists (especially cartel lists). While 
this assumption has not been substantiated by empirical research, the authors 
emphasize the hybrid nature of local politics in Belgium and stress the need for further 
research as local candidate lists ‘are a factor not to neglect in trying to understand local 
electoral processes in Belgium’ (Steyvers et al., 2008).  
  
                                                     
5
 Anyone can propose a list with one or more candidates, which then has to be submitted by a resigning councillor 
or by a certain (limited) number of voters. 
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National Lists in Flanders 
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5 LOCAL STRONGHOLDS OR NATIONAL DISCIPLES? 
DECISIONAL AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF 
NON-NATIONAL LISTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This first empirical part of this research project deals with the actual independence of 
non-national lists from political parties. As indicated by Reiser (2008), the lack of 
relevant and practicable classification models to nuance the default dichotomy 
between local and national candidate lists in local elections hinders the development 
of comprehensive academic knowledge on the miscellaneous nature of non-national 
candidate lists and their differentiated role in local politics. The actual independence 
of non-national candidate lists has been suggested as one of the critical dimensions for 
differentiation as several scholars have referred to the occurrence of pseudo-local lists, 
hidden party lists or other concealed sub-species, which can neither be considered as 
independent lists, nor as fully national lists (Dudzinska, 2008; Göhlert et al., 2008; 
Steyvers et al., 2008). In addition to these indications that presumed independent 
candidate lists can maintain hidden links to national parties, local party branches also 
behave increasingly autonomous from national party centres. Several authors have 
referred to the weakening hierarchical relationships between organizational entities of 
contemporary political parties as a characterizing feature of the cartelization tendency 
in political parties (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Katz & Mair, 1995) Hence, the 
traditional distinction between national/partisan and local/independent lists 
oversimplifies the political reality and disregards the actual links between non-national 
lists and national parties. 
Moreover, a proper knowledge of the actual independence of non-national lists is of 
substantial theoretical importance as it is critical in our academic understanding of the 
party politicization process as first established by Rokkan (1966). He argued that the 
‘breakdown of the traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally 
organized parties into municipal elections’ would eventually result in completely 
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nationalized local party systems without any nonpartisan actors left. A number of 
studies regarding the supply-side of local elections in Western democracies do indeed 
give indications for such a constantly increasing homogenisation of local party systems 
(Bäck, 2003; Kjaer & Elklit, 2009), while more recent research challenges Rokkan’s 
theoretical end-state by pointing to the persistence and recent revival of nonpartisan 
actors in many European local party systems. These alleged independent actors are 
argued to counterbalance the entry of national parties into municipal elections (Aars & 
Ringkjob, 2005; Steyvers et al, 2008). Yet, this academic discussion on (the end-state 
of) party politicization is equally distorted by a flawed conception of the actual 
independence of these actors. If not all non-national lists are as local or independent as 
their popular label suggests, their prominence and role in the party politicization 
process should be reconsidered.   
This first empirical research part concerning the actual independence of non-national 
lists comprises three main components. Following Reiser and Holtmann’s plea, I will 
first elaborate a practicable and contingent classification model to differentiate non-
national lists based on their decisional autonomy – a concept which is closely related 
to actual independence. This classification model is then applied to non-national lists 
in Flemish municipalities allowing to establish the occurrence and political relevance 
of different ideal-types of non-national lists. Secondly, I will consider the decisional 
autonomy of non-national lists in a longitudinal perspective and identify the causal 
mechanisms behind strategic changes in decisional autonomy and the rationales of the 
different types of non-national lists. A last component of this first research part on the 
actual independence of non-national list concerns the theoretical implications of this 
conceptual refinement of non-national lists for prevailing insights on the party 
politicization of local party systems. The degree of party politicization in Flemish 
municipalities is assessed and explained based on an innovative measure to analyse 
local party system composition. 
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5.2 CLASSIFYING LOCAL CANDIDATE LISTS: INDEPENDENCE RECONSIDERED 
Literature on multilevel parties offers valuable clues to analyse the actual 
independence of non-national lists. The recent trend of political decentralization has 
fuelled academic interest in the territorial organization of state-wide parties and the 
inter-level relationships within multilevel parties (Hopkin, 2009; Swenden & Maddens, 
2009; Thorlakson, 2009; Van Houten, 2009). In this novel research field, a distinction 
is often made between three dimensions of inter-level party organization. Vertical 
integration refers to the extent of formal and informal organizational linkages, 
interdependence and cooperation between national and sub-national levels (common 
party membership, shared finances, a common governance structure); Influence refers 
to the extent to which the party organizations at the lower level can affect decisions of 
party branches at the higher levels; and autonomy concerns the extent of control of 
higher party levels over lower ones or the freedom of the subnational level to conduct 
its affairs without interference from the national party (Reiser & Vetter, 2011; 
Thorlakson, 2009).  
This theoretical framework offers valuable clues to analyse the actual independence of 
non-national lists, although this upcoming discipline generally disregards local party 
organizations as its focus is on the relationship between national, sub-national 
(regional) and supra-national (European) party-level. Reiser & Vetter (2011) however 
advocate to integrate the local party level in multilevel party analysis and consider 
local interest representation at higher system levels. Yet, while their focus is on vertical 
integration and (bottom-up) influence of local party organizations in multilevel 
parties, the concern of this study lies in the autonomy of local party levels and the 
interdependence between local and national party levels.  
This interdependence between local and national parties comes with mutual benefits. 
National party centres aspire maximum presence at the local level as this provides 
them with valuable political resources (funding, activist recruitment, media exposure, 
…) while the national party equally provides the local subunits with important local 
resources (financial, personnel, logistic) and ensures the overall integration of the local 
party and national image-building. In a traditional conception of political parties as 
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hierarchical organizations with a dominant central party, local party branches are 
considered to have little autonomy (Michels, 1962). More recent party scholars 
however have focussed on the balance between control and intra-organizational 
autonomy within parties and consider contemporary parties as stratarchical or 
franchise organizations in which national party centres ánd organizational sub-units 
have considerable autonomy (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Katz & Mair, 1995). As several 
authors have indicated that a local name can conceal more or less strong links to the 
national party level, non-national lists could be considered as an expression of this 
relative autonomy of local party branches and hence an extension of the stratarchical 
imperative as identified by Carty and Bolleyer (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004). 
This interesting multilevel party approach however does not suffice to fully capture the 
actual independence of non-national lists. Especially in a Belgian context, the presence 
of non-national lists can to a certain extent be attributed to the increased 
attractiveness of so-called cartel initiatives between various local political actors6. 
Verthé and Deschouwer (2011) use the term pre-electoral alliances to refer to these 
‘agreement[s] between parties to form a joint list or present joint candidates to the 
voters’. They argue that local party branches in Belgium often opt for such a pre-
electoral alliance to reduce the electoral risks and secure office or even survival (in case 
of small parties) (Verthé & Deschouwer, 2011). These joint lists influence the autonomy 
of the cartel partners as they require agreements on a variety of aspects (joint 
programmatic profile, campaigning, candidate selection, list formation, cooperation...). 
Hence, the autonomy of non-national actors in Flanders is not only influenced by 
direct vertical links with higher party levels, but also by horizontal links to other local 
parties. 
To integrate this vertical and horizontal dimension of in(ter)dependence, I will rely on 
the analytical concept of decisional autonomy as elaborated by Randal & Svasand 
(2002) as an essential component of party institutionalization. These authors define 
the decisional autonomy of a party as ‘the freedom from interference in determining its 
                                                     
6
 Although the term ‘cartel’ generally has another connotation in political science (cfr the cartel party of Katz & 
Mair, 2006), the concept of ‘cartel lists’ is very familiar in Belgium (Flanders as well as Wallonia), referring to pre-
electoral alliances in the form of joint candidate lists. 
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own policies and strategies’ (Randall & Svasand, 2002). While ‘interference’ mainly 
refers to (top-down) control, the more neutral term influence is preferred for the 
current research on non-national lists since this also include less hierarchical modes of 
interdependence. The decisional autonomy of non-national candidate lists is thus 
defined as ‘the extent of external influence on the lists’ policies and strategies’ 
containing a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Their vertical decisional autonomy 
concerns the extent of influence from national party centres, while their horizontal 
autonomy involves the extent of external influence from other political actors in the 
local party system.  
Operationalizing this analytical concept of decisional autonomy is a challenging task 
and needs to reconcile two concerns: validity and practicability. Assessing the extent of 
external influence on the policies and strategies of non-national lists requires detailed 
and inside information on local lists’ policies and strategies and the external actors 
involved. As this is only feasible for small-N case studies, a pragmatic approach is more 
appropriate to analyse the decisional autonomy of large groups of non-national lists. 
Hence, for the purpose of this study, the decisional autonomy of non-national lists is 
measured by assessing the presence / absence of explicit / implicit links to national / 
local parties. The presence of explicit links can be inferred from the name under which 
the non-national lists participate in municipal elections as it is a deliberate choice to 
face the voter locally with a national label (or a combination of national labels) or to 
use a place-bound name expressing a willingness to localize the list. Assessing implicit 
links requires some additional investigation. These implicit links can be of strategic 
(e.g. support in cartel or coalition negotiations or conflict resolution), financial 
(funding of campaign activities), or logistic (provision of material) nature and it can be 
assumed that local media are familiar with any potential hidden alliances with national 
or local political actors.  
On the horizontal dimension of non-national lists’ decisional autonomy, a distinction 
can be made between solitary lists which face the voter at own strength and cartel lists 
which combine two or more local political parties in a specific and time-bound 
electoral context. On the vertical dimension a distinction is made between national, 
pseudo-national, pseudo-local and local candidate lists. National candidate lists have 
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explicit links to national parties. Pseudo-national lists equally have explicit links to the 
national party level, but also explicitly refer to the local context in their name. Pseudo-
local lists have a local name without any reference to national parties, but maintain 
implicit links to the national party level, while local lists have no explicit, nor implicit 
links to national parties. Combining the vertical and horizontal component of non-
national lists’ decisional autonomy thus results in a practicable and contingent 
typology distinguishing four ideal-types of solitary lists and four ideal-types of cartel 
lists, varying in their level of autonomy regarding the national party level (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1: DA-typology for local candidate lists 
Decisional 
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party cartel 
localized 
cartel 
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Party lists are local candidate lists that are submitted by local party branches under a 
clear and unambiguous national party label without any additional nominal reference 
to the local context. Extended party lists are solitary lists which also explicitly refer to a 
national mother party, but this national party label is complemented with a nominal 
reference to the local context7.  Supported local lists are solitary lists with a local name 
(without any nominal reference to the national party level) but with implicit links to a 
national party8. Independent lists lastly have no links with a national party at all 9.  
In the category of cartel lists, a party cartel is a pre-electoral alliance between two or 
more local branches of national parties with explicit references to these national 
parties and without any nominal reference to the local level10. An extended party cartel 
similarly is a joint list of two or more clearly discernible local actors with explicit 
references to the national party level, but with an additional nominal reference to the 
                                                     
7
 Examples in 2012: ‘Groei met Open VLD’ (Hasselt); ‘SP.A Samen’ (Gooik); ‘N-VA Nieuw’ (Herk-De-Stad)… 
8
 Examples in 2012: ‘Lijst van de Burgemeester’ (Steenokkerzeel = linked to Open VLD); ‘Gemeentebelangen’ 
(Beerse, linked to VB)… 
9
 Examples in 2012 : ‘Het alternatief’ (Borsbeek) ; Gemeentebelangen (Herenthout); Voor U (Kortemberg)… 
10
 Examples in 2012: SP.A/Groen (Lier); Groen/SP.A (Dilbeek); CD&V/Open VLD (Hove)… 
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local context11. A localized cartel is a joint list of two or more clearly discernible local 
political groups without any explicit references to the national party level, yet 
containing one or more national party branches12. An independent cartel to conclude is 
a purely independent variant of a joint candidate list, in which the respective cartel 
partners have no links at all to any national party.  
 Although this typology has been developed in a Belgian context, it seems equally 
relevant to analyse non-national lists in other Western democracies. While not 
empirically established, several authors suggest that independent actors in other 
countries likewise are not all as independent or as local as their label suggests and 
instead maintain implicit or partial links to national parties (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008; 
Copus & Wingfield, 2013). Moreover, many other Western countries are equally 
familiar with various forms of pre-electoral coalitions in local politics (Golder, 2006). 
Consequently, the DA-typology can be considered a useful tool for national or 
comparative research on non-national lists in local politics. In the following section, 
this typology is applied to non-national lists in the local political context of Flanders. 
5.3 APPLYING THE DA-TYPOLOGY TO NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN FLANDERS 
Previous research has indicated that local lists continue to give a place-bound flavour 
to local party systems in Flanders and suggested that this can be partly attributed to 
the existence of local cartel lists and the presence of ‘hidden party lists’ (Steyvers & De 
Ceuninck, 2013; Steyvers et al., 2008)However, until present no empirical evidence was 
available to confirm these assumptions.  
To establish the prevalence of the different types of non-national lists in Flanders, the 
horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy of all candidate lists that have participated 
in (one of) the last two rounds of local elections (2006 and 2012) in the 308 
municipalities in Flanders were determined, allowing to allocated these lists in the DA-
typology. A two-tiered approach was adopted, firstly determining the presence of 
explicit links to national/local parties based on the list names as registered in the 
                                                     
11
 Examples in 2012 : VLD/Groen/M+ (Mechelen); ‘VLD -SP.A Positief’ (Westerlo); N-VA Lennik² (Lennik)…  
12
 Examples in 2012 : ‘Open Voor de Mens’ (an alliance between Open VLD, Dicht bij de Mens and independents in 
Bever); Lijst Burgemeester (an alliance between CD&V, SP.A, Groen and independents in Affligem)… 
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electronic election database of the Flemish Agency for Internal Affairs13. This nominal 
analysis allowed to filter out all national lists from the non-national lists with a 
(partial) local denomination.  
Secondly, for all remaining lists with a non-national name, the presence of implicit 
horizontal and vertical links to national or local parties was considered. As it can be 
assumed that local political journalists and local inhabitants are familiar with these 
concealed links, I have opted for a content analysis of the news coverage on the 
municipal elections. All media-reports on individual non-national candidate lists, 
published in the local editions of national newspapers during the 6 months preceding 
the elections (8 October 2006 and 14 October 2012)14 were analysed to identify implicit 
links. Additionally, the websites of the local lists and national parties proved a valuable 
source of information and in case of doubt the head of the lists concerned were 
contacted by telephone for further information.  
The presence of implicit links with a national party was assumed in the following 
situations, illustrated by an example: 
- The list is presented in media reports as an initiative of one or more local party 
branch(es):  
‘For the first time Open VLD in Putte does not participate in elections under its own label, 
but with the name “Lijst Burgemeester”: “We consciously opted for a new project, an open 
list on which even some independent candidates occur”’’
15
 
- The list is presented as containing one or more dominant group(s) of members 
from a national party:  
‘In Dilbeek former councillor Piet Ronsijn returns to local politics with the candidate list 
“Vernieuwing” on which both independent candidates and incumbent councillors of the 
Vlaams Belang occur.’
16
 
- The front runners of the list are presented as prominent supra-local 
officeholders from a national party:  
                                                     
13
 www.vlaanderenkiest.be 
14
 These media reports are publicly accessible through the media-database mediargus, now www.gopress.be 
15
 Van Eycken, E. Lijst Burgemeester voorgesteld; Het laatste nieuws, 9 juni 2012, p. 45 
16
 DHB; Piet Ronsijn komt met ‘Vernieuwing’; Het laatste nieuws, 23 april 2012, P;13 
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‘Jan Laurys - member of the Flemish Parliament for the CD&V- will be the new mayor of 
Diest. Laurys headed the candidate list DDS and obtained 9 seats.’
17
 [discussion of poll-
results prior to the elections] 
The presence of horizontal links was assumed if local journalists reported the 
involvement of clearly discernible and organized political actors in contrast to the 
mere involvement of some individual independent candidates.  
Table 5.1 offers an overview of the allocation rules applied to assign the local candidate 
lists in the DA typology. 
Table 5.1: Allocation rules to assign local candidate lists in the DA typology 
 Name 
representation in media reports and/or 
websites as 
party list National party name; no local reference 
Candidate list submitted by a national 
party branch 
party cartel 
Combination of two or more national 
party names; no local reference 
Electoral alliance between two or more 
national party branches 
Extended party list 
National party name, supplemented with 
local reference 
Candidate list submitted by a national 
party branch (extended with non-
organized independent candidates) 
extended party cartel 
Combination of national party name(s) 
and local reference. 
Electoral alliance between two or more 
identifiable partners of which at least one 
national party branch. 
supported local list 
Local name; no reference to national 
party level 
Candidate list closely linked to and 
supported by a national party or a 
national party branch 
localized cartel 
Local name; no reference to national 
party level 
Electoral alliance between two or more 
identifiable partners of which at least one 
national party branch. 
independent list 
Local name; no reference to national 
party level 
An autonomous and independent political 
group 
independent cartel 
Local name; no reference to national 
party level 
Electoral alliance between two or more 
independent partners 
The acquired data concerning the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists have 
been further linked to their electoral results18 allowing a cross-sectional analysis of the 
political relevance of the different types of non-national lists in Flanders at two specific 
points in time (municipal elections of 2006 and 2012). The following section discusses 
the results of this analysis. 
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 IVB; Vlaams parlementslid Jan Laurys wordt de nieuwe burgemeester, Het nieuwsblad, 8 oktober 2006.  
18
 The electoral results of all participating candidate lists are publicly available on the website of the Flemish Agency 
for Internal Affairs (www.vlaanderenkiest.be) 
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5.4 OCCURRENCE AND POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF NON-
NATIONAL CANDIDATE LISTS IN FLANDERS 
The political relevance of the different types of local candidate lists will be discussed 
based on the lifespan approach to political parties as developed by Pedersen (1982) and 
adapted by Deschouwer (2008). Pedersen depicts the evolution of political parties by 
means of four crucial thresholds. The explicit declaration or the intention to 
participate in elections is considered as the first crucial threshold in a party’s lifespan. 
Subsequently, all legal requirements have to be met and official authorization is 
needed to effectively participate in elections. To surpass the ensuing representation 
threshold, a party needs to attract sufficient votes to have representatives elected in 
legislative bodies. And lastly, all parties are assumed to aim for the relevance threshold 
which distinguishes influential from non-influential parties (Pedersen, 1982, p. 8). 
These thresholds can be crossed in both directions and determine the consecutive 
lifecycle stages and the relevance of political parties.  
The relevance threshold in this lifespan approach is the most difficult to interpret and 
can be narrowly defined by participation in government, but also more broadly as the 
power of opposition parties to intimidate coalition parties and influence the direction 
of party competition (Sartori, 2005). Hence, Deschouwer builds on Pedersen’s model 
and distinguishes between blackmail potential and governing potential in the 
relevance threshold and introducing governing as a fifth threshold, which is considered 
a crucial transitional phase with significant consequences for the party (Deschouwer, 
2008). This lifespan approach to political parties is illustrated in figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Adapted lifespan approach to political parties (Deschouwer, 2008) 
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To scrutinize the political relevance of the different types of local candidate lists, I will 
consider their position in four crucial momentums in the local process of power 
achievement which correspond to the authorization, representation and governing 
threshold of this lifespan approach. The local power achievement process starts from 
the pre-electoral configuration, containing all lists that have crossed the declaration 
and authorization threshold and compete for the grace of the voters. All enfranchised 
citizens can choose from this party political offer and allocate their vote to the list or 
candidates of their preference. The obtained vote-shares are then transformed into 
council seats, determining who is able to cross the representation threshold. Based on 
these obtained seats - and considering the governing potential of the represented lists 
– a governing majority is formed, allowing one or more participating lists to cross the 
governing threshold. The following sections successively deal with the political 
relevance of the different types of local candidate lists in the pre-electoral 
configuration, vote allocation, seat distribution and majority formation. 
5.4.1 Pre-electoral configuration 
In 2006, 1458 candidate lists crossed the authorization threshold and participated in 
the municipal elections. This figure amounted to 1654 in the 2012 municipal elections. 
All these candidate lists have been allocated into the DA-typology, offering a clear 
conspectus of the incidence of the different types of local candidate lists in the pre-
electoral configuration of both municipal elections in Flanders. Table 5.2 summarizes 
the results of this allocation exercise. 
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Table 5.2 Occurrence of different types of local candidate lists in Flanders 
 2006 2012 
 n % n % 
party lists 745 51,1 
72,4 
1104 66,7 
72,6 party cartels 286 19,6 63 3,8 
small national parties 25 1,7 33 2,0 
Extended party lists 35 2,4 
5,5 
52 3,1 
6,0 
Extended party cartels  45 3,1 47 2,8 
Supported lists 28 1,9 
7,6 
79 4,8 
8,8 
Localized cartels 83 5,7 67 4,1 
Independent lists 206 14,1 
14,5 
208 12,6 
12,6 
Independent cartels 5 0,3 1 0,1 
total 1458 100 1654 100 
These figures demonstrate that national lists dominate the local political arena in 
Flanders with over 72% of all participating candidate lists having explicit and 
unambiguous links to the national party level. A small minority of these national party 
lists concerns small national parties, which are organized at national level, but with 
limited local representation and no national list number19. The relative share of 
national lists remains quasi constant between the two electoral periods, although the 
share of party cartels in this category has decreased substantially. The latter can be 
attributed to the cessation of some national cartel agreements. In the years before the 
municipal elections of 2006, several national parties agreed to form a cartel at national 
level20 and following this national example, many of the local branches of these parties 
also formed local variants of these national alliances. Especially party cartels between 
CD&V and N-VA branches and between SP.A and SPIRIT were widespread in 2006. In 
2012 most national cartels had been abrogated and consequently, many of the local 
alliances were equally terminated which clarifies the drop in party cartels and the rise 
of party lists between 2006 and 2012. 
In addition to these local reflections of national alliances, a considerable portion of the 
party cartel lists concerns progressive alliances between local branches of the socialist 
and the green party. At national level cartel deliberations between these two Flemish 
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 Small national parties are VLOTT, PVDA+, ROOD, LSP, BEB-N, VCD. 
20
 SP.A/SPIRIT, VLD/VIVANT, CD&V/N-VA en VB/VLOTT 
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parties have never materialised, but their local branches were given the freedom to 
deal autonomously or jointly with the local reality. Furthermore, various less obvious 
combinations of national party branches occur within the group of party cartels21. The 
adopted list number of local cartel lists offers an indication of the dominant cartel 
partner in the alliance. Table 5.3 summarizes for each national list number22 (in 
random order) the ratio between party lists and party cartels both in absolute terms as 
in terms of their penetration grade (share of municipalities where the national list 
numbers represent a party list or a party cartel).  
Table 5.3: Spread and penetration of national party lists and national party cartels per national list number 
 2006 2012 
party lists party cartels party lists party cartels 
SP.A 
N  100 96 139 43 
penetration 32,5% 31,2% 45,1% 14,0% 
Open VLD 
N  163 38 181 0 
penetration 52,9% 12,3% 58,8% 0,0% 
N-VA 
N  33 0 259 1 
penetration 10,7% 0,0% 84,1% 0,3% 
Groen 
N  106 11 96 7 
penetration 34,4% 3,6% 31,2% 2,3% 
Vlaams Belang  
N  214 9 181 1 
penetration 69,5% 2,9% 58,8% 0,6% 
CD&V 
N  129 128 241 10 
penetration 41,9% 41,6% 78,2% 3,2% 
Lijst Dedecker 
N  0 0 7 0 
penetration 0% 0,0% 2,3% 0,0% 
Total 
N  745 281 1104 62 
penetration 91,6 60,1 95,1 19,8 
These figures clearly illustrate the effect of the come and go of national alliances, with 
a sharp decline in party cartels for the CD&V and the Open VLD. Also for SP.A, the 
number of cartel lists has decreased substantially, though less drastically 
notwithstanding the abrogation of the national cartel with SPIRIT.  These figures 
suggest that a further sub-distinction can be made in the group of party cartels 
between national party cartels and local party cartels. The former concern the 
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 Some examples from 2012: CD&V/Open VLD in Hove, CD&V/Groen in Ronse, SP.A/CD&V in Antwerpen. 
22
 Prior to municipal elections, each submitted candidate list receives a list number. The numbers one to seven were 
reserved for nationally represented parties, the succeeding list numbers are allocated to local lists (and small 
national parties) 
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nationally agreed upon pre-electoral alliances between local branches of national 
parties, while local party cartels are not nationally acknowledged and reflect a local 
agreement between national party branches. 
National party lists and national party cartels have been extensively studied by other 
authors (Kris Deschouwer, Tom Verthé, & Benoît Rihoux, 2013; Verthé & Deschouwer, 
2011) and the main subject of this dissertation are those lists participating in elections 
under a non-national name23. Both in the municipal elections of 2006 and 2012, it 
concerned a large quarter of all participating lists. Table 5.4 focusses on these non-
national lists and offers a clearer image of how the different sub-types of non-national 
lists are distributed.  
Table 5.4: share of different types of non-national lists 
 
2006 2012 
n % n % 
pseudo-
national lists 
Extended party  lists 35 8,7 
19,9 
52 11,5 
21,8 
Extended party cartels 45 11,2 47 10,4 
pseudo-        
local lists 
Supported lists 28 7,0 
27,6 
79 17,4 
32,2 
Localized cartels 83 20,6 67 14,8 
local lists 
Independent lists 206 51,2 
52,5 
208 45,8 
46,0 
Independent cartels 5 1,2 1 0,2 
 total 402 100 454 100 
Approximately half of all non-national candidate lists in Flanders actually concern 
independent lists without any links to national parties. This share slightly decreased 
from 52,5% in 2006 to 46,0% in 2012. In both elections these independent candidate 
lists almost exclusively concerned solitary lists as independent cartel lists are extremely 
rare. Therefore, in the further analysis, independent cartel lists will be merged with the 
solitary independent lists.  
The category of pseudo-local lists contains supported lists and localized cartels. Both 
types have a local name but maintain implicit links to the national party level. This 
pseudo-local category comprises about a third of all non-national lists (27,6% in 2006 
and 32,2% in 2012). In 2006, localized cartels formed a large majority in this group, 
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 Where possible however, local party cartels will also be included in the analysis as they also represent a locally 
oriented logic.   
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while the proportion of cartel lists substantially decreased in 2012 as the amount of 
supported lists increased to a more balanced distribution between supported lists and 
localized cartels.  
The pseudo-national lists contain extended party lists and extended party cartels. Both 
explicitly refer to one or more national parties, while their name equally contains a 
local component. In 2006, 19,9% of all non-national lists belonged to this pseudo-
national category, slightly augmenting to 21,8% in 2012 with a balanced distribution 
between solitary and cartel lists.  
In addition to the absolute numbers of lists in each category, the political relevance of 
the different list types in the pre-electoral stage can be indicated by their penetration 
grade (the share of municipalities in which this type of list is present) as well as by the 
average number of the list types per municipality as summarized in table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: Penetration grade and average number of different types of local candidate lists 
  
  
2006 2012 
% x̅ % x̅ 
National 
party lists 91,6 2,4 95,1 3,6 
party cartels 60,1 0,9 19,8 0,2 
Pseudo-
national 
Extended party lists 11,0 0,1 15,3 0,2 
Extended party cartels  13,6 0,2 14,0 0,2 
Pseudo-
local 
Supported lists 8,4 0,1 23,1 0,3 
Localized cartels 23,4 0,3 19,8 0,2 
Local Independent lists 50,6 0,7 51,0 0,7 
These figures corroborate the previous findings and demonstrate that party lists have a 
penetration grade of over 90%, with an average of 2,4 such lists in 2006, rising to 3,6 in 
2012 attributable to the abrogation of national party cartels. In 2006 over 60 percent of 
the local party systems in Flanders contained at least one party cartel, with an average 
of nearly one, while in 2012 party cartels occurred in one out of five municipalities, 
with an average of only 0,2. Of all non-national lists, independent lists have the highest 
penetration grade, occurring in more than half of the 308 Flemish municipalities, with 
an average of 0,7 such list per municipality in both elections. The penetration grade of 
the other types of non-national lists is substantially lower.  
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5.4.2 Representation 
To cross the representation threshold and have representatives elected in council, the 
local candidate lists need to appeal to a sufficient share of the electorate. Table 5.6 
indicates the average vote share of each type of local candidate list.  
Table 5.6: Average vote share of the different types of local candidate lists 
 
2006 2012 
x̅ σ x̅ σ 
Party lists 19,7 14,09 18,5 12,06 
Party cartels 25,4 12,78 21,5 13,54 
small national parties 2,1 4,86 2,8 3,92 
Extended party lists 23,8 11,41 20,9 12,01 
Extended party cartels 24,5 13,29 23,6 14,00 
Supported lists 34,3 21,36 22,5 17,13 
Localized cartels 28,4 15,72 28,5 17,44 
Independent lists 16,8 16,73 14,3 16,71 
Total 21,1 15,00 18,6 13,73 
Eta² 0,090*** 0,070*** 
   ***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05 
These vote shares differ significantly between the different ideal-types. Small national 
parties obtain significantly lower vote shares than all other list types with an average 
below 3%. Independent local lists also score significantly lower than most other 
pseudo-national and pseudo-local lists as indicated by a Bonferroni test. They obtain 
an average vote share of around 16,8% in 2006 and 14,3% in 2012, while the different 
pseudo-local and pseudo-national lists obtain between 20 and 25% of the votes with a 
peak of 34,3% for supported lists in 2006. National party lists also obtain significantly 
lower vote shares than these pseudo-local and pseudo-national lists with an average 
below 20% in both elections.  
After the elections, the acquired votes are transformed into council seats based on the 
quasi-proportional Imperiali quota which slightly increases the factual threshold and 
favours larger parties. Consequently, differences in vote shares between the different 
types of local candidate lists are reflected in their relative number of seats. Small 
national parties obtain a futile average amount of council seats (0,3). Party lists and 
independent candidate lists also obtain significantly less council seats than the other 
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types of pseudo-national and pseudo-local candidate lists in both elections. The party 
lists stay below an average of five seats and independent lists fluctuate around three 
seats, while the average number of council seats for the other list types hover between 
about five and seven seats (table 5.7).  
Table 5.7: Average number of council seats 
  
2006 2012 
x̅ σ x̅ σ 
Party lists 4,6 4,04 4,6 3,93 
Party cartels 7,2 4,54 5,9 5,17 
small national parties 0,3 1,21 0,4 1,32 
Extended party lists 5,9 3,18 5,2 3,76 
Extended party cartels  6,0 4,11 6,1 4,42 
Localized cartels 6,6 3,90 6,9 4,91 
Supported lists 6,3 4,23 4,7 3,80 
Independent lists 3,2 3,71 2,7 3,66 
Total 5,1 4,31 4,5 4,09 
Eta² 0,116*** 0,068*** 
   ***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05 
Moreover, small national parties and independent lists significantly less often succeed 
to surpass the representation threshold (table 5.8). Small national parties only rarely 
have candidates elected (less than 10%). In 2006 about one out of three independent 
lists did not succeed to cross the representation threshold, amounting to about two 
out of five in 2012. This share of non-represented lists is significantly lower for other 
types of candidate lists (Cramer’s V=0,453 - 0,408). Moreover, table 5.8 indicates that 
for the other pseudo-local and pseudo-national lists, the share of non-represented lists 
has increased substantially between 2006 and 2012, which could be attributed to an 
increased fractionalization of the local party systems.  
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Table 5.8: Share of the different types of local candidate lists without representatives in council 
  2006 2012 
Party lists 10,1% 11,8% 
Party cartels 1,0% 3,2% 
small national parties 92,0% 90,9% 
Extended party lists 2,9% 11,5% 
Extended party cartels 4,4% 6,4% 
Supported lists 3,6% 13,9% 
Localized cartels 1,2% 3,0% 
Independent lists 34,6% 42,6% 
Total 12,3% 16,5% 
Cramer's V 0,453*** 0,408*** 
      ***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05 
5.4.3 Majority formation  
In the last power achievement momentum in municipal elections, a governing majority 
is formed based on the acquired council seats and a candidate-mayor is nominated. If 
one party or list was able to obtain a majority of the council seats, a single majority can 
be formed. If not, a coalition with two or more parties is required. To assess the 
political relevance of the different types of local candidate lists in this last phase, 
information is needed concerning their council position (whether or not part of the 
local government and mayor delivery). Yet, this information is not readily available in 
the electoral database of the Agency of Internal affairs and collecting this information 
is a time-consuming mission. As the focus of this research is on non-national candidate 
lists, the following part of the analysis concentrates on the different types of non-
national lists excluding national lists.  
Data concerning the position in council of the non-national lists after the municipal 
elections of 2006 was derived from a broader dataset developed by Ellen Olislagers for 
her PhD-research on local coalition formation in Flanders (Olislagers, E., 2013). The 
council position of non-national lists after the 2012 elections was collected from the 
official websites of the municipalities.  
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While the political relevance of independent lists significantly differed from the other 
types of non-national lists in the pre-electoral configuration (independent lists are 
more prevalent) and in the phases of vote-allocation and seat distribution (lower vote 
share and less representatives in council), the differences in governing relevance show 
a more complicated picture. It was established above that significantly more 
independent lists do not succeed to cross the representation threshold and 
consequently these lists are also significantly less involved in majority formation as 
illustrated in Table 5.9. In general, about one out of three of the non-national lists 
participate in local government (31,7% in 2006 and 32,7% in 2012). Independent 
candidate lists however are significantly less involved in local government with a share 
of about one out of four (26,1% in 2006 and 23,6% in 2012 ), while for the other list 
types this share hovers around 40%. A similar picture arises for the relative shares of 
lists that deliver the mayor in local government, although with less significant 
differences (as the number of observations is smaller).   
Table 5.9: Share of non-national lists in local government 
 
2006 2012 
government 
participation 
mayor 
government 
participation 
mayor 
Extended party lists 37,1% 20,0% 40,4% 23,1% 
Extended party cartels  42,2% 24,4% 41,3% 26,1% 
Supported lists 42,9% 35,7% 40,0% 25,0% 
Localized cartels 34,9% 20,5% 40,3% 32,8% 
Independent lists 26,1% 16,1% 23,6% 13,5% 
Total 31,8% 19,7% 32,7% 20,8% 
Cramer's V 0,284*** 0,131 0,296*** 0,179* 
 ***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05 
Remarkably however, these differences in governing relevance between independent 
candidate lists and the other non-national list types disappear if we restrict the analysis 
to those lists which have crossed the representation threshold (N = 327 in 2006, N= 341 
in 2012).  
The share of represented independent lists that are included in local government 
increases to a comparable figure as for the other list types (39,3% in 2006 and 41,9% in 
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2012). This is also the case for the share of represented independent lists that deliver 
the mayor (24,3% in 2006 and 27,6% in 2012) as summarized in table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: Share of represented non-national lists in local government 
 
2006 2012 
government 
participation 
mayor 
government 
participation 
mayor 
Extended party lists 38,2% 20,6% 46,7% 26,7% 
Extended party cartels  44,2% 25,6% 42,2% 26,7% 
Supported lists 44,4% 37,0% 46,4% 29,0% 
Localized cartels 35,4% 20,7% 41,5% 33,8% 
Independent lists 39,9% 24,6% 41,9% 23,9% 
Total 39,5% 24,4% 43,4% 27,6% 
Cramer's V 0,063 0,100 0,044 0,08 
These findings suggest a dichotomy within the group of independent local lists. The 
average vote share of independent local lists is significantly lower than for the other 
subtypes and they are less likely to cross the representation threshold. However, once 
having crossed the representation threshold, the governing relevance of independent 
lists is quite similar to other non-national lists in terms of their chances to participate 
in the governing majority and in their ability to obtain the mayoralty. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The default dichotomy between local and national candidate lists in local elections 
prevents a comprehensive understanding of the internal variation of local candidate 
lists and of local politics more generally. In this chapter a practicable classification 
model was proposed based on the horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy of local 
candidate lists to conceptualize local lists beyond this traditional binary distinction 
and better understand their actual independence.  
Applying this typology to the local political offer in Flanders revealed significant 
differences in the political relevance of the different list types, varying with the 
successive power achievement momentums related to local elections. In the pre-
electoral constellation, national lists constitute a large majority of all local candidate 
lists in Flanders. Yet, a substantial amount of over 25% of the local candidate lists 
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concerns non-national candidate lists, which participate in municipal elections under a 
label that deviates from the national party label. Yet, these non-national lists can 
certainly not all be considered as independent occurrences as commonly assumed. 
Only about half of these non-national lists have no links to national parties and can 
thus be defined as independent. The other half concerns pseudo-national or pseudo-
local lists as they do maintain explicit or implicit links to national or other local 
parties, though distance themselves from national parties by assuming a local or a 
localized name.  
The electoral results of the independent local candidate lists - and consequently the 
political relevance of these lists in council - proved significantly lower than for other 
(national and non-national) list types (disregarding small national parties). 
Independent lists more often fail to obtain sufficient votes to surpass the electoral 
threshold and play along in the municipal council. It can therefore be concluded that 
independent lists have less electoral guarantees when entering the electoral arena. As 
the Belgian local electoral system is very permissive with hardly any financial or 
logistic thresholds to submit a candidate list, they easily enter the local electoral 
competition – even with low or uncertain electoral prospects - but they have more 
difficulties to establish themselves in the local legislative arena.  
Pseudo-local and pseudo-national lists (including party cartels) on the other hand 
obtain significantly higher average vote shares than the traditional local party lists and 
have more representatives in council. Once past the representation threshold however, 
differences in political relevance between the different types of non-national lists 
evaporate. Although independent lists less often succeed to cross this threshold, still a 
considerable part does compete with traditional local parties at the top levels of local 
politics and play a highly relevant executive role in the final stage of local power 
achievement. We can therefore conclude that the gap between political relevance and 
political irrelevance is harder to bridge for independent local lists than for the other 
local candidate lists.  
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6 DECISIONAL AUTONOMY IN MOTION: PARTY CHANGE IN 
LOCAL CANDIDATE LISTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, a practicable classification model has been proposed to 
differentiate local candidate lists based on their decisional autonomy. Eight ideal-types 
of local candidate lists have been identified, varying in their vertical (influence from 
national party centres) and horizontal (influence from other local actors) autonomy. 
Applying this classification model to the local offer in Flemish municipal elections 
revealed interesting cross-sectional insights on the distribution and the political 
relevance of the different types of local candidate lists in Flanders. This chapter 
approaches the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists from a longitudinal 
perspective and focuses on changes in the horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy.  
Decisional autonomy has been operationalized as the occurrence / absence of implicit 
/ explicit links to national / local political actors. The presence or absence of these 
links can be considered as the result of strategic decisions concerning alliances with 
local or national political actors and the name adopted to present the list to the 
electorate. These links can change from one election to another (or in between): 
existing links can be cut through, new links can be forged and explicit links can be 
made implicit or vice versa. More specifically, engaging in a local cartel list results in a 
decrease of the horizontal autonomy, while the abrogation of a cartel re-increases the 
decisional autonomy of cartel partners. Changes in the composition of local cartel lists 
(involving additional partners or eliminating old ones) can also alter the horizontal 
autonomy of the cartel partners involved. The vertical autonomy of local candidate 
lists increases by fully or partially dissociating from the national party level 
(localization), while it decreases by joining a national party (affiliation) or making 
implicit links explicit (nationalization).  
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Local candidate lists can thus move from one ideal-type in the DA-typology to another 
as their horizontal or vertical autonomy increases or decreases. Newly established 
candidate lists enter the DA-typology by deciding on potential alliances and on the 
label to face the electorate, while candidate lists can also disappear from the pre-
electoral configuration and exit the typology.  
This chapter analyses the motives and causal mechanisms behind these strategic 
changes in decisional autonomy and aims to comprehend the rationale of the different 
ideal-types of local candidate lists. In the following sections, I will firstly review some 
relevant theoretical insights on party change and elaborate a conceptual framework to 
analyse changes in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. Next, the adopted 
multiple case design is justified before discussing the changes in decisional autonomy 
of the selected cases and how these changes can be clarified based on the detailed 
accounts provided by the in-depth interviews.  
6.2 ANALYSING PARTY CHANGE 
To structure the qualitative analysis of changes in the decisional autonomy of local 
candidate lists, I will rely on some theoretical insights provided by party literature on 
party change and strategic party behaviour. Party change is a popular research field in 
political science although the precise nature of change is often left hanging in midair. 
Political parties are versatile organizations engaging in a variety of activities and party 
change therefore can relate to an equally diverse set of party characteristics. Harmel & 
Janda describe party change as: ‘any variation, alternation or modification in how 
parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what 
they stand for and what they do’ (Harmel & Janda, 1994). As this definition is not very 
practicable, they further suggest to focus empirical research on those changes that 
result from deliberate actions within the party.  
Empirical research on party change generally focusses on the causal factors of change, 
often avoiding the issue of definition. Three academic approaches to party change can 
be distinguished (Harmel, 2002). The lifecycle approach considers party change as the 
result of a natural process of development. Parties are assumed to follow an analogous 
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course of life in which each life cycle phase is characterized by specific organizational 
appearances. The previously mentioned lifespan model of Pedersen is illustrative for 
this approach (Pedersen, 1982), as is Michels’ famous iron law of oligarchy which 
claims that all political parties eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchic elite-
controlled organizations (Michels, 1962). A second, system-level approach considers 
the organizational development of political parties mainly within a societal context. 
Party change is seen as a cumulative process in which parties conjointly adapt to 
changing societal circumstances. The evolution from elite- and mass parties to catch-
all and cartel parties and the party-decline thesis result from this popular school of 
thought (Duverger, 1964; Katz & Mair, 1994; Kircheimer, 1966). The discrete change 
approach to conclude, considers party change less as a clustered ensemble of changes 
but rather looks at concrete adaptations within individual parties. It favours a hybrid 
explanation, considering party change as the effect of a combination of external and 
internal factors: ‘Both the environment and internal party politics produce important 
stimuli, which result in discrete organizational change only when relevant party actors 
allow them to do so’ (Harmel, 2002).   
This latter tradition offers a valuable approach to study changes in the decisional 
autonomy of local candidate lists as these can equally be considered as intentional 
changes resulting from a combination of external environmental factors and internal 
circumstances. In the discrete change approach, the internal factors for party change 
mainly relate to changes in power relations within parties and the role of party 
leadership, factions and dominant coalitions (Belloni & Beller, 1978; Panebianco, 1988; 
Verstraete, 2003; Wilson, 1980). Wilson (1980) considers party leadership as the motor 
of party change. Party leaders analyse the environmental stimuli and decide on the 
appropriate organizational changes to better pursue the goals of the party. The internal 
factors thus interact with external stimuli which can be further subdivided in party-
related external factors (electoral defeat, government participation) and non-party-
related external factors (socio-economic changes, electoral law, party system changes) 
(Verstraete, 2003). Harmel and Janda (1994) consider external stimuli with direct 
relevance to the parties’ primary goal as external ‘chocks’ which result in the most 
dramatic and broadest changes. Initially, these external chocks were mainly associated 
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with electoral performance assuming that electoral defeat could explain all party 
change (Janda, 1990). In their later works Harmel and Janda acknowledged that these 
external chocks could also relate to other goal priorities (Harmel & Janda, 1994).  
This prominent role of party goals is also manifest in the rational choice school aiming 
to clarify competitive party behaviour. Since the pioneering work of Downs (1957), the 
rational choice perspective has entered political science assuming that party behaviour 
results from a rational cost-benefit assessment. This school has long distinguished 
between vote-, office- and policy-seeking parties depending on their main goal. Vote-
seeking parties mainly aim to maximize electoral support; office-seeking parties aspire 
to maximize control over the private benefits of government participation; and policy-
seeking parties seek to maximize their impact on policy decisions (Muller & Strom, 
1999; Strom, 1990; Wollinetz, 2002). More recently, this rational choice approach has 
been criticized for its highly simplifying assumptions and its limited correspondence 
with political reality. It disregards the organizational complexity of political parties and 
the adopted static models of party behaviour ignore internal conflicts and institutional 
and contextual factors influencing party goals (Bartolini, 2002; Green & Shapiro, 1994; 
Strom, 1990). In reaction to these perceived flaws, neo-institutionalists have developed 
a ‘soft’ rational choice approach, adopting more plausible representations of the 
rationality of political actors and integrating contextual factors to analyse party 
behaviour (Aldrich, 1995; Montero & Gunther, 2002; Muller & Strom, 1999; Strom, 
1990). Strom’s (1990) unified model of competitive parties is especially illustrative in 
this adjusted rational choice tradition. She asserts that political parties pursue different 
goals simultaneously and considers the interrelations and trade-offs between vote-
seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking objectives. Moreover, she argues that these 
strategic goals can have instrumental or intrinsic purposes and that party leaders’ 
behaviour is equally affected by organizational constraints, political institutions and 
situational determinants (Muller & Strom, 1999).  
Golder (2009) adopted a similar soft rational choice approach to analyse the causes of 
cartel formation (at national level) and provides interesting clues for this research on 
changes in the horizontal decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. In her 
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pioneering work on the topic, Golder argues that pre-electoral coalitions24 are the 
result of a cost/benefit assessment relating to political parties’ office-seeking and 
policy-seeking aspirations. Ideological proximity, expected size of the coalition (large 
but not too large) and relative size of the partners (similar in size) are found to have an 
important predictive value for national pre-electoral coalitions. Moreover, Golder 
established that pre-electoral coalition formation is more likely if the party system is 
ideologically polarized and if the electoral rules are disproportional (Golder, 2006). In 
a Belgian context, Verthé and Deschouwer (2011) similarly established that the 
principal motive for (local) parties to engage in a cartel list and renounce their 
autonomous character is their aim to participate in government. Additionally, small 
parties are found to form joint lists in order to cross the electoral (and representation) 
threshold and secure their survival. The (nearly-proportional) Imperiali system and the 
fractionalization of the party system are indicated as important incentives for cartel 
formation in Belgium (Verthé & Deschouwer, 2011).  
 An additional research strand in this strategic choice approach which is relevant to 
this analysis of local candidate lists concerns the emergence of new parties in 
established party systems (Cox, 1997; Hug, 2001; Tavits, 2006). The theory of strategic 
entry considers party emergence as the result of strategic decisions by party elites who 
aim to maximize their vote share, for the sake of influencing policy or for the spoils of 
office, or for both. These strategic decisions are influenced by the costs of entry, the 
benefits of office and the probability of receiving electoral support. The costs of entry 
are determined by political institutions, including the monetary costs to register a 
party and the electoral rules for seat distribution. The benefits of office relate to the 
monetary rewards and prestige associated with office functions, but also to the 
capability of office-holders to shape the policy which has been associated with the level 
of corporatism. Moreover, the probability of receiving electoral support (electability) 
depends on party system characteristics. The more crystalized an existing party 
system, the smaller the probability of electoral support for new parties (Tavits, 2006).  
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 Golder’s concept of pre-electoral coalitions encloses a broader phenomenon of various pre-electoral cooperation 
strategies between political actors than only cartel lists (public promise to govern together, joint campaign, joint 
candidate list). 
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Combining these overlapping theoretical models of discrete party change and strategic 
party behaviour offers an analytical model to analyse changes in the decisional 
autonomy of local candidate lists as illustrated in Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1: Analytical model to study changes in decisional autonomy of local candidate lists 
  
It can be assumed that changes in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists are 
equally  influenced by a combination of internal and external factors and the following 
qualitative analysis will assess the role of goal priorities, internal powers structures, 
political institutions, local and national party system changes and system-level party 
changes. We can expect local candidate lists to also care for votes, policy and office in 
varying ratios and that these goal priorities are a driving force for the strategic 
decisions concerning alliances with local or national political actors and the adopted 
list name. Moreover, we assume that organizational features regarding internal power 
structures and the role of party leaders are relevant. As for national political parties, 
external factors concerning political institutions and situational determinants could 
also influence the political opportunity structure of local candidate lists. Local 
elections are often thought of as second-order elections as the strategic decisions of 
local parties (and voters) are often influenced by the national political context (Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980; Steyvers & Kjaer, 2014). Hence, both local and national party system 
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characteristics could influencing the political opportunity structure for local candidate 
lists. Moreover, we have theoretically associated the occurrence of non-national lists 
with system-level changes faced by contemporary parties and thus presume that the 
decisional autonomy of local candidate lists are also influenced by these national party 
evolutions, characterized by inter-party collusion, the interpenetration of parties and 
the state, and the dealignment of the public from party politics.  
Based on in-depth elite interviews with list headers of non-national lists, I will assess 
the role of these different internal and external factors and reveal the rationale of the 
different types of non-national lists and the causal mechanisms at play. 
6.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
A qualitative multiple case study is considered the most appropriate method to 
examine the strategic choices of local candidate lists and the causal mechanisms 
behind changes in decisional autonomy. Case study research is a popular method in 
political science. Case studies allow an in-depth focus on a single or a small number of 
‘cases’ and generate context-dependent knowledge on a wide range of topics. Gerring 
defines a case study as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ (Gerring, 2004). Case studies are 
especially valuable to study complex social phenomena and are considered most 
appropriate to answer ‘how?’ or ‘why?’ questions about a contemporary set of events on 
which the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 1994). A distinction is often made 
between single and multiple case designs. A single case study provides detailed and in-
depth understanding of one case - which is especially advisable for critical, extreme or 
unique cases – while multiple case designs not only allow for within-case analyses, but 
also across-case analyses which can add confidence to the findings.  
Although case studies play an important role across different fields in social science, 
they have often been criticized for they would lack scientific rigor and do not allow for 
‘generalization’. Flyvbjerg (2011) argues that these reproaches are based on 
misunderstandings about case study research relating to theory, reliability and validity, 
as depicted in figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2: Five misunderstandings about case study research (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 521) 
 
Flyvbjerg (2011) discusses and corrects each of these misunderstandings and 
demonstrates the added value of concrete case knowledge. He points to the 
generalizability by ‘force of example’ or by transferability as opposed to statistical 
generalizability. The latter involves inferences on data extracted from a representative 
statistical sample to the population from which the sample was drawn, while 
qualitative researches are rather interested in analytical generalization to contribute to 
theory building.  
Case study research seems especially appropriate to analyse processes of change as 
argued by Fisher: ‘the key to how (policy) change comes about has to be grounded in 
detailed contextual examination of the circumstances at play in specific cases. For this 
purpose quantitative methods have to take a back seat to qualitative research’ (Paredis, 
2013). Therefore, a multiple case study design is most appropriate to analyse changes in 
the decisional autonomy of non-national candidate lists. By contrasting and comparing 
multiple cases, a detailed and contextual examination of the different internal and 
external factors influencing the changes in the decisional autonomy of non-national 
lists is possible.  
Methodological guidelines for case-selection recommend a sample size close to data-
saturation or the point where additional data no longer generates additional 
theoretical insights (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). In this perspective, our sample 
contains 22 non-national lists, based on a theory-driven purposive sampling method 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). As our main aim is to clarify the rationales behind the 
different types of non-national lists, horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy 
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served as theoretical selection criteria. The selected cases are spread across the 
different ideal-types as defined in the DA-typology.  
The data collection on these cases is based on elite interviews. For each selected case 
the most suited political leader was identified to provide us with insightful information 
concerning the competitive behaviour of the list. This person was invited for a face-to-
face, semi-structured interview. It should be mentioned that this actor-centred 
approach entails a risk of reductionist fallacy as the leaders of these list provide their 
personal interpretation of the functional behaviour of their list. Yet, it can be assumed 
that the leading candidates have a clear and comprehensive understanding of the 
rationales and strategic choices of the lists.  
Considering the cyclical nature of qualitative research, two independent series of data 
collection occurred, enabling to redirect data collection based on preliminary findings. 
A first wave of interviews took place by the end of 2010 with a focus on the 2006 
municipal elections. The second phase of data collection took place by the end of 2012 
focusing more on the 2012 local elections.  
These in-depth elite-interviews provided ‘thick descriptions’ concerning the origins, 
evolutions and rationales of the selected cases and allowed a longitudinal analysis with 
a focus on changes in their decisional autonomy. All interviews were transcribed and 
the software program NVivo proved a helpful tool to reduce, organize and analyse this 
enormous amount of qualitative data. The analysis of the data was structured by the 
analytical model presented above.  
6.4 CHANGES IN DECISIONAL AUTONOMY 
The elite-interviews with list headers of a selection of non-national lists in Flanders 
allowed to map the movements of the selected cases in the DA-typology. This 
descriptive analysis confirms that the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists is a 
mutable feature. Table 6.1 summarizes how the cases have moved in the DA-typology 
across the three latest elections. The established changes are subdivided into three 
categories: 1) changes in horizontal autonomy distinguishing between cartel formation, 
cartel abrogation and changes in the cartel composition; 2) changes in vertical 
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autonomy with a distinction between affiliation with a national party, nationalization 
(making implicit links more explicit) and localization (making explicit links more 
implicit); and 3) changes in the mere presence in the party system (entry or exit).  
Four analysed cases have entered the local party system during the period examined, 
while three cases disappeared from the local political arena. The latter three all 
concern independent candidate list.  On the vertical level, three of the 22 cases were 
founded as independent lists and decided to affiliate with a national party25. Three 
others made the already existing implicit links to the national party level more explicit, 
reinforcing the links with the national party level and resulting in a decreased 
decisional autonomy. In the opposite direction on this vertical dimension, six cases 
decided to distance themselves from the national party level and increase their vertical 
decisional autonomy by adopting a local(ized) name. On the horizontal level, ten cases 
in the sample decided to engage in a cartel list, thus decreasing their horizontal 
autonomy. Only one cartel was closed down, while in several other cases the 
composition of the cartel changed between the different electoral periods, including 
new partners or shedding old ones.   
                                                     
25
 One case affiliated with the national green party, while the other two affiliated with the Flemish-nationalist party 
N-VA 
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Table 6.1: Established changes in the decisional autonomy of the analysed cases 
 type of candidate list change in decisional autonomy 
 2000 2006 2012 presence horizontal vertical 
case 1 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
national party 
list  
/ / affiliation  
case 2 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
entry / / 
case 3 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
/ / / 
case 4 localized cartel localized cartel 
national party 
list 
/ 
cartel 
formation, 
cartel 
abrogation  
affiliation  
case 5 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
/ exit / / 
case 6 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
extended party 
cartel 
/ cartel formation affiliation  
case 7 
national party 
cartel 
extended party 
cartel 
extended party 
cartel 
/ 
cartel 
formation, 
cartel change 
localization 
case 8 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
/ exit / / 
case 9 / 
independent 
local list 
/ entry and exit / / 
case 10 
extended 
national list 
extended 
national list 
supported local 
list 
/ / localization 
case 11 
national party 
list 
national party 
list 
national party 
cartel 
/ cartel formation / 
case 12 localized cartel localized cartel  localized cartel / 
cartel 
formation, 
cartel change 
/ 
case 13 
national party 
list 
supported local 
list 
extended party 
cartel 
/ cartel formation localization 
case 14 
national party 
list 
supported local 
list 
supported local 
list 
/ / localization 
case 15 independent list 
extended party 
cartel  
extended party 
cartel  
/ 
cartel formation 
+ cartel change 
/ 
case 16 / 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
entry / / 
case 17 
independent 
local list 
independent 
local list 
extended party 
cartel 
entry cartel formation / 
case 18 
national party 
list 
localized cartel localized cartel / 
cartel formation 
+ cartel change 
localization 
case 19 supported list supported list 
national party 
list 
/ / nationalization 
case 20 
national party 
list 
extended 
national list 
national party 
list 
/ / 
localization + 
nationalization 
case 21 
supported local 
list 
supported local 
list 
supported local 
list 
/ / / 
case 22 localized cartel localized cartel 
extended party 
cartel 
/ 
cartel 
formation+ 
cartel change 
nationalization 
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These findings confirm that decisional autonomy is a fluid concept as the analysed 
cases frequently move from one ideal-type in the DA-typology to another. The 
following section aims to reveal the rationale behind these horizontal and vertical 
changes in the decisional autonomy by analysing the role of internal and external 
factors in these changes.   
6.5 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS CAUSING CHANGE IN DECISIONAL 
AUTONOMY 
To clarify the established changes in the decisional autonomy of the cases, I will 
successively assess the role of goal priorities, internal power structure, political 
institutions, local and national party system characteristics and system-level party 
changes.    
6.5.1 Goal priorities 
The interviews clearly show that any change in the decisional autonomy of the cases is 
primarily motivated by vote-seeking ambitions. Local candidate lists are essentially a 
device to participate in municipal elections and gather votes. The respondents report 
in detail about their efforts to gain as many votes as possible and have representatives 
elected in council. In this quest for votes, their first aim is to compose a full26, wide-
ranging and complementary candidate list. Especially candidates with a high electoral 
profile are considered a valuable asset: ‘You don’t need to be the smartest guy in town, 
but you need to have electoral capacity’ (case 3). Only one (deviant) case in the sample 
(case 9) does not follow this vote-maximizing logic as it concerns a one-man’s list with 
only one candidate.  
Composing such a full candidate list is perceived as a challenging mission and several 
cases report severe difficulties to attract adequate candidates. Changes in the 
horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy of the cases often result from these 
difficulties, aiming to attract extra candidates with a high electoral profile (and the 
                                                     
26
 The maximum amount of candidates on a local candidate list equals the amount of councillors to be elected 
(dependent on the size of the municipality). No minimum of candidates is stipulated, so local candidate lists can 
contain between one candidate and the maximum number of candidates. 
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additional votes these candidates represent). Several lists in the sample spring from 
national party branches that have decided to open up their local party list and involve 
independent candidates from outside the party to cope with a lack of adequate 
candidates: ‘It is not that easy to appeal to people, so we decided to open up to 
independents because we needed people who are broad-minded, and who are not 
necessarily tied to a national party’ (case 10). These lists have adopted a local(ized) 
name to reflect this openness to independent candidates. Some have added a local 
reference to the national party label (resulting in extended party lists), while others 
have abandoned the national label and adopted a local name, though maintaining the 
links to the national party (resulting in supported lists). These increases in vertical 
decisional autonomy thus result from the perceived scarcity of party candidates and 
the electoral strategy to involve independent candidates to pursue the vote-seeking 
ambitions of the list.  
A different strategy to cope with recruitment problems and maximize the vote share is 
to engage in a local cartel list. This strategy decreases the horizontal autonomy of the 
individual cartel partners but also reduces the amount of candidates required to 
compose a full list. Joining recruitment forces allows the cartel partners to put forward 
their strongest candidates and maximize the electoral capacity of the list: ‘Honestly, 23 
names on a list is no longer possible. That’s the advantage of forming a list with three 
parties and some independents […]. You can all forward your best people and come to a 
balanced mix to score with as a team’ (case 12). Hence, local cartel formation can 
equally be considered as an electoral strategy resulting from the vote-seeking 
ambitions of the local political actors involved and the limited supply of candidates 
The vote-maximizing ambition of the cases - and the strategic choices to increase the 
electoral potential of the lists - are not so much a goal in itself, but an important lever 
for other policy- and office-related objectives. Most cases aim to maximize their votes 
in order to have representatives elected in council and influence local policy. The 
respondents agree that local policy decisions are very specific and managerial in nature 
and they stress the importance of the personal characteristics of executive politicians 
rather than their ideological affiliation to shape local policy: ‘Electoral programs don’t 
differ a lot from one another, merely different accents, or maybe a slightly different 
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interpretation. In fact, local politics is about persons’ (case 4). Consequently, policy-
seeking goals are closely related to office-seeking goals. Moreover, the nature of these 
office-seeking goals seems to evolve over time. Several cases report that their initial 
office-seeking ambitions were relatively low. Their first aim was to have some 
representatives elected in council and disrupt the power of the established dominant 
party(ies). Especially when confronted with an alleged undemocratic (absolute) 
majority27, the initial objective of several non-national lists in the sample was to attract 
sufficient votes to break the long-standing majority (mostly CD&V) and offer a 
democratic alternative to the citizens, without necessarily aspiring government 
participation themselves: ‘We felt that there was more and more need to break the 
enduring CVP-bastion […]. Being in power for so many years makes power self-evident 
and decisions are made without properly listening to arguments’ (case 17). However, 
once having representatives elected in council, several cases experienced that a mere 
legislative role in opposition is not very rewarding. Policy initiative in Flanders is 
dominated by the executive and generally there is a strongly anchored divide between 
majority and opposition infused by party discipline. Consequently, policy influence 
from the opposition benches is perceived as confined and government participation 
becomes increasingly attractive. Government participation is also increasingly 
associated with access to other valuable political resources (financial resources, 
information, communication channels). Hence, initial power-breaking goals develop 
into more explicit office-seeking goals: ‘What can you do with 2 or 3 seats? Nothing 
according to me, or you should come in a balancing position. […]. So, whereas we never 
had the ambition in the past to participate in a majority, I am convinced we should 
prioritize that at this moment’ (case 17). Furthermore, incumbency further intensifies 
these office-seeking goals. Once having experienced the benefits of government 
participation, sustaining this privileged executive position becomes more central: 
Afterwards [after having participated in government] I realized that it is important to 
have power, otherwise you can’t realize much’ (case 6).  
                                                     
27
 In Flanders the Christian-democratic party CVP traditionally stood very strong in local politics, with many 
absolute majorities. 
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We can conclude that goals priorities are a key determinant in changes in the 
decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. The strategic decisions influencing the 
decisional autonomy of the lists are motivated by vote-seeking ambitions, which are 
instrumental to interlinked policy- and office-seeking objectives.  Moreover, the office-
seeking ambitions seem to evolve from power-breaking, to office-taking and office-
holding.  
6.5.2 Internal power structure 
The analysis confirms the crucial role of list leaders. These list leaders evaluate the 
political context and estimate the consequences of different strategic options for the 
objectives of the list. Their strategic decisions are strongly influenced by personal 
preferences. Changes in the decisional autonomy of the analysed cases often result 
from leadership changes. In five cases, the changes resulted from a generational 
turnover in the party elite as exemplified in case 13: ‘there was a new wind [in a former 
cartel partner]: a new board, a new president, and they decided not to continue the cartel’.  
Yet, these party leaders do not decide free and autonomously but have to take account 
of the inclinations of other members or activists of the list to safeguard their common 
goals. If the strategy preferred by the list leaders is in conflict with sub-group 
preferences or other (personal) ambitions within the group, internal resistance might 
hamper the intended changes. Cartel formation for example implies arrangements 
concerning the distribution of candidate positions on the list and of any executive 
mandates (in case of government participation). Several cases reported internal 
discussions concerning these arrangements: ‘All of a sudden, we were forming a cartel 
and so there was a great shift (on the list). I was promised a specific position, and I had 
to drop only one place, but there was someone else who had to give in six places, so they 
really had some explanation to do’ (case 7). How this internal resistance is dealt with 
and how it affects the intended changes in decisional autonomy depends on the 
leadership style and the decisional culture of the list. The analysis suggests a clear 
distinction between democratically organized candidate lists with transparent 
decision-making process and commitment to support-building within the group, while 
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other cases show a more authoritarian culture in which the party elite decides 
autonomously on strategic choices.  
The resistance to intended changes in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists 
can also emanate from the national mother party who might resent the preferred 
strategy in view of other national objectives. Several respondents stated for example 
that the N-VA strongly discouraged its local branches in 2012 to form local cartels in 
their aim to develop autonomous political anchorage at local level. Yet two cartel lists 
in the sample did involve a local N-VA branch. Consequently also national resistance 
can be overcome by strong and influential local leaders.  
The data suggest an additional organizational constraint which influences the strategic 
decisions of the list leaders. Maintaining an active party organization requires 
adequate financial resources, but also activist engagement. The lack of these essential 
resources also proves an important internal organizational influencing the changes in 
decisional autonomy, especially for independent candidate lists. Several independent 
cases in the sample report difficulties to uphold their political activities and compete 
with traditional parties in the local party system. Two cases (without representatives in 
council) did not see another option than to cease their political activities and 
disappear from the local political arena in 2012 (case 5 and case 8). Another 
independent list decided to affiliate with the green party to cope with this experienced 
lack of resources: ‘A local party means hard work. You have to write statutes, generate 
revenues, write flyers and booklets…. We joined the green party because of a lack of 
manpower and insufficient influx of younger people to uphold our political activities. It’s 
a pure necessity’ (case 6). 
6.5.3 Political institutions 
After elections, council seats are distributed according to the Imperiali quota, which 
slightly favours bigger parties or constellations and installs a factual electoral threshold, 
according to the size of the municipality. The obtained number of council seats is a key 
consideration in local coalition formation (Olislagers & Steyvers, 2015) and accordingly 
the Imperiali-quota stimulates local political actors with high office-seeking ambitions 
to join forces which increases the chances for government participation: ‘If we wouldn’t 
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have formed a cartel, we might have obtained maybe five seats, or four. Then we could 
have sit by and watch how things went around here, but now we will be in power for 18 
years’ (case 12). 
 The same institutional arrangement also encourages smaller actors – with less office-
seeking ambitions - to form a cartel list as this offers them more certainty to surpass 
the implicit electoral threshold: ‘Simply because of the electoral system we’d better join 
forces, because it increases our chances of having representatives’ elected (case 4). 
Furthermore, the local electoral system in Flanders is highly permissive in terms of 
candidacy and the costs for submitting a candidate list are very low. Individual vote-
seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking ambitions therefore easily result in the 
establishment of an (independent) local candidate lists.   
6.5.4 Local and national party system characteristics 
The data also demonstrate that both local and national party system characteristics 
equally influence the decisional autonomy of the analysed local candidate lists. At local 
level, the increased fractionalization of local party systems has aggravated the 
problems to attract candidates. The more candidate lists compete in the elections, the 
higher the competition for adequate candidates: ‘We always had two parties competing 
in elections, while there are now four lists coming up and we all fish in the same pond’ 
(case 10). The fractionalization of the party system thus incites local party leaders to 
consider alternative strategies to cope with the perceived scarcity of candidates 
(involving independent candidates or engaging in joint candidate lists).  
These strategic decisions concerning the decisional autonomy of the candidate lists are 
not only influenced by the number of parties/lists in the local party system, but also by 
the internal power relations between them. The competitive position of local lists in 
the local party system determines the attractiveness for potential candidates. Small 
candidate lists in opposition are deemed less attractive than governing lists for ‘nobody 
likes to identify with a party in the opposition’ (case 23). Smaller lists therefore 
experience more problems to find adequate candidates. They often need to settle for 
candidates with limited electoral capacity (often friends and relatives). Successful lists 
experience less problems to attract candidates as they have more ‘positions’ to 
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distribute, but still even the most successful lists are constantly in search for notorious 
candidates to further increase the electoral profile of the list.  
Moreover, the electoral potential of competing lists in the local party system proves an 
important argument in cartel considerations. In case of a strong opponent, a joint list 
can increase the competitive position and the odds of government participation, while 
in case of a weak and fractionalized contenders, autonomous government participation 
becomes more likely. Case 11 for example has been a very successful governing list since 
years. Yet, the hot breath of an increasingly successful competing list, incited the party 
leader to form a cartel list in 2012: ‘6 years ago, the (other) cartel had exactly 2 votes less 
than our CD&V list, so we were well matched. We therefore sought reinforcement to 
remain the largest party’ (case 11). Also for smaller lists in opposition, the strength of 
the competition is considered when deliberating cartel formation. A fractionalized 
opposition is argued to reinforce a strong opponent, while cooperation increases the 
odds of small groups to play a more prominent role in council: ‘If we would participate 
in elections separately, we would each have about two seats in council and the CD&V-
supremacy would continue’ (case 13).  
While the ideological proximity of parties has an important predictive value for 
national cartel formation (Golder, 2006), our data suggest that ideological proximity of 
potential cartel partners in the local party system plays a more confined role in cartel 
formation at local level.  National party cleavages are considered of limited relevance 
for local politics and seem not not decisive in local cartel formation: ‘What is left, what 
is right? [...]. On the ideological level, there are issues on which we [cartel partners] do 
not really match, but that rather concerns national politics. Local politics is really 
focused on what's happening in my neighbourhood, in my street’ (case 7). Instead, 
personal proximity and past cooperation experiences are considered far more pivotal as 
stated decisively by a party cartel in our sample: ‘If you don’t get along with the persons, 
you obviously cannot form a cartel’ (case 11). 
In addition to these current features of the local party system, historical features 
equally influence the vertical decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. 
Municipalities are often associated with a specific party-political tradition and these 
traditional party affiliations affect the perceived benefits of explicit and implicit links 
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to a national party. Several respondents argue that confronting the voter with a 
national party label that differs from this local tradition would impair the electoral 
potential of the list. The national party label is perceived as an electoral disadvantage 
in these situations and the respondents prefer to conceal the links to that party by 
adopting a local name. ‘We are a liberal mark in a Christian-democrat bastion […]. If I 
would contest as an Open VLD-list in that bastion, we would risk losing votes’ (case 22).  
The changes in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists are also influenced by 
changes in the national party system. The power relations between national parties 
trickle down to the local level and incite local party leaders to capitalize national 
successes or distance themselves from national defeats. The evolution of the Flemish-
nationalist party is illustrative in this matter. The former Volksunie has degenerated in 
the nineties and eventually moulded into two new parties (SPIRIT and N-VA). Several 
cases in the sample are historically links to the Volksunie but have decided to cut all 
links with that national party when it was waning as they did not want to be associated 
with the internal problems (case 1, case 4, and case 15). These local groups often 
continued their political activities at local level as independent lists. With the recent 
national success of the N-VA these lists retighten the links with the national party for 
the assumed electoral benefits: ‘Our biggest strength today is the brand N-VA, so we 
should play that off’28 (case 4). Two of these cases with roots in the Volksunie 
transformed into a local branch of the N-VA, while another lost some activists to a 
newly founded local N-VA branch, and joined a cartel list with this group. Two more 
cases with less clear roots in the Volksunie equally explicitly engaged in a cartel with 
the local N-VA branch, hoping to surf on the same wave of success (case 22 and 17).  
6.5.5 System-level party change 
The interviews show mixed results on the role of system-level party changes in the 
strategic decisions affecting the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. The 
changes in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists generally result from the 
ambition to maximize the electoral potential of the list and a perceived lack of 
                                                     
28
 The Flemish-Nationalist party N-VA experienced enormous electoral successes in the past years and has grown 
from a small party to the biggest party in parliament. 
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adequate candidates. This limited availability of candidates can be linked to the 
partisan dealignment of the electorate. Several respondents indeed argue that party 
politics has lost its appeal and that potential candidates are reluctant to stand for 
elections: ‘It is not easy to convince candidates, politics is no longer a hot item’ (case 10). 
Electoral strategies to cope with this lack of candidates (localizing a party list or 
engaging in a local cartel list) could thus be considered as a result of this dealignment 
tendency. While citizens turn away from national party politics, local parties adapt to 
this situation and implement alternative strategies – resulting in non-national lists - to 
maintain their local political functions. These non-national lists might thus be 
considered as a local response to the decreased appeal of political parties, illustrating 
the adaptive character of political parties at local level rather than their demise. On the 
other hand, the dealignment of the citizens appears quite selective. We have argued 
above that the perceived scarcity of candidates and the preferred electoral strategy is 
strongly influenced by the competitive position of political parties in the local and 
national party system. Several respondents indicate that specific (and especially 
‘winning’) party labels maintain their substantial appeal to both voters and candidates.  
National party evolutions are also characterized by the collusion between parties and 
the demise of ideological differences between traditional parties. The local cartel lists 
between parties from different ideological affiliation seems to substantiate this 
interparty collusion at local level. Several respondents have argued that a-typical local 
cartels are possible because local electoral programs hardly differ from one another. 
Yet, these similarities in local policy preferences might rather be attributable to the 
specificity and the personal character of local politics than to the ideological 
convergence between the parties: ‘[local policy] is not about what you want and what 
the other wants, it’s about collecting the right people to implement it’ (case 4). The local 
political context thus seems less relevant to assess intraparty collusion. 
The interviews are also inconclusive on the stratarchical imperative associated with the 
cartelization tendency. Several cases demonstrate a considerable autonomy of local 
party branches to interpret the local political situation and tune their electoral 
strategies to respond to local specificities, resulting in changes in the decisional 
autonomy. Some respondents indicate that these decisions are taken without much 
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intervention of the national party level, yet other respondents indicate that the 
national party remains closely involved in the strategic decisions at local level. The 
influence of national party centres in these local decisions seems to depend on the 
authority of the local party elite in the national party. Further research is needed to 
reveal the precise nature of the inter-level relationships between local party branches 
and their national mother party.  
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on decisional autonomy as a fluid characteristic of local 
candidate lists to uncover the rationale of the different types of non-national lists. The 
in-depth interviews with list headers of the selected cases revealed that non-national 
lists generally result from vote-seeking ambitions. In their quest for votes, the list 
leaders seek ‘the path of least resistance’ to maximize the vote share of the list in order 
to achieve other office- or policy-related objectives. The list leaders are identified as a 
key internal factor influencing the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. They 
interpret the political situation and consider internal and external factors to decide on 
the most appropriate electoral strategies to pursue their goals. Internal resistance and 
inadequate resources can represent important internal constraints to adopt the 
preferred strategy. The style of the list leaders and their capacity to deal with these 
constraints and build internal support for their preferred strategies is a determinative 
internal factor in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. 
In their vote-seeking ambition, local list leaders are often confronted with a limited 
availability of adequate candidates to compose a candidate list with high electoral 
potential. This is partly attributed to system-level changes of political parties and the 
general dealignment of the voters, but also by other local and national party system 
characteristics. As the public turns away from political parties, less citizens are found 
prepared to stand for (municipal) elections. Yet, the attractiveness of specific 
candidate lists to potential candidates (and voters) seems highly influenced by the 
competitive position of the associated party in the national party system and the 
competitive position of the local list in the local party system. Local candidate lists that 
are associated with electoral success (locally or nationally) face far less problems to 
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appeal to candidates than less successful lists. Moreover, the fractionalization of the 
local party system also influences the availability of candidates as the competition 
among parties for the available candidates increases if more candidate lists enter the 
electoral arena.  
To increase the electoral potential of the list in this context of limited availability of 
candidates, local list leaders can decide to alter the decisional autonomy of their list by 
involving independent candidates, engaging in a cartel list or modifying the list name. 
The Imperiali quota for seat distribution are an important additional institutional 
stimulus for cartel formation as it benefits the office-seeking goals of the list leaders. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the causal mechanisms - and the interrelations between these 
internal and external factors - resulting in changes in the decisional autonomy of local 
candidate lists. While Harmel has previously argued that electoral defeat is the mother 
of all change (Harmel, 2002), our analysis suggests that electoral hunger is the mother 
of changes in the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists and party leaders 
function as main filter by making sense of several internal and external factors and 
relating these to their electoral hunger.  
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Figure 6.3 Internal and external factors causing changes in decisional autonomy 
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7 FIFTY SHADES OF ROKKAN? RECONCEIVING LOCAL PARTY 
SYSTEM NATIONALIZATION IN BELGIUM 
This chapter is based on a paper written in collaboration with Prof. Dr. Steyvers and 
presented at the 2015 ECPR General Conference (Montreal). 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapters considers the implications of the refined conceptualization of non-
national candidate lists for our insights on local party system nationalization. In one of 
the main strands in the colligated literature, nationalization is conceived as the 
uniform end state of an ongoing party politicization process at the local level. The 
Norwegian comparativist Stein Rokkan (1966) was among the forbearers of this thesis 
explicitly associating it with the advancing of modernization. However, the enduring 
presence and success of a range of non-national phenomena at the local level serves as 
a more recently emphasized empirical counterfactual to this teleology. We have argued 
for a more fine-grained approach to the default local-national dichotomy by assessing 
the vertical autonomy of the parts comprising the system invoking the subtypes of 
national, pseudo-national, pseudo-local and independent local lists. Applying this 
classification model to all lists partaking in the last two rounds of local elections in 
Flanders demonstrated the municipal scene is predominated by lists at least having 
implicit links with a national party. This refines previous conclusions accentuating the 
imprint of such parties on the local soil with an array of non-national forces 
maintaining relevance. This chapter aims to develop, apply and assess in an explorative 
manner a more close-knit measure of local party system nationalization based on the 
vertical decisional autonomy of local candidate lists. We will first situate the object of 
inquiry into the study of party systems and then propose a refined index to describe 
party system nationalization in Flanders. Moreover, we will study the explanatory 
power of different categories of social and political factors for variation in this index. 
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7.2 LOCAL PARTY SYSTEM NATIONALIZATION: TOWARDS A 
RECONCEPTUALIZATION 
7.2.1 Reassessing Iconic Focus and Locus in Party System Nationalization  
In the multilevel approach of party systems, nationalization has emerged as a key 
theorem. Its basic tenet holds that political differences are disappearing between the 
various geographic units of a nation (Lago & Montero, 2014). The extent to which this 
is the case in the configuration of party systems has become central herein. Most of 
this research has been concerned with convergence in the aggregate composition of 
the partisan offer and the distribution of partisan success in elections over time and 
across space. Increasingly refined yardsticks have eventually spurned mixed empirical 
results. Whereas some have discerned a general trends towards party system 
nationalization, other accounts are more sceptical or emphasize its contingency 
(Caramani, 2004; Morgenstern & Swindle, 2007)  
However, these efforts predominantly focus on the state-wide level and actually 
address the territorial homogeneity of national party systems (‘local’ referring to the 
constituency level). To overcome this bias and obtain a more fine-grained vista, 
scholars have pleaded a reversed outlook (Mustillo & Mustillo, 2012). This would 
include taking local party systems as an alternative frame of reference for which 
relatively scarce evidence on longitudinal and cross-sectional nationalization is indeed 
available. Therein, its emergence over time is often conceived as indicating a process of 
party politicization. This a is central element in the work of Rokkan (Rokkan, 1966) 
associated with societal  modernization implying ‘[…] the  breakdown  of  the  
traditional systems  of  local  rule  through  the  entry  of  nationally organized parties 
into municipal elections’. Although this suggests an almost teleological take-over of 
local politics by national political parties, in many contexts traditional nonpartisan 
elements continue to hold local ground (Aars & Ringkjob, 2005; Back, 2003; Kjaer & 
Elklit, 2010b). Apart from remaining differences in the territorial anchorage of national 
political parties, this is due to the enduring presence and success of various types of 
non-national candidate lists in local polities (Copus et al., 2012).  
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The cross-sectional approach then refers to the extent to which the national party 
political presence (the degree to which all state-wide parties are competing) and 
performance (the grade of territorial homogeneity of their electoral results) at a given 
local election are geographically alike (Thorlakson, 2006). In line with most 
longitudinal findings, the sustaining and contingent divergence in local party system 
nationalization is often emphasized. Based on a discrete numerical measure to assess 
multilevel partisan resemblance Kjær & Elklit (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010) confirmed the 
positive effect of municipal size on nationalization in the Danish context whereas 
comparable evidence for Austria (Ennser & Hansen, 2013) highlighted the additional 
explanatory value of the (regional) degree of party organization.     
Similar tendencies appear in Belgium. In the long run and accelerated by municipal 
amalgamations in the 1970s, national parties effectively superseded merely place-
bound phenomena in local elections. Generally, a straightforward and increasing 
nationalization cannot be discerned however. The presence, success and shifts of and 
between parties are not homogenous for the whole country. Local results largely follow 
similar evolutions as those for national elections but dissimilarities continue to 
characterize the geographical division of party systems (Wille & Deschouwer, 2007). 
Very much alike, supply-sided evidence shows the local party field is infused with 
national candidate-lists. Nevertheless, non-national counterparts have maintained 
their presence stemming in mixed or predominantly national local party systems in at 
least 70% of all municipalities (Steyvers et al., 2008).  
This traditional approach is generally based on the basic nominal distinction between 
national lists (acknowledged local chapters of nationally renowned parties) and their 
local counterparts (all other non-national local candidate lists). Yet we have argued 
above that this simplified juxtaposition does not correspond to political reality and is 
incomprehensive in disregarding the polymorphous linkages between local and 
national party levels. An alternative taxonomy has been proposed, based on the 
horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy of local candidate lists (cfr. chapter five). 
As this chapter focusses on the vertical autonomy of local candidate lists, we will 
concentrate on the distinction between 1) national; 2) pseudo-national; 3) pseudo-local 
and 4) independent local list including their counterparts with a curtailed degree of 
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horizontal autonomy in cartel lists. Table 7.1 resumes the results of applying this 
fourfold typology to all lists participating in the last two rounds of local elections (2006 
and 2012) in the 308 municipalities in Flanders (N = 1458 and 1645)  
Table 7.1: Distribution of local candidate list subtypes according to the vertical autonomy 
Subtype list 
2006 2012 
% N % N 
National 72,4 1056 72,6 1200 
Pseudo-national 5,5 80 6,0 99 
Pseudo-local 7,6 111 8,8 146 
Independent local 14,5 211 12,6 209 
Total 100 1458 100 1645 
These figures confirm the predominance of national lists on the local electoral scene. A 
bit more than 72% are nominally recognizable place-bound chapters of national 
political parties. This share is constant in both rounds of elections. The remaining part 
of a bit less than 28% thus electioneers under a (partially) local denominator. Almost 
half of the latter have either partially explicit or implicit links with a national party. 
Pseudo-local lists are then more prevalent than their pseudo-national counterparts. A 
small majority of non-national local candidate lists can be termed as genuinely 
independent. In the most recent local elections these proportions have remained 
largely constant. It can be noted that the share of independent local lists has decreased 
mainly to the benefit of their pseudo-national counterparts. Overall, more than 85% of 
all candidate lists thus have links with national parties constricting their scope of 
vertical autonomy to differing degrees.       
7.2.2 Reconfiguring the Canvas: Indexing Local Party System Nationalization 
This typology of vertical decisional autonomy allows us to aggregate more close-knit 
the assemblage of the local partisan canvas and the degree to which this resembles its 
supra-local counterpart in every municipality. Subsequently, we here develop a 
discrete index of local party system nationalization taking the ratio between the 
different subtypes set out above into consideration. For the exploratory purpose of this 
paper, the index will concentrate on the number of lists of each subtype (their relative 
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share in the party system)29. These numbers are weighted by a factor reflecting their 
actual linkage with national political parties: a) national lists: factor = 2; b) pseudo-
national lists: factor = 1; c) pseudo-local lists: factor = -1 and c) independent local lists: 
factor = -2.     
These weighted numbers are then added up and the result is divided by the total 
number of lists in the local party system. The index of local party system 
nationalization can thus be represented by the following formula:  
ILPSN = [(2a+b) – (c+2d)]/n 
With a = the number of national lists; b = the number of pseudo-national lists; c = the 
number pseudo-local lists; d = the number of independent local lists and n = the total 
number of lists.  
In line with the distinction between the electoral (lists participating in the local 
electoral supply) and the parliamentary (lists obtaining elected representatives in the 
local council) party system (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010b) and to take further account of the 
political relevance of the various types of lists two variants of the index are calculated: 
a) the electoral index of local party system nationalization (EILPSN) and b) the 
parliamentary index of local party system nationalization (PILPSN)
30.   
The index thus reflects the weighted ratio between the amount of (pseudo-)national 
and (pseudo-)local lists allowing to incorporate the relative importance of vertical 
decisional autonomy in the assertion of the composition of the local party system (in 
elections or in the council). It ranges from +2 in completely nationalized local party 
systems to -2 in completely place-bound counterparts. Table 7.1 below display the 
measures of central tendency and dispersion of the distribution of the scores on the 
electoral and parliamentary indexes for the local elections of 2006 and 2012.    
 
 
                                                     
29
 Small national parties were not included in the analysis as these lists have a different status. 
30
 For the latter index, only the number of lists of a given subtype represented in the council have been taken into 
account with the total number of lists adjusted accordingly.  
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Table 7.2: Measures of distribution of the indexes for local party system nationalization 
 x̅ median σ skewness 
EIlpsn2006 1,05 1,20 0,88 -1,32 
PIlpsn 2006 1,16 1,25 0,92 -1,48 
EIlpsn 2012 1,08 1,20 0,83 -1,47 
PIlpsn 2012 1,20 1,33 0,89 -1,55 
The figures point at an undercurrent of relative local party system nationalization. The 
mean and the median vary between  respectively 1,0 to 1,2 (with a standard deviation 
between 0,8 and 0,9) and 1,2 to 1,3. The skewness confirms a relative long tail to the 
left. The electoral indexes are on average relatively lower than their parliamentary 
counterparts. In the eventual council composition the nationalization of the local party 
system is more outspoken than in the preceding partisan supply. Comparing 2006 with 
2012, the pattern remains highly similar with a slight increase of local party system 
nationalization.    
Given this distribution and for the logistic regression purposes explained below, 
discrete index scores were categorized into four specific ranges of relative local party 
system nationalization leading to the following subtypes: a) nationalized party systems 
= 1 to 2; b) pseudo-nationalized party systems = 1 to 0; c) pseudo-localized party systems 
= 0 to -1 and d) localized party systems = -1 to -2. Here also, a distinction between the 
electoral and the parliamentary arena was made. The data in table 7.3 display the 
relative share of these subtypes.  
Table 7.3: Relative share of local party system types according to nationalization (%) 
Election 2006 2012 
                        LPS-type 
arena Electoral Parliamentary Electoral Parliamentary 
Nationalized 57,5 63,6 53,9 64,0 
Pseudo-nationalized 30,5 24,7 35,4 25,0 
Pseudo-localized 6,8 5,5 6,2 6,2 
Localized 5,2 6,2 4,5 4,8 
The table indicates that the majority of all municipalities has a nationalized electoral 
arena. This share increases to about two out of three for its parliamentary counterpart, 
suggesting that non-national candidate lists face more hurdles in obtaining 
representation. Regarding pseudo-nationalized local party systems the ratio between 
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both arenas is reversed. Whereas about one third of all municipalities has an electoral 
offer that can be termed accordingly, this is the case for around one fourth of all 
associated councils. The more localized party systems are rather uncommon. 
Conjointly, (pseudo-)localized party systems characterized the electoral or 
parliamentary arena of around one out of every eight (2006) to nine (2012) 
municipalities. Localized party systems are generally least prevalent. During the last 
local elections they have even lost ground representing less than 5% of all 
municipalities.  
7.3 GETTING THE PICTURE: ACCOUNTING FOR VARIATION IN LOCAL PARTY 
SYSTEM NATIONALIZATION 
In this section we will probe into similarities and differences between localities 
accounting for variation in local party system nationalization. First, we will introduce 
the explanandum (the nationalized subtype of the local party system). Second, the 
explanans will be outlined along sets of variables respectively labelled as social 
morphology and political ecology. Their explanatory direction and strength will be 
tested by binary logistic regression. 
7.3.1 Explanandum: nationalized local party system   
For the dependent variables we refer to the subtypes of local party system 
nationalization based on the re-categorized electoral and parliamentary index scores. 
More in particular we will try to account for the nationalized subtype of these indexes.  
We argue that this is both theoretically as well as empirically meaningful. First, the 
associated index scores (1 to 2) reflect the undercurrent of relative nationalization still 
leaving substantial room for the potential relevance of non-national candidate lists 
with differing degrees of linkage to national political parties. Within this category both 
semi- as well as fully nationalized local party systems are included31. Second, this 
                                                     
31
 From a cross-tabulation we can infer that if the municipality belongs to a local party system that is electorally 
nationalized, this implies that it has at least two national candidate lists present in the electoral supply. However, 
invariably about one fourth of all cases have respectively at least one pseudo-national, pseudo-local or local 
candidate list as well on offer. Hence, more than 61% of all cases have at least one non-national candidate lists. The 
pattern for the parliamentary variant is highly comparable.    
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theoretically relevant distinction also divides the population in empirically practicable 
shares vis-à-vis the dependent reference category. For both reasons it is preferred over 
alternatives based on measures of central tendency or the marginal frequency 
distribution of the discrete indexes which in themselves are too skewed for linear 
regression.   
Given the exploratory nature of this research, we will focus on the most recent local 
elections of 2012. This will also allow us to include some derivatives of the data 
gathered for their counterparts in 2006 to account for different aspects of path 
dependency in the local party system (cf. infra). The dependent variable in the analysis 
will thus be the position of a locality outside (0) or inside (1) the nationalized electoral 
and parliamentary local party system in the municipal elections of 2012. For reasons of 
clarity the hypotheses below do not differentiate between expected effects for presence 
in elections and representation in councils.  
7.3.2 Explanans: between social morphology and political ecology  
Two sets of independent variables will be incorporated accounting for the local party 
system nationalization of each municipality. Each contains various explanatory factors 
inspired by the sparse literature on local party system nationalization and made 
operational in a manner argued to be meaningful in the Belgian context. The factors 
will be formulated such as to expect significantly increased odds for a municipality to 
dispose of a nationalized local party system. The comparability of these effects and the 
overall parsimony of the models are enhanced by a dichotomization of the original 
indicators.     
Does social morphology matter?   
One string of independent variables refers to the place-bound characteristics of the 
locality pertaining to the wider social morphology of the municipality against which 
more specific political thrusts are moulded. More in particular, three dimensions will 
be covered.  
First, differences in nationalization have been associated with variation in municipal 
size. The traditional strand is summarized by Kjær and Elklit (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010b): 
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‘the local party system in more populous municipalities tends to resemble the party 
system at the national level more than is the case in smaller municipal units, i.e. the 
larger the municipality, the more ‘nationalized’ the local party system’. Size does not 
tend to work directly but through intermediate variables such as political diversity 
however. Larger municipalities have a heterogeneous social make-up implying a 
complex cleavage structure and diversified interests represented by different political 
parties. These demand-side explanations are reinforced by an increased supply of 
national political parties on the local courtyard coming with an enhanced size. In 
larger municipalities, local councils are seen as an organizational base from which 
national parties can mobilize important resources (Kjaer & Elklit, 2010). 
This relationship has often been corroborated in empirical research underlined by 
significant leaps in nationalization over time following scale-enlarging reforms such as 
municipal amalgamations (Ennser & Hansen, 2013; Kjaer & Elklit, 2010; Steyvers et al., 
2008). In contrast, non-national local candidate lists have traditionally fared better in 
smaller municipalities associated with more harmonious and factual modes of local 
decision-making. However, in recent decades a trend has been discerned in which 
alternatives to national parties established themselves in larger cities as well indicating 
the emergence of newer types of non-national lists allegedly embodying anti-system 
sentiments (Reiser, 2008).  
Hence, two indicators of size have been included in our analysis to grasp ditto related 
but not interchangeable aspects relevant in Belgium. On the one hand, with the 
traditional criterion of the number of inhabitants we discern the relatively largest from 
the smaller municipalities32. On the other hand, population density has been measured 
analogously33. This should help us to distinguish municipalities that are sizeable in 
terms of inhabitants but cover a commodious polycentric area consisting out of 
numerous smaller settlements from their more consolidated mono-centric 
counterparts (stemming from differences in the nationally imposed amalgamation 
process in the 1970s, see De Ceuninck et al., 2010). We expect that population (number 
                                                     
32
 This distinction is based on the marginal frequency distribution of the number of inhabitants. Highest refers to 
the third of municipalities where this is above 18 643 (N = 105 or 34,1%).  
33
 This distinction is based on the marginal frequency distribution of population density. Highest refers to the third 
of municipalities where this is above 556 inhabitants per square kilometer (N = 103 or 33,4%).  
Chapter 7 
88 
 
and density) will increase the odds for a nationalized local party system. Hence, two 
hypotheses (with subdivisions in a and b for each dimension of the local party system 
type) will be tested:               
H1: in municipalities with the highest number of inhabitants the odds for an 
electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized local party system are 
significantly higher 
H2: in municipalities which are the most densely populated the odds for an 
electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized local party system are 
significantly higher 
Second, we assert the effect of metropolitan status on local party system 
nationalization. The emergence of functional metropolitan regions and the 
embeddedness of various municipal jurisdictions therein has been identified as one of 
the main trends of contemporary political geography (Sellers, Kübler, Walks, Rochat, & 
Walter-Rogg, 2013). In Belgium, the official conception outlines these regions as the 
factual overarching layer of an urban agglomeration and its (suburban) banlieue. 
Beyond that commuter living areas are distinguished as part of the urban living 
complex. For inclusion of specific localities, functional zones have been adjusted to 
municipal administrative divisions (Luyten & Van Hecke, 2007)34.  
Metropolitan status is often considered as the topical variant of the traditional center-
periphery divide invoking delineated sources of political behaviour. Recent 
comparative research demonstrated metropolitan ecologies shape whether citizens 
participate in voting and the ideological orientations brought to enact this right 
(Sellers et al., 2013). Most research efforts concerned the geometry of national cleavage 
structures in the metropolis identifying typical strongholds of the right and left. Less 
attention has been paid to the relative presence and success of national versus non-
national candidate lists within. Explorative research for Belgium discerned some 
relevant tendencies (albeit from the default nominal perspective). The closer to the 
                                                     
34
 The urban agglomeration is the central city before sprawl, i.e. the city center, its 19th century extensions and its 
20th century outskirts. The banlieu is the outer zone of the metropolis; i.e. the spatial expression of suburbanization 
from the urban agglomeration. Population density and spatial planning in terms of housing form the base for 
distinguishing the agglomeration from its banlieue. Commuting, population growth and immigration serve as 
criteria to determine if a municipality is part of the metropolitan region or not.    
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metropolitan core, the more nationalized the overall political offer. In terms of specific 
labels a relative (but incomplete) homogenization of the national partisan offer can be 
discerned. Variation in terms of voter demands is even more outspoken as partisan 
orientations tend to differ significantly according to metropolitan status. In central 
cities (centre-)left wing voting is more popular with an electoral landscape much more 
polarized in national terms and limited electoral leeway for non-national candidate 
lists. In the (outer) suburbs and outside the metropolitan area (centre-)right wing 
voting predominates. Further away from the metropolitan core, more centrist 
tendencies emerge. For local lists the pattern is diversified with relatively higher shares 
in the inner suburbs and outside the metropolis (Steyvers, 2009) 
For this research a simplified distinction is made based on the typology mentioned and 
the assignment of specific localities therein to separate municipalities inside (part of an 
urban agglomeration or its banlieu) from their counterparts outside (part of the wider 
living complex) a metropolitan region35. We expect in the former the odds for a 
nationalized local party system are higher. Hence, one hypothesis will be tested:  
H3: in municipalities that are part of a metropolitan region the odds for an 
electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized local party system are 
significantly higher 
Third, the effect of socioeconomic morphology will be scrutinized. This arguably 
differs from the demographic configuration (i.e. size) and the spatial location (i.e. 
metropolitan status) of the municipality. In her comparative conclusions on local lists 
Reiser (2008) already hints at the general importance of such factors. More specific 
empirical evidence linking socioeconomic features to local electoral tendencies is 
scarce however. Existing explorations concern the relationship between specific 
socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality and the presence and success of one 
or more particular parties (Coffe, Vermeir, & Heyndels, 2007; Hooghe, heyndels, 
Jottier, Birsan, & Bottermans, 2007). We assume that these findings can be extended to 
                                                     
35
 Metropolitan status refers to the position of a specific municipality inside a metropolitan region (N = 109 or 35,4 
%).  
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the aggregated level, linking the socioeconomic status of a municipality with local 
party system nationalization.       
For the purpose of this paper, we have derived this status from a multifaceted and 
comprehensive typology often adopted by the regional government for official 
purposes (Dessoy, Erouw, & Rombouts, 2007). This typology is based on a factor 
analysis of data on a bit more than hundred characteristics collected for each 
municipality eventually clustered in six subgroups for sixteen clusters. We have 
ultimately aggregated the subgroups of municipalities with central functions (central), 
with a concentration of economic activity (industrial) or which are semi-urban or an 
agglomeration (urban) into one category expected to be associated with higher odds 
for a nationalized local party system36. Hence, one hypothesis will be tested: 
H4: in municipalities that are central, industrial or urban the odds for an 
electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized local party system are 
significantly higher 
Does political ecology matter? 
Another string of variables refers to the electoral features of the local political milieu 
pertaining to the more specific institutional and partisan ecology of the municipality. 
Here, the literature is in even shorter supply. However, there are some relevant clues in 
the seminal work of Reiser and Holtmann (2008) on the presence and performance of 
non-national candidate lists that may benefit from aggregative reframing in terms of 
local party system nationalization by connecting two of their central slants adding a 
third.  
First, Reiser (2008) stresses the importance of the organizational capacity of parties. 
The penetration of national lists in the local electoral arena has a strong negative effect 
on the vote shares for non-national ones. In a substantial number of European 
countries national candidate lists are only present in a minority of municipalities 
facing difficulties in finding and mobilizing personnel to contest under their label and 
vying with the perception that politics at this level is factual and harmonious and thus 
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 For central, industrial or urban municipalities N = 120 or 39%.          
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hostile to partisan conflict. Here non-national candidate lists are the only groups 
running. However, when contesting national lists are almost invariably able to occupy 
a large slate of the vote. Non-national lists ‘[…] benefit predominantly from the low 
[presence] or even total absence of political parties’ (Reiser, 2008). In a sense, they fill 
the voids left and ‘[…] often exist as a substitute when political parties are absent from 
the local political scene’ (Holtmann, 2008).    
From an aggregate perspective, this could imply the better national lists are 
entrenched in a locality the higher the nationalization of its party system. However, 
the risk arises of a circular interpretation provoking questions of causality. If the 
presence and performance of national and non-national lists correlate which is than 
the consequence of the other? The above suggests the key-decision lays with national 
lists: if they choose to run they tend to appropriate the bulk of the vote and their non-
national counterparts can only act as surrogates or by filling the remaining electoral 
holes. Yet, this initial decision in turn seems to be influenced by a preceding 
assessment of their political viability in a given municipality. Consequently, in a mere 
cross-sectional analysis co-variation can thus hardly be distinguished from causality.  
In trying to overcome this circularity, the factor time should be integrated. This relates 
to a second core empirical finding of the aforementioned comparative research. Reiser 
(2008) namely emphasized the importance of path dependencies in political traditions 
conceived as enduring place-bound focal points of non-national candidate lists. Here 
also, an aggregated postulate could be derived arguing that the stronger the tradition 
of national candidate lists in a given municipality, the higher the nationalization of its 
local party system. An antecedent predominance of national candidate lists in a certain 
locality will constitute barriers for authorization and representation of non-national 
alternatives. Ideally, such a history-sensitive approach includes longitudinal 
measurement over various electoral cycles. Since we only dispose of sufficiently fine-
grained and comprehensive data for 2006 and additionally assuming that the political 
conditions at the end of the previous cycle will be most decisive for the dynamics at 
the beginning of the next, we will use these one but the most recent elections as our 
point of reference.  
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Combining national party entrenchment with political tradition, three indicators will 
be used to scrutinize the effect of the anterior degree of national party organization on 
the current local party system nationalization. As a first indicator the electoral local 
party system type in 2006 will be used dichotomizing nationalized from non-
nationalized variants. This takes the antecedent ascendancy of national lists in the 
partisan offer into consideration. A second indicator probes into the relative success of 
national lists in the associated local elections discerning municipalities where this was 
above average from those where this was not in 200637. This clarifies the voting 
preponderance of lists with explicit links to national politics. As a third indicator the 
parliamentary local party system type in 2006 will be considered making an analogous 
distinction between nationalized and non-nationalized variants. This highlights the 
subsequent representative primacy of national lists in the council. We expect that each 
of these antecedents will increase the odds for a current nationalized party system 
type. Hence, three hypotheses will be tested:      
H5: in municipalities where the anterior electoral local party system was 
nationalized, the odds for an electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized 
local party system are significantly higher 
H6: in municipalities where the anterior vote for national parties was relatively 
higher, the odds for an electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized local 
party system are significantly higher 
H7: in municipalities where the anterior parliamentary local party system was 
nationalized, the odds for an electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized 
local party system are significantly higher 
A third empirical finding at the heart of the comparative research mentioned is the 
effect of within-country differences in the institutional framework for local elections. 
Here, the impact of substantial alterations and/or in-built differentiation of the 
electoral system are frequently cited. In Belgium virtually no reforms have been 
enacted substantially affecting the longstanding semi-open proportional list system 
                                                     
37
 For this variable the mean (76,3%) is preferred as a cut-off point since the marginal frequency distribution 
suggests a strong skewness to the right. For vote share national lists in 2006 relatively high N = 193 or 62,6%.     
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uniformly spread throughout the country (Wouters, Verlet, & Ackaert, 2012). One 
aspect of institutional difference exists however in the variation in the number of seats 
up for election often termed as the district magnitude. In their account of Denmark, 
Kjaer and Elklit (2010) have included this as a control variable for municipal size 
finding the sustenance of an autonomous size-effect with district magnitude having a 
significantly positive effect on the parliamentary variant of local party system 
nationalization. Moreover, in explaining local party system fragmentation in Belgium, 
Geys (2006) found significant interaction effects between district magnitude and social 
heterogeneity suggesting an electoral arena more open to accommodate the full array 
of national political forces. Building on these findings we assume that where district 
magnitude is highest the odds for a nationalized local party system will increase38. 
Hence, one hypothesis will be tested:   
H8: in municipalities where the district magnitude was highest, the odds for an 
electorally (a) or parliamentary (b) nationalized local party system are 
significantly higher 
7.4  RESULTS: LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
The relationship between the independent variables and their dependent counterparts 
is studied by binary logistic regression. This will help us to assess the direction, the 
strength (Exp(B)) and the significance (Sign) of the odds that a municipality has a 
nationalized electoral or parliamentary local party system, given its morphological and 
ecological features encapsulated in the independent covariates. The analysis consists 
out of two models with the first only including the morphological characteristics of the 
municipality and the second adding ecological variables to the equation39. Within both 
moulds of the nationalized local party system type we will discuss each model in turn. 
Significant covariates are displayed in bold. The overall explanatory power of the 
models is expressed by Nagelkerke R².     
                                                     
38
This distinction is based on the marginal frequency distribution of the number of seats. Highest refers to the third 
of municipalities where this is above 25 (N = 105 or 34,1%). 
39
Some independent variables correlate significantly. However, further diagnostics based on the variance inflation 
factor do not raise problems of multicollinearity.  
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Table 7.4: Results of the binary logistics regression analysis 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable 
Local party system type 
[nationalized; 2012] 
Electorally Parliamentary 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b 
Exp(B) Sign Exp(B) Sign Exp(B) Sign Exp(B) Sign 
Social morphology 
 Number of inhabitants [h] 1.53 .12 2.67 .09 3.61 .00 7.65 .01 
 Population density [h]  0.85 .56 0.63 .17 .96 .90 0.65 .23 
 Metropolitan status  1.06 .84 1.14 .65 1.88 .04 2.36 .02 
 Central/industrial/urban 0.83 .45 0.78 .39 1.31 .34 1.27 .46 
Political ecology 
 Electorally nationalized 2006   1.31 .52   1.12 .82 
 Vote share national lists 2006 [rh]   4.02 .00   3.01 .00 
 Parliamentary nationalized 2006   2.59 .05   4.75 .00 
 District magnitude 2012 [h]   0.24 .02   0.22 .05 
Nagelkerke R² .01 .60 .30 .00 .14 .00 .41 .00 
N = 308 
In model 1a morphological variables conjointly do not significantly increase the odds 
for a municipality to have an electorally nationalized local party system. The overall 
explanatory power of the model is very low and none of the separate variables has a 
significant effect. Social morphology does not seem to matter for the relative presence 
of national candidate lists over their non-national counterparts. Therefore and with 
regard to model 1a H1-4a cannot be confirmed.  
As model 1b shows jointly morphological variables significantly increase the odds for a 
municipality to have a parliamentary nationalized local party system. The overall 
explanatory power of the model remains relatively low but is significant. This is 
particularly due to the positive effect of the number of inhabitants and the 
metropolitan status of a municipality. In the relatively largest municipalities the odds 
are about four times higher whereas in those that belong to a metropolitan region 
these are about two times higher. For population density and central, industrial or 
urban status no significant effects appear. Aspects of the social morphology thus 
matter for the relative representation of national candidate lists over their non-
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national counterparts. Therefore and with regard to model 1b H1b and H3b can be 
confirmed whereas H2b and H4b cannot.  
In model 2a the overall explanatory power increases to 30%. This is entirely due to 
adding political ecology variables. Again, morphological variables jointly do not 
significantly increase the odds for a municipality to have an electorally nationalized 
local party system. The same holds for each of the morphological variables considered 
separately. Among the political ecology variables the vote share for national lists in the 
preceding local elections is most determinative. Where this share was above average 
the odds increased by a factor of more than four. To a lesser extent significance can 
also be established for the effect of the antecedent parliamentary local party system. 
Where this was nationalized in 2006, the odds are a bit less than three times higher for 
the electoral party system in 2012 to be nationalized. Path dependencies thus matter. 
The electoral preponderance of national lists in the preceding local elections and their 
subsequent representative primacy seem to elevate barriers for the proliferation of 
non-national alternatives in the partisan offer. But not all path dependencies do: the 
nationalization of the anterior electoral party system did not affect significantly that of 
its successor. Whereas earlier demonstrated vote-stacking capacity matters, prior pre-
electoral ascendency does not. Remarkably, the effect of district magnitude opposes 
our expectations: in municipalities where the highest number of seats are up for 
election the odds significantly decrease that the local partisan offer is nationalized. 
With regard to model 2a H6a and H7a can be confirmed whereas H1-5a and H8a 
cannot.  
Finally, in model 2b the R² amounts to a bit more than 40%. Now both types of 
variables produce significant effects in a way combining the predictors of model 1b and 
2a. Here also, the number of inhabitants and metropolitan status matter. Where this 
number is relatively highest or municipalities are located in a metropolitan region the 
odds that the parliamentary local party system is nationalized increase with a factor of 
respectively a bit less than eight and a bit more than two. Municipal context-factors 
thus co-determine the representative primacy of national lists. But not all do: the effect 
of population density or the central, industrial or urban status of a municipality is not 
significant. Similar effects as for electoral nationalization can be found with regard to 
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political ecology factors. Here the best predictor of actual parliamentary 
nationalization is its antecedent in 2006 (the odds are more than five times higher). 
This is followed by the vote share for national lists in the preceding local elections. 
Where this was above average, the odds are a bit more than three times higher. The 
effect of district magnitude is highly comparable (and equally unexpected) to that for 
the electoral local party system. Where the highest number of seats are contested the 
odds for a national predominance in the council are significantly lower. Therefore and 
with regard to model 2b H1b, H3b, H6b and H7b can be confirmed whereas H2b, H4b, 
H5b and H8b cannot.  
7.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter tried to contribute to the study of local party system nationalization 
emphasizing a more fine-grained approach beyond the hitherto predominant national 
versus non-national dichotomy to acknowledge the shaded palette colouring the place-
bound partisan canvas.  
Assessing the vertical autonomy of the parts comprising the system demonstrated an 
array of non-national forces maintain relevance on the local soil and hence refines 
previous conclusions accentuating the imprint of national parties.  
Based on the more close-knit distinction between national, pseudo-national, pseudo-
local and independent local lists we have developed discrete indexes of local party 
system nationalization to assess the nationalization of the place-bound partisan 
assemblage. These indexes express the ratio between the different subtypes outlined 
above in both the electoral and the parliamentary arena and pointed at the 
undercurrent of relative nationalization of local party systems. Based on a re-
categorization of the discrete values nationalized, pseudo-nationalized, pseudo-
localized and localized local party system subtypes have been discerned with a 
majority of all municipalities situated in the first. Nationalization is more outspoken in 
the council than in the electoral offer. This fine-tunes the prevalence of mixed or 
predominantly national party systems discerned in previous categorical research in 
Belgium (Steyvers et al., 2008). The alleged end-state of exclusive nationalization has 
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thus not been reached in a large majority of municipalities both due to the persistence 
of independent local lists as well as of those (partly) concealing their linkage to 
national parties.   
Moreover, we have tried to explain variation in local party system nationalization by 
considering the conjoined effect of place-bound social morphology and political 
ecology variables hitherto considered in isolation or less systematically (Ennser & 
Hansen, 2013; Kjaer & Elklit, 2010b; Reiser, 2008). With the nationalized subtypes as 
dependent reference categories, the binary logistic regressions show that overall 
political ecology matters more (often) than social morphology. Taken together the 
covariates are also more predictive for the parliamentary variant of local party system 
nationalization than for its electoral counterpart. This further accentuates the 
importance to distinguish between the local presence and performance of various 
types of lists. 
Also more particular effects appear. First, morphological factors do not significantly 
increase the odds for the electoral local party system to be nationalized. This applies 
both when considered in isolation as well as in conjunction with their ecological 
counterparts. In other words, context does not matter for the relative nationalization 
of the partisan supply. Second, specific morphological factors do matter for the 
parliamentary local party system to be nationalized. In municipalities with the highest 
number of inhabitants or within a metropolitan region the odds are significantly 
higher that local chapters of national political parties predominate the council. 
Context thus matters for the relative nationalization of the partisan success. Third, the 
same specific ecological factors matter for both electoral and parliamentary party 
system nationalization. Here, the particular relevance of path dependency as the 
preceding degree of national party organization for the current local party system 
comes to the fore. Especially the anteriorly demonstrated vote-stacking capacity of 
national political parties stands out. In municipalities where national lists have 
previously been able to collect a relatively high share of the vote or occupy a ditto 
subsequent slate of council seats, the odds increase significantly for the electoral and 
parliamentary local party system to be nationalized confirming the assumptions of 
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Reiser and Holtmann (2008). Unexpectedly, the significant effect of district magnitude 
on both aspects of nationalization was negative and needs further research.   
Finally, a substantial amount of variance remains unexplained. Herein lay the limits of 
a quantitative approach focusing on the effect of exogenous social and political 
conditions on local party system nationalization. Notwithstanding the merits of 
measuring nationalization through the aggregated vertical autonomy of all place-
bound lists, circumstances can only partially account for systemic variation. 
Arrangements of decisional autonomy are equally driven by endogenous factors within 
specific candidate lists and often affected by temporal contingencies of place as 
demonstrated in chapter six.  
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8 TO PARTY OR NOT TO PARTY? A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF NON-NATIONAL LISTS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first empirical part of this research project has focused on the actual independence 
of non-national lists in Flanders, based on the concepts of vertical and horizontal 
decisional autonomy. This second empirical part deals with the partisan character of 
non-national lists or the extent to which they functionally behave like political parties, 
to further contribute to our understanding of the role of these lists in local politics.  
Non-national lists are generally considered as functional equivalents of local parties for 
they compete in the same local electoral arena (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008). Yet, this 
functional equation is hardly substantiated by empirical research. Non-national lists 
are typically omitted from any functional approaches to local parties as exemplified by 
recent large-scale studies on the functioning of local parties in Belgium which largely 
ignore non-national political occurrences (Buelens, Rihoux, & Deschouwer, 2008; K. 
Deschouwer, T. Verthé, & B. Rihoux, 2013). Moreover, this functional equation might 
be erroneous. Non-national lists are often associated with a nonpartisan conception of 
local self-government (Saiz & Geser, 1999; Steyvers et al., 2008) and hence, it could be 
assumed that they behave differently than their national counterparts. Steyvers et al. 
support this hesitation by suggesting that the degree to which local lists behave like 
political parties can vary significantly and that ‘partisanship’ should be interpreted as a 
continuum (Saiz & Geser, 1999; Steyvers et al., 2008). The following chapters examine 
whether this functional equation is justified by analysing similarities and differences in 
the functional behaviour of the different types of non-national lists and local parties in 
Flanders. 
Chapter two discussed in detail the range of programmatic, positional and civic 
functions national parties (are expected to) perform (Fiers, 1998) and how these 
functions have changed over time as political parties gradually evolved towards cartel-
like organizations with an increasingly professionalized party centre close to the state 
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and a declining party on the ground (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Daalder, 2002; Enyedi, 
2014; Katz & Mair, 1994).  
While non-national lists are functionally equated with local parties, local parties are 
expected to perform similar functions as national parties (Geser, 1999), but it remains 
largely unclear how local parties deal with the contemporary challenges faced by 
national parties and how national party evolutions affect the functional behaviour of 
local parties. Some authors argue that local parties have become increasingly 
redundant considering the decline in membership figures (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001; 
Webb, 1995). Others contend that local parties adapt to these challenges and develop a 
new political logic with a main focus on municipal elections (Deschouwer & Rihoux, 
2008). Still others assert that local parties continue to play a crucial linking role 
between the electorate and (local) policy as the remaining party members assume a 
more active role in the party and compensate for the decline in members.  
However, when assessing the functional behaviour of local parties (and non-national 
lists), a distinction needs to made between the two divergent roles of local parties. On 
the one hand local parties constitute the organizational subunits of national parties, 
organising the party on the ground and performing a number of functions to serve the 
national party goals (provision of political personnel, socializing and mobilizing the 
members, providing programmatic input …). On the other hand, they participate in 
local politics and perform several locally-oriented party functions (providing local 
candidates, involving local adherents, influencing local policy, …). We can assume that 
both ‘faces’ of local parties are affected differently by national party evolutions. As 
national party centres have become increasingly professionalized and less and less 
dependent on the political resources of the local subunits, local party functions in this 
former role as party agencies might have lost significance. Their functions as local 
political actors however might not have lost importance. Local party branches behave 
increasingly autonomous in local political affairs (Carty 2004) and institutional reforms 
in combination with a shift towards governance networks have increasingly politicized 
the local level, resulting in more and increasingly complex competences for local party 
branches (Geser, 1999). 
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To assess the partisan character of non-national lists, the following chapters will focus 
on the locally-oriented party functions. Three key party functions are selected for 
analysis inspired by the conceptualization of political parties as tripartite systems of 
interaction as discussed in chapter two (Fiers, 1998; Key, 1964; King, 1969; Sorauf, 1972; 
White, 2006). Political parties engage in three different realms - each involving a 
variety of activities, actors and rationales. This distinction between the party-in-
government, the party-in-the-electorate and the party-as-organization is highly topical 
and equally relevant to study the functional behaviour of non-national lists. Hence, the 
following chapters deal with 1) candidate recruitment as a key function of non-national 
lists role in the electorate; 2) non-national lists as organizations, analysing their 
organizational strength; and 3) the programmatic preferences of non-national lists as 
an important function in the governmental realm. These three complementary 
functional assessments jointly provide a comprehensive image of the partisan 
character of non-national lists.  
Each chapter follows a similar structure starting with an introduction on the 
theoretical relevance of the corresponding party function both in national and local 
perspective. Subsequently, existing insights on how local parties in Belgium assume 
these three party functions are discussed. The empirical sections than combine 
quantitative and qualitative research findings and discuss functional differences 
between the different types of non-national lists and local party branches. For each 
chapter, first the quantitative results are presented - based on survey data - providing a 
general understanding of how non-national lists assume the three selected key party 
functions and differ from national party branches. These quantitative findings are then 
further explored and refined based on a qualitative analysis of elite-interviews with list 
headers of non-national lists. In the following methodological section I will further 
elaborate in detail on the adopted mixed methods research design for this functional 
analysis.  
8.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The functional analysis of non-national lists in Flanders is equally based on a parallel 
convergent mixed methods design as elaborated in chapter four(Creswell & Plano 
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Clark, 2011)(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011)(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011)(Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011)(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Quantitative and qualitative data have 
been collected concurrently but independent from one another to obtain a 
comprehensive and multifaceted view on the functional behaviour of non-national 
lists. The qualitative approach for this functional analysis is based on a multiple case 
study equal to the adopted method for analysing changes in the decisional autonomy. 
The elite-interviews with list-headers of the 22 selected non-national lists in Flanders 
equally dealt with the functional behaviour of these lists and offer ample information 
on how and why the cases assume the three party functions under study. More details 
on this qualitative multiple-case approach can be found in chapter six, while this 
section elaborates on the methodological aspects of the quantitative component of this 
functional analysis.  
The quantitative part of this functional analysis of non-national lists in Flanders is 
based on a mail survey among list headers of non-national candidate lists in Flanders. 
Mail surveys have significant advantages as they offer a relatively cheap and time-
saving method to collect standardized data. Moreover, they can increase the 
accessibility of the research population and allow for flexibility of the respondents 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). However, mail surveys also come with some 
disadvantages as they don’t allow complex questions and lack the flexibility to probe 
for clarifications and comprehensive answers. Additionally, mail surveys generally have 
a limited response rate given the absence of personal contact. The average response 
rate of mail surveys is estimated between 20% - 40% (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (1996).  
The research population for this functional analysis in the first place concerns the 454 
non-national lists that have participated in the municipal elections of 2012 in Flanders. 
Additionally local party cartels have been included in the survey. As elaborated in 
chapter five, these local cartel lists concern locally agreed upon alliances (in contrast to 
the national party cartels in local politics which are decided upon by national party 
centres) which equally reflect a non-national rationale. It can be assumed that the 
functional behaviour of these local cartel lists rather resemble other local cartel types 
(extended party cartels or even localized cartels) than that of local party branches and 
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therefore, the 63 local cartel lists which have participated in the 2012 municipal 
elections in Flanders have been included in the research population of this functional 
analysis.   
The questionnaire can be found in appendix and contains four main topics: 1) 
objectives and evolution of the list; 2) list composition; 3) content and style; and 4) 
internal organization of the list. This questionnaire has been partly based on a survey 
conducted in 2012 among local party presidents in Belgium by the Belgian 
Interuniversity Attraction Pole PARTIREP40. Similar topics are dealt with but the 
questionnaire for non-national lists headers was shortened and modified to lower the 
threshold for participation and to meet the specific research goals of this research 
project. Although these similar but not identical survey data do not allow for direct 
comparison between local party branches and non-national lists, the Partirep data 
provide a meaningful benchmark to assess the partisan character of non-national lists. 
While the PARTIREP-survey was send to the presidents of local party branches, our 
survey was distributed among list leaders of non-national lists as it cannot be a-priori 
assumed that non-national lists have a party-like structure with clearly identifiable 
formal party leaders. List headers of non-national lists instead can be easily identified 
in the publicly accessible electoral database of the Agency of Internal Affairs41. Yet 
collecting the contact details of all these list headers was a challenging endeavour, 
requiring different information resources such as the ‘ABC of local governments’42, 
websites of the municipalities, websites of the candidate lists themselves and finally 
some public search sites. In the end, we were unable to trace the contact details of 
about 30 list headers.  
The survey procedure was based on Dillman’s suggestions for a ‘tailored design 
method’ to minimize non-response. He emphasizes an attractive lay-out and a close 
follow-up of response (Dillman, 2000). By the end of April 2014, 485 list leaders 
                                                     
40
 www.partirep.eu 
41
 www.vlaanderenkiest.be/verkiezingen2012 
42
 www.abclokalebesturen.be 
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received a formal personalized letter43 to frame the study and announce the survey. 
This letter was followed a couple of days later by a mail44 with a personalized link to 
the online questionnaire45. After one week 141 completed surveys had returned (29,1%). 
The respondents who did not respond to this call received a mail reminder 10 days 
later, whereupon the response rate increased to 45,2%. As the survey was send in full 
campaign period for the national elections on May 25th and local front runners can also 
politically engage in supra-local election, we sent a last reminder after the national 
elections resulting in a definitive and satisfactory response rate of 53,4% of the 
contacted frontrunners or 50,1% of all non-national lists in Flanders (including party 
cartel lists). Table 8.1 demonstrates how this response rate is distributed over the 
different types of lists as identified before based on their decisional autonomy.  
Table 8.1: Response rate of the different types of local candidate lists 
 
total number   
of responses 
total N response rate 
party cartels 35 63 55,6% 
extended national lists  23 52 44,2% 
extended party cartels 24 47 51,1% 
supported local lists 38 79 48,1% 
localized cartels 33 67 49,3% 
independent local list 106 209 50,7% 
Total 259 517 50,1% 
Although the different types of local candidate lists are sufficiently represented in the 
response, the total number of observations in the various categories is too small for 
relevant statistical comparison and therefore non-national lists are categorized based 
on a simplified version of the DA-typology, merging related list types to a more limited 
number of categories. I will further distinguish between cartel lists (party cartels, 
extended party cartels and localized cartels), associated lists (extended party lists and 
supported lists) and independent lists, which allows for more meaningful comparison 
between these categories.  
                                                     
43
 These letters were send by post mail, except for 15 respondents from whom no postal address was found and who 
received the announcement letter by electronic mail.  
44
 For 46 of the front runners, we only found a postal address and they received the questionnaire by post with a 
stamped envelope, with the explicit opportunity to receive an online version of the questionnaire.  
45
 All respondents were offered the opportunity to receive a paper version of the questionnaire by post mail 
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9 CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The recruitment and selection of political personnel is considered ‘one of the central 
defining functions of a political party in a democracy’ (Katz, 2001). Political parties 
recruit candidates to stand for elections under a common party label and invest in 
campaign activities to have these candidates elected for legislative or executive 
positions. This also holds true for local parties, who select candidates for legislative or 
executive functions in the competition for local powers. To assess the partisan 
character of non-national lists in Flanders, this first chapter considers similarities and 
differences in the candidate selection process of non-national lists and local parties.  
In party literature, candidate selection and recruitment is generally considered as a 
structured market-place in which supply and demand factors interact (Jacob, 1962; 
Norris, 2006; Prewitt, 1970; Schwartz, 1969; Seligman, 1961). The supply-side of this 
market-place concerns the availability of eligible candidates which is influenced by 
formal eligibility criteria (age, residence, certain amount of signatures …), but also by 
individual motivations and personal perceptions concerning the rules of the political 
game. The demand–side of this political recruitment and selection process refers to the 
screening of eligible candidates and how from the many candidates are chosen the few 
to stand for elections and pursue a political career. Political parties provide the main 
gatekeepers in this selection process and internal party rules and procedures as well as 
prevailing party traditions determine the structure of opportunities for aspirant 
candidates to be selected. Furthermore, the interaction between supply and demand 
factors is influenced by the characteristics of the electoral system (proportionality, size 
of constituencies, electoral threshold, …) and the party system (competition, 
heterogeneity of the party system) (Norris, 2006, 1997).  
Based on this market-based approach, scholars have focused on different features of 
the selection and recruitment process. A first line of research concentrates on the 
supply-side and considers who is eligible for nomination. This research strand 
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examines the social and personal characteristics of eligible candidates, as well as 
socializing and mobilizing experiences which facilitate political careers46. A second line 
of research concerns the locus of decision-making within political parties (who 
nominates?). This strand studies the centralization and the breath of participation in 
the decisions on candidate selection within political parties47. A third component of 
the selection process often scrutinized by scholars concerns the outcome of the 
process (who is nominated?) and the consequences for representative democracy. 
Especially the social bias of the legislative/executive force (in terms of gender, 
occupational class, ethnic background …) has been intensively studied48. 
Although traditional selection theories clearly distinguish between selection and 
election, they often apply a narrow focus on elite recruitment and only consider those 
candidates that have successfully ran through the sequential selection filters, including 
election by the electorate. This elite bias could be justified by the political relevance of 
elected (office-holding) candidates, but neglects a vast majority of candidates that have 
been selected to stand on a candidate list but did not mobilize enough votes to get 
elected (or appointed) for any legislative or executive function. Although, non-
electable candidates are sometimes disparagingly labelled as ‘list filling’, they play a 
crucial role in the overall electoral performance of political parties.  
This market-based approach to candidate selection is also relevant to study candidate 
selection at local level (Steyvers, 2005), yet the supply of eligible candidates is much 
more confined in a local context. Traditional selection and recruitment theories 
generally assume an abundant supply of eligible and motivated candidates, where local 
party selectors often struggle to find adequate candidates, especially in smaller 
municipalities (Kjaer, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2001; Rysavy & Bernard, 2013). As established 
in chapter six, the eroding public support for increasingly cartelized political parties 
further constricts the availability of eligible candidates for local parties.  
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 cfr. i.a. Farly, Budge, & Irwin, 1977; Steyvers, 2005 
47
 cfr. i.a. Bille, 2001; Hazan & Rahat, 2006 
48
 cfr. i.a. Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Rule & Zimmerman, 1992 
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Analysing the candidate selection process of non-national lists will therefore focus on 
the list composition process as a first and key stage in the further recruitment of local 
political elites.  Norris’s (2006) market-based model of the candidate selection process 
provides a valuable framework to study the composition of non-national lists. It is 
especially interesting as it also considers independent candidates as illustrated in 
Figure 9.1. The pool of nominated candidates in this model consists of candidates 
nominated by party selectors and independent candidates without party nomination.  
Figure 9.1: Model of the candidate selection process (Norris, 2006: 90) 
 
To assess if and how non-national lists in Flanders differ from local party branches in 
the implementation of this key party function of candidate selection, I will focus on the 
nomination stage and consider the list composition of non-national lists as a result of 
supply- and demand factors with specific attention for the role of independent 
candidates. In the following sections, I will first outline the legal requirements for 
eligibility and then discuss previous research results on the list composition of local 
party branches in Belgium.  
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9.2 LOCAL CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT IN BELGIUM  
9.2.1 Legal requirements 
As in other countries, local candidates have to meet some minimal legal qualifications 
to be entitled to stand for local elections. Candidates are required to have the Belgian 
or a EU member state nationality. They must have reached the age of 18 and be 
registered in the municipality in which they plan to stand for elections. They may not 
be deprived of their rights to vote or to be elected and lastly, a small number of 
professions are considered incompatible with candidacy49.  
Furthermore, some formal procedures need to be respected to stand for local elections 
in Belgium: candidates have to be nominated by an incumbent councillor (regardless 
of party affiliation) or by a certain number of registered voters50. The nomination 
certificate contains all candidates of a list (at least one and not more than the total 
amount of councillors to be elected, depending on the size of the municipality) and 
determines the definite sequence on the list. Gender quota have been introduced in 
the Belgian electoral law to guarantee a balanced mix of man and woman. The 
difference between the total amounts of candidates from the same sex cannot exceed 
one and the first two candidates on the list need to have different sexes. 
9.2.2 List composition in traditional local parties in Flanders 
Several scholars have studied the list composition of traditional local party branches in 
Belgium (Buelens, 1996; De Winter, Erzeel, Vandeleene, & Wauters, 2013; Devos, 
Reynaert, & Verlet, 2008). These studies revealed that local candidate selection is 
primarily a local matter with a confined role for national party organs or national 
considerations. The list composition of local party branches is predominantly 
determined by local selectors (local leaders, outgoing mandataries and candidates) and 
the selection criteria are very locally oriented. Local associations figure as the largest 
source of recruitment and potential candidates’ commitment to and prominence in 
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 For example police officers or magistrates 
50
 The precise amount of voters needed to nominate a candidate depends on the size of the municipality. 
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local associational life and in neighbourhood activities are considered far more 
relevant than their role in national politics or other nationally oriented features.  
Additionally, local party branches proved highly concerned with balancing the ticket 
and involving a mix of candidates to appeal to a large group of voters. Especially the 
balance between various neighbourhoods and various age groups is deemed important 
(De Winter et al., 2013; Devos, 2006; Devos et al., 2008). Notwithstanding these general 
findings, significant differences were found between the party families. De Winter et al. 
(2013) distinguish between the selection process of the more traditional parties and 
that of the newer green and nationalist parties. The former attach even more 
importance to the local embeddedness of the candidates and have more contacts with 
leisure and socio-economic organizations to recruit candidates. These local 
associations function less as recruitment channel for the newer parties in which the 
candidates themselves play a more dominant role and local anchorage is considered 
less important (De Winter et al., 2013).  
Both Buelens (1996) and Devos et al. (2008) also confirmed that the supply of eligible 
candidates for local elections is limited. They established that local party branches in 
Belgium often encountered problems to find sufficient candidates. A general lack of 
interest in politics and the reluctance of potential candidates to commit to a specific 
party are indicated as main thresholds for candidacy. Especially finding sufficient 
woman to meet the gender quota has been put forth as challenging (Buelens, 1996; 
Devos et al., 2008). While Buelens could not find a statistical link between these 
selection problems and the electoral performance of the local party or the position in 
council, Devos et al. cautiously argued that finding adequate candidates is more 
troublesome for parties in opposition. Moreover, Buelens has argued that involving 
independent candidates served as a widespread ‘remedy’ for local party branches to 
cope with the encountered lack of candidates. Regrettably, the role of independent 
candidates on local party lists has been disregarded in later research of national party 
branches.  
The following sections scrutinize the list composition process of non-national lists to 
establish differences and similarities between the different types of non-national lists 
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and local party branches in Flanders. Firstly, a quantitative analysis of the survey data 
provides a general picture of the supply and demand factors influencing the list 
composition of non-national lists. Subsequently, these findings are refined based on a 
qualitative analysis of the interview data.   
9.3 THE LIST COMPOSITION PROCESS OF NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN FLANDERS 
In this section I will present the survey results concerning the list composition process 
of non-national lists in Flanders and successively discuss the applied selection criteria, 
the encountered recruitment problems, the share of independent candidates and the 
recruitment ability of associated lists, cartel lists and independent lists.  
9.3.1 Selection criteria  
The survey data demonstrate that non-national lists value similar locally oriented 
selection criteria as has been established for local party branches (De Winter et al., 
2013). The non-national list headers were asked to indicate the importance of a range 
of selection criteria on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 4 (very important). Table 
9.1 summarizes the average scores in decreasing order of importance and demonstrates 
that no significant differences were found between associated lists, local cartel lists and 
independent local lists. Involvement in the municipality is considered by far the most 
important selection criterion by all three types of non-national lists, followed by some 
criteria relating to the commitment and political capacities of the candidates 
(dedication and available time and issue knowledge and governance capability). 
Political experience proves the least important criterion (table 9.1).  
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Table 9.1: Average importance of local selection criteria for non-national lists 
 associated lists cartel lists independent lists 
Eta ² 
 x̅ σ x̅ σ x̅ σ 
involvement in the municipality 3,32 0,651 3,37 0,631 3,17 0,845 0,015 
dedication and available time 2,95 0,693 2,97 0,673 2,95 0,767 0,000 
issue knowledge / governance capability 2,82 0,785 2,86 0,904 2,78 0,970 0,002 
Ideological profile 2,46 0,897 2,80 0,760 2,48 1,049 0,030 
communication and campaign skill 2,49 0,788 2,40 0,756 2,32 0,937 0,007 
political experience 1,90 1,045 2,07 1,065 1,72 1,129 0,019 
(N=246-249) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
Moreover, non-national lists recruit from similar recruitment channels as established 
for local party branches. Table 9.2 summarizes the shares of the three types of non-
national lists that recruit from the different local organizations and demonstrates that 
more than two thirds of the associated lists and only slightly less of the local cartel lists 
equally mainly recruit from local associations (cultural, youth, leisure and sports 
organizations). Independent lists recruit significantly less from these traditional local 
associations with shares around and below 50%. As independent lists do not recruit 
substantially more from other organizations, this could indicate more general 
recruitment problems of these lists. Potential candidates in local associations might be 
discouraged by the lower political relevance of independent lists. Table 9.2 also 
indicates that local cartel lists recruit significantly more from environmental 
movements. This can be explained by the substantial share of progressive cartel lists, 
involving green party branches - often in combination with socialist party branches - 
which traditionally recruit more in the environmental movements. 
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Table 9.2: Share of non-national lists recruiting from different recruitment channels 
 
Total 
associated 
lists 
cartel lists 
independent 
lists 
Cramer's V 
cultural organizations 59,1% 68,9% 67,4% 46,2% 0,218** 
youth organizations 58,7% 68,9% 63,0% 49,1% 0,169* 
leisure organizations 57,1% 67,2% 56,5% 51,9% 0,12 
sports clubs 55,2% 68,9% 55,4% 47,2% 0,169* 
employer’s organizations  37,1% 44,3% 33,7% 35,8% 0,085 
environmental movements  32,0% 21,3% 51,1% 21,7% 0,303*** 
woman’s organizations 32,0% 32,8% 37,0% 27,4% 0,09 
family organizations 23,9% 31,1% 21,7% 21,7% 0,094 
        (N=259) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
9.3.2 Recruitment problems  
The survey results demonstrate that a large majority of non-national lists (72,6%) has 
encountered problems to recruit candidates in the run up to the municipal elections of 
2012 confirming that eligible candidates are a scarce asset at local level. Significant 
differences occur between the three types of non-national lists. Associated lists more 
often experienced recruitment problems (82%), while local cartel lists faced the least 
problems to attract candidates (63%). Table 9.3 summarizes the specific nature of 
these recruitment problems and demonstrates that – as for local party branches - most 
of these problems are related to the increasing distance between citizens and political 
parties and the decreasing public support for political parties (reluctance to confess to 
a political party, lack of interests in politics, negative image in politics). These specific 
problems are more pervasive for associated lists. Independent lists more often face 
other (unspecified) problems which are less related to national party politics.   
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Table 9.3: Share of non-national lists indicting problems to attract candidates 
  Total 
associated 
lists 
cartel lists 
indepen-
dent lists 
Cramer's 
V 
no problems to attract candidates 27,4% 18,0% 37,0% 24,5% 
0,168** 
problems to attract candidates 72,6% 82,0% 63,0% 75,5% 
candidates refuse to confess to a party 47,5% 67,2% 44,6% 38,7% 0,225*** 
lack of interest in politics 42,1% 59,0% 35,9% 37,7% 0,191* 
negative image of politics 32,4% 42,6% 19,6% 37,7% 0,208** 
other problems 18,5% 13,1% 14,1% 25,5% 0,149 
candidates fear to be elected 9,7% 9,8% 9,8% 9,4% 0,006 
  (N=259) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
9.3.3 Independent candidates 
Involving independent candidates has been identified above as an alternative electoral 
strategy of local party branches to cope with the limited supply of candidates and 
increase the electoral capacity and the recruitment ability of the list. The survey results 
allow to establish the prevalence of this strategy. Table 9.4 summarizes the average 
number and average share of independent candidates on associated lists, cartel lists 
and independent lists and demonstrates that the share of independent candidates 
varies significantly (eta² = 0,354***). Remarkably, independent lists contain a large 
majority of independent candidates, but are not exclusively composed of independent 
candidates (72,7%). More in-depth analysis is needed to clarify this figure. Local cartel 
lists contain about one out of five independent candidates (20,3%), while associated 
list are situated in between with an average of 36% independent candidates. 
Table 9.4: Average number and share of independent candidates on non-national lists 
 x̅ % 
associated lists 7,7 36,0 
cartel lists 4,5 20,3 
independent lists 13,6 72,7 
Total 8,9 45,1 
Eta² 0.189*** 0.354*** 
          (N=242) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
These figures confirm that independent candidates are common in the different 
categories of non-national. However it remains unclear to what extent independent 
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candidates enable non-national lists to overcome the encountered recruitment 
problems. The following section therefore considers the recruitment ability of non-
national lists.  
9.3.4 Recruitment ability 
As non-national lists are found to be highly vote-seeking, it can be assumed that they 
equally aim to maximize the number of candidates as each additional candidate could 
entail additional votes (cfr. Chapter six). Hence, the completeness of the lists or the 
number of candidates on the list relative to the maximum number of candidates 
allowed51 indicates the recruitment ability, or the capacity to cope with the limitations 
of the supply side and attract sufficient candidates to compose a complete candidate 
list. Table 9.5 summarizes the average recruitment ability of the different types of non-
national lists as well as the respective shares of complete, nearly complete (more than 
half of the maximum number of candidates) and far from complete lists (less than half 
of the maximum number of candidates). Most non-national lists (76,4%) were able to 
submit a complete list, with an average recruitment ability of 85,5%. Independent lists 
however demonstrate a significantly lower average recruitment ability than associated 
lists or cartel lists. While more than eight out of ten associated lists and cartel lists 
succeeded to compose a complete list in 2012, only 64,2% of the independent lists 
submitted a complete lists. Moreover, associated and cartel lists contain only a limited 
share of lists with less than half of the available council seats, while for independent 
lists this share of far from complete lists rises to nearly 25%.  
 
 
  
                                                     
51
 The maximum number of candidates equals the available council seats in the municipality and depends on the 
population size 
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Table 9.5: Average recruitment ability and corresponding shares of complete, nearly complete and far from complete 
lists 
 
average 
recruitment 
ability 
share of 
complete lists 
nearly 
complete lists 
far from 
complete lists 
associated lists 92,6% 85,9% 9,8% 4,3% 
cartel list 93,4% 83,6% 9,8% 6,6% 
independent list 74,5% 64,2% 11,3% 24,5% 
total 85,5% 76,4% 10,4% 13,1% 
 Eta²: 0.094*** Cramer’s V: 0,242*** 
(N=256) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
We can thus conclude from these figures that independent lists have significantly 
more problems to compose a complete candidate list. Moreover, a more detailed 
analysis of the absolute number of candidates on independent lists demonstrates that a 
small, but substantial share of these lists (13%) does not contain more than one single 
candidate. These latter one-person lists can be assumed to participate in elections with 
a different, less vote-seeking logic than the candidate lists containing a substantial 
number of candidates.  
The recruitment ability of non-national lists significantly influences their electoral 
performance of all three list types (Pearson = 0,333*** – 0.482***) indicating that non-
national lists with high vote-seeking ambitions have every interest to aim for a 
complete candidate list. Involving independent candidates has been indicated as an 
alternative electoral strategy to increase the recruitment ability of local candidate lists 
and consequently the vote share. Yet, a negative correlation was found between the 
share of independent candidates and the recruitment ability of the lists (Pearson = -
0.180**). This can largely be attributed to the group of independent lists with high 
shares of independent candidates but a low recruitment ability. For local cartel lists 
and associated lists no significant correlation were found between the share of 
independent candidates and their recruitment ability. Moreover, no significant 
correlation was found between the share of independent candidates and the electoral 
performance of non-national lists. For associated lists a negative correlation was even 
found. The larger the share of independent candidates on associated lists, the lower 
the electoral performance of the list (Pearson =-0.270*).  
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These findings indicate that independent candidates on non-national lists in the first 
place reflect recruitment problems rather than a remedy to overcome these problems. 
Independent candidates might attract some additional votes, but do not compensate 
for the limited electoral appeal of the list which can be attributed to other – contingent 
- factors. Local cartel lists demonstrate a higher recruitment ability with a lower share 
of independent candidates and hence we can conclude that engaging in a pre-electoral 
alliance is the most effective electoral strategy to overcome local recruitment problems 
and increase the electoral capacity of the list.  
9.3.5 Interim conclusions 
These survey results offer valuable insights concerning the nomination stage of the 
selection process of non-national lists for municipal elections in Flanders. In Norris’s 
model of candidate selection presented in the introduction, a clear distinction is made 
between candidates nominated by party selectors and independent candidates without 
party nomination. The former are subjected to a candidate nomination procedure 
within the party and the interaction between supply- and demand, while independent 
candidates are assumed to enter the pool of nominated candidates directly without 
intervention of any nomination procedure to align supply- and demand factors. The 
survey results indicate that this distinction is inconsistent with the political reality of 
the candidate selection process for municipal elections in Flanders. The pool of 
nominated local candidates in Flanders equally contains a mix of party candidates and 
independent candidates, but the nomination of independent candidates equally results 
from supply- and demand factors and nomination procedures.  
Party selectors and independent selectors both value similar locally oriented selection 
criteria and are faced with a limited supply of eligible candidates for local elections. 
The demand by both selector types is influenced by strategic choices to cope with 
these supply-side limitations. Cartel lists experience less problems to attract candidates 
as they have joined recruitment forces. Party selectors can also involve independent 
candidates, while independent selectors also recruit non-independent candidates. This 
results in varying shares of independent and party candidates on the different types of 
non-national lists. Independent candidate lists contain the largest share and cartel lists 
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the lowest share of independent candidates. Moreover, independent selectors are 
found to have significantly more problems to overcome the supply-side limitations as 
they less often succeed to compose a full candidate list, resulting in a lower electoral 
appeal.    
9.4 ROLE AND ORIGIN OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES 
The quantitative analysis clearly indicated that non-national lists differ from each 
other in their recruitment ability and the numeric role for independent candidates. 
This qualitative section further explores these differences by analysing the origin and 
position of independent candidates on non-national lists and how this differs from 
party candidates. Based on the elite-interviews with list headers of non-national lists, I 
will examine in more depth where the independent candidates come from and what 
position they assume in non-national lists. Do they merely serve to fill up these lists 
and generate some additional votes to reinforce the position of leading party 
candidates on the list? Or do they adopt winnable positions on the lists and are they 
further included in the non-electoral political activities of the list? Successively, the 
origin and position of independent candidates on associated lists, cartel lists and 
independent lists are discussed.  
9.4.1 Associated lists 
Associated lists (extended party lists or supported list) have been initiated by local 
party branches in their aim to involve independent candidates and attract additional 
votes by taking some distance from the national party. Our sample contains 6 
associated lists, all involving a number of independent candidates in addition to the 
party members on the list. These independent candidates are selected for their local 
notoriety and subsequent electoral potential. Some of these independent candidates 
are recruited from local associations, others from local activist groups, still others from 
the local middle class or liberal professions. In fact their origin seems of little concern 
to the local party selectors as long as they are able to attract additional votes ‘We 
welcome independents on our list. It usually concerns people - and their voters - whom 
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we can’t reach otherwise. We also welcome action groups. [...] if they are willing to 
present themselves to the voter’ (case 20).  
Some of these independent candidates however do have a party-background in a 
different party. Case 21 for example embraced some former local VU-members who 
were left orphaned as the national party was waning in the second half of the nineties 
and the local VU-branch ceased to exist: ‘In that time, several VU-people joined us. The 
local VU here was at its last gasp and some came to us as the VU was practically non-
existent’ (case 21). These former VU-members received the status of independent 
candidates notwithstanding their party-background.  
The interviews also reveal that independent candidates on associated lists generally 
occupy a prominent position on the lists. Only in one case, the independent candidates 
on the list merely served as list filling to attract some additional votes without any 
further interest to remain involved in the party. In the other cases, the independent 
candidates were assigned prominent positions on the list and given their high electoral 
potential, they often got elected in council and were integrated in the further 
legislative work of the list: ‘two or three of our independent candidates were elected, but 
they were included in the group […]. They have no party membership card, but we form 
one group.’ (case 10). Three associated lists in the sample were part of a governing 
majority and the independent candidates also obtained executive positions, indicating 
their prominent position in the group. In chapter 11, I will further examine the 
organizational consequences of including independent candidates in the political 
activities of a local party branch. For now, we can conclude that independent 
candidates on associated lists are selected for their high electoral potential and 
generate sufficient votes to also assume an important role in the legislative of even 
executive activities of the party.  
9.4.2 Local cartel lists 
Most cartel lists in the sample52 equally included independent candidates to increase 
the electoral potential of the list. Only one analysed cartel list contained no 
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 The sample contains 10 cases which have (at least once) engaged in a pre-electoral alliance during the period 
analyzed (2000-2012), three of which were only just starting up when the interviews took place in 2012 and did not 
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independent candidates (case 11), while all others contained at least one, but mostly 
several independent candidates. In three cases the independent candidates formed a 
separate group presented as a distinct (independent) cartel partner. Two of these 
independent groups also have their origins in local party branches. In case 15, the 
independent cartel partner has been established long ago by VU-members (before the 
decline of the national party) following a personal conflict between the leading 
candidate of the local VU-branch and the national party leadership concerning his 
place on the national list. In case 7, the group of independent candidates on the cartel 
list concerned a splinter group of the local Christian Democrat party: ‘the cartel also 
contained three former CD&V Aldermen […] and some other people who used to be 
CD&V-minded but joined our list as independent Christian-Democrat candidates’  (case 
7). These candidates similarly left their former party after a disagreement on strategic 
choices of the local party.  
The other analysed cartel lists in the sample contained a smaller amount of individual 
independent candidates which have been included on the list because of their electoral 
potential. It equally concerns local notables with many supporters who easily get 
elected and hence adopt a prominent place within the list as they are often involved in 
the legislative or even executive activities. Yet, some respondents consider these 
independent candidates as a cumbersome necessity. They do generate highly coveted 
votes, but especially if the list gets to participate in government, independent 
candidates can also generate additional tensions within the cartel. The cartel partners 
need to negotiate on the distribution of mandates and independent candidates further 
complicate these negotiations. Including them after the elections in the political 
activities of the list is not always done with great enthusiasm: ‘We had one independent 
on our list and he got elected too. He didn’t want to confess to one of the parties on the 
list but he had a large family, very notorious and respected, and he did got elected! That 
made things more difficult’ (case 18). Another respondent judges independent 
candidates as unpredictable and unaccountable. They are considered as potentially 
problematic for they have no political superiors who can rebuke them and hence it is 
                                                     
contain sufficient information on the list composition and are not included in the analysis, which is based on seven 
lists.  
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more difficult to keep them under control: ‘If I would have a problem with my socialists, 
I could turn to Brussels, as there is a hierarchy. Independents don’t have that [...]. They 
can say a different thing tomorrow because they have no ideology, no president, no party, 
and no structure. They are beyond my control and that is a problem’ (case 12). 
As for associated lists, we can conclude that independent candidates on local cartel list 
often assume a prominent position on the list. Their high electoral potential makes 
them indispensable for the lists and they are often elected and hence also included in 
the post-electoral activities of the list. The involvement of independent candidates in 
the policy work of the cartel partners seems to generate some more reluctance than in 
associated list. The independent candidates on local cartel lists are also recruited in the 
local community, but can also originate in traditional local parties. 
9.4.3 Independent lists 
The sample contains 9 independent lists without any implicit or explicit links to any 
national party when the interviews took place. Some of these lists have extra-
parliamentary origins, initiated by citizens who feel dissatisfied with established local 
policy making and aim to provide a democratic alternative in the electoral arena. These 
candidates generally concern well-educated and socially engaged citizens with roots in 
the local civil society as exemplified by case six: ‘We started out by the end of the 1980’s 
because we were dissatisfied with established local politics. We gathered several people 
from local organizations such as the women’s movement, 11.11.11, Oxfam, the peace 
movement, VAKA’ (case 6). 
Yet, a substantial share of the analysed independent lists have their origin in 
traditional local party branches. Several independent lists in the sample were founded 
by local politicians with ample experience in local politics as a party member. One of 
the cases for example can again be traced back to the former Volksunie. The local VU-
branch had been able to deliver the mayor, but decided to profile themselves as an 
independent mayoral list when the national party disappeared. This independent 
Candidate Recruitment 
123 
 
course was regarded as ‘the path of least resistance’ to obtain the goal to re-deliver the 
mayor53. 
Several other independent lists in the sample were also established by formal members 
of a local party branch – often with executive experience in local council. The 
interviews reveal that crushed personal ambitions and internal conflicts often serve as 
main motive to initiate an independent candidate list. Three cases were prompted by 
disavowed local party politicians who left their former party following an internal 
discord concerning their personal position within the party. Case two was established 
by two former councillors of the Open VLD who had suspended their political 
activities as elected councillors due to family circumstances. After a few years they 
decided to re-engage in local politics ‘for the political microbe continued to tickle’ (case 
2). Yet, their political come-back was not appreciated by the local party elite and their 
re-application was rejected. Thereupon, they decided to participate in the ensuing 
elections with an independent list and successfully gathered additional (independent) 
candidates to support the list. A similar story can be constituted for case 16 which was 
established by a former CD&V-councillor who felt disadvantaged when his local party 
appointed the office mandates. He equally decided to gather a group of (independent) 
candidates to contest his former party and ‘demonstrate what we are capable off’. 
Similarly the deviant one-man’s list in the sample (case 9) can be considered as a 
symbolic act of rancour, inspired by mere personal motivations. The single candidate 
on this list used to assume a prominent position in the local CD&V-branch of his 
municipality but after an internal conflict concerning the distribution of executive 
mandates, he decided to submit a candidate list of his own: ‘I was persona non-grata 
and honestly I was offended. I was upset for some months, but then it started itching 
again as I am a bit of a political animal’ (case 9). This independent candidate did not 
get elected, but was later rehabilitated in his former party.  
We can conclude that independent lists benefit from the permissiveness of the local 
electoral system in Flanders. The costs for submitting a candidate list are very low and 
individual vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking ambitions easily result in the 
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 In the latest elections of 2012, this list affiliated with the N-VA for electoral reasons  
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establishment of an independent candidate lists. The lists can comprise independent 
citizens or representatives of civil society, but also former party members who look for 
a different path to achieve their political ambitions.  
9.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter dealt with candidate selection as a first of three selected key party 
functions to assess the partisan character of non-national lists in Flanders. Based on a 
combination of survey data and interview data the list composition process of different 
types of non-national lists was analysed and compared with existing insights on list 
composition in local party branches. The analysis indicates that the list composition 
process of the different types of non-national lists shows many similarities with that of 
local party branches. Candidate selection in the local political arena proves largely 
determined by a shared local context with a limited supply of eligible candidates. 
When selecting candidates, both party selectors and independent selectors value 
similar selection criteria with a preference for notorious, locally embedded candidates. 
As the supply of adequate candidates is confined, selectors face difficulties to attract 
adequate candidates and modify the selection demands to compose a full candidate list. 
Party selectors often involve independent candidates on associated lists or cartel lists 
while independent selectors also involve party affiliated candidates on independent list. 
This results in varying shares of independent candidates on the different types of non-
national lists. Local cartel lists contain the least independent candidates as recruitment 
efforts are shared which reduces the number of list places available for additional 
independent candidates (some cartel lists however concerns pre-electoral alliances 
between local party branches and groups of independent candidates often involving a 
larger share of independent candidates). Associated list contain higher shares of 
independent candidates, while independent lists contain the highest share of 
independent candidates, although supplemented with non-independent candidates. 
Traditional recruitment channels (local associations) are less relevant for independent 
selectors and these independent selectors face more problems to overcome 
recruitment problems and less often succeed to compose a complete list. 
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The independent candidates on the different types of non-national lists are not only 
recruited from the local community (local notables, professions, middle class, ...), but 
also frequently emanate from traditional local party branches. Hence, the analysis 
indicates that independent candidates on non-national lists should not simply be 
equated with nonpartisan candidates as their independent character not always refers 
to a nonpartisan background, but often to the mere fact that they no longer belong to a 
party. The interviews revealed that several independent candidates on the different 
types of non-national lists have substantial political experience in traditional parties. 
Especially leading candidates of independent lists or independent groups on cartel lists 
could be traced back to traditional party branches where they once were active as 
notorious party-members often with local office functions. They dissented from their 
former party and continued their local political engagement as independent candidates 
on non-national lists. The motivation for such secessions seem not the most noble as 
they often relate to individual feuds and unprocessed personal setbacks. Hence it can 
be concluded that not only the autonomous character of local candidate lists is a fluid 
concept (as demonstrated in chapter six), but also the independent status of individual 
candidates can change over time. 
If we look at these findings from the broader analytical lens of party change, a mixed 
picture arises. On the one hand, non-national lists can be considered as a response to 
the partisan dealignment of the electorate. They recruit independent candidates who 
refuse to affiliate with established political parties and hence expand the pool of 
eligible candidates to citizens who might have defected from traditional party politics. 
Moreover, these independent candidates can further mobilize dealigned voters who 
might otherwise turn their back to the (local) electoral process. Hence, it can be 
argued that non-national lists add value to the local representative democratic process 
by broadening the pool of nominated candidates and consequently the electorate in a 
context of party dealignment. In doing so, non-national lists can increase the 
legitimacy of the local party system and contribute to bridging the gap between the 
electorate and local policy. On the other hand however, the established party political 
background of many independent candidates tempers this democratic argument. 
Independent candidates often developed political experience in a local party branch 
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but resigned from this party because of frustrated personal ambitions. Their 
independent position is just an alternative way to realize their personal ambitions. This 
could confirm the image of politicians as ‘postjespakkers’ and hence, reinforce the 
distrust of politicians.  
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10 ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH 
10.1  INTRODUCTION: PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONS 
After having analysed how non-national lists proceed to select candidates for local 
elections, I will focus in this chapter on non-national lists as organizations to 
contribute to our understanding of the partisan character of non-national lists. 
Political parties require a certain level of organizational maintenance to assume their 
political functions and bridge the gap between local government and civil society. This 
second component of the functional analysis aims to assess if and how the 
organizational features of non-national lists resemble those of local parties.  
Although forerunners of party research such as Ostrogorski, Duverger and Michels had 
a strong organizational predisposition, the study of parties as organizations has long 
been a lacuna in contemporary political science with a general focus on the party 
system level and not on individual party organizations. Only by the end of the previous 
century, scholars’ interest in the systematic study of party organizations revived. 
Panebianco was the first to re-focus attention on the fact that ‘parties are above all 
organizations and organizational analysis must therefore come before any other 
perspective’ (Panebianco, 1988). Indebted to prevailing organizational theory, he 
proposed a comprehensive conceptual framework to study party organizations as the 
result of internal struggles for power among different sub-actors within a party. His 
theoretical insights inspired a renewed organizational approach to political parties as 
complex systems consisting of diverse sub-actors within one single organization. 
Commonly, three different organizational faces of political parties are distinguished, 
each with their own specific rationales and behaviour: the Party on the Ground (party 
members), the Party in Public Office (office-holding members) and the Party in Central 
Office (professional officials). Many scholars have focussed on the interaction and 
power relations between these three organizational faces and the recent decline of 
parties is generally interpreted as a changing balance between these faces to the 
detriment of the party on the ground and in favour of the party in central office and 
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the party in public office (Bolleyer, 2009; Janda, 1980; Katz, 2005; Katz & Mair, 1994; 
Panebianco, 1988; Van Biezen, 2000).  
Party organizational strength has long been studied in terms of electoral achievements. 
Yet, measuring the organizational strength of political parties should rather capture 
the sustained and predictable nature of their party activities beyond electoral periods. 
In their aim to assess the organizational strength of political parties in the United 
States – Gibson and his colleagues conceptually distinguish between programmatic 
capacity and organizational complexity as two main components of organizational 
strength (Gibson, Cotter, Bibby, & Huckshorn, 1983, 1985). The programmatic capacity 
of party organizations refers to their activity level or the stability and frequency of 
political activities, while organizational complexity denotes the formalized nature of 
the procedures for interaction between the different components of the organization 
to engage in sustainable party activity. At the extreme end of this scale, Gibson et al. 
situate bureaucratic parties with a professionalised and formalised structure, adequate 
resources and sustained activity. At the other extreme of this scale they identify the 
dormant party with no leaders and with limited palpable existence (Gibson et al., 1985).  
While national party organization has attracted growing academic attention in recent 
decades, the organizational aspects of local parties have received much less academic 
interest. Local parties are generally considered as mere subunits of national parties 
forming the – declining - national party on the ground. Although local parties require 
some degree of organizational maintenance and organizational arrangements to 
assume the versatile party functions in a local political context, the (interaction 
between) different subunits within local parties are generally disregarded.  
In a comparative attempt, Saiz and Geser (1999) have assembled the scarce research on 
local parties in political and organizational perspective across nation states. In the 
absence of a general local party theory, this comparative endeavour yielded disparate 
yet interesting insights into the nature and status of local parties. Although the 
organizational characteristics of local parties remain underexposed and the national 
contributions demonstrate considerable variance, Saiz (1999) concludes that local 
party activity in general is vigorous and increasing, stimulated by the national party 
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centres which still highly value local anchorage and invest in local organizational 
continuity. Moreover, the authors established that local party organizational strength 
is correlated with community size and with other features of the local communities. 
More populous communities have larger, more professionalized party systems, while 
local parties are weakest in communalities with a young and highly educated 
population, signalling a shift away from traditional class-based politics (John & Saiz, 
1999). Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) equally argue that declining party membership 
does not necessarily signify the demise of party organizations as the degree of party 
activity among the remaining members has typically increased. They contend that 
political parties have adapted to a more volatile campaigning environment by 
broadening their organizational base even if the foundations of their mass membership 
are thinner. Hence, local party branches can still be considered as institutionalized 
local organizations with a stable organizational structure, notwithstanding the decline 
in membership figures. 
Few scholars have equally touched upon the organizational strength of non-national 
lists. Especially independent local candidate lists have been criticized for being short-
term and only loosely structured political groups with little representative 
accountability (Soos, 2005; Steyvers et al., 2008). Other authors have argued that this 
traditional perception of independent local lists as parochial or folkloristic occurrences 
is erroneous as these lists have evolved over time and diverge less from their national 
counterparts than previously assumed (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008; Reynaert & Steyvers, 
2004; Van Tilburg & Tops, 1990). Empirical evidence to substantiate any of these 
assumptions is scarce and again distorted by the unsatisfactory dichotomous 
distinction between national party lists and ‘independent’ candidate lists.  
This chapter aims to increase our understanding of the organizational characteristics 
of non-national lists in Flanders and how these differ from local party branches. I will 
adopt the distinction proposed by Gibson’s  et al (1983; 1985) between organizational 
complexity and programmatic capacity to assess the organizational strength of non-
national lists in Flanders and establish whether these lists should be considered as 
short-term, underactive and weakly structured political groups or rather as durable 
and active institutionalized political organizations similar to local parties. Yet, to avoid 
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confusion with the programmatic functions of non-national lists which are dealt with 
in chapter 12, I will further use the term organizational capacity instead of 
programmatic capacity.  
In the following sections I will first review previous research findings relating to the 
organizational strength of local party branches in Belgium which can serve as a 
benchmark in assessing the partisan character of the organizational features of non-
national lists. Subsequently, the quantitative analysis is presented assessing the 
organizational capacity and organizational complexity associated lists, local cartel lists 
and independent lists in Flemish municipalities based on the survey results. These 
findings are then further refined and interpreted in a qualitative section based on the 
interviews with list headers of non-national lists. In a concluding section the results 
are interpreted through the broader analytical lens of party change. 
10.2 LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN BELGIUM 
Deschouwer and Rihoux (2008) have established that the activity level of local party 
branches in Belgium is decreasing as a result of decreasing membership figures. These 
findings thus contradict Saiz’s (1999) conclusions of increasing party activity. More 
recent research on Belgium however indicates that the decline of party activities has 
ceased in recent years (André & Depauw, 2013). Moreover the organizational strength 
of local parties in Belgium is found to vary across party families. Traditional mass 
parties are among the most active local parties, while the newer party families (green 
and Flemish-nationalistic parties) are generally less vigorous. Moreover, a positive 
relation has been established between the activity level of local party branches and 
their electoral performance, especially for the traditional party families (André & 
Depauw, 2013). 
Local party branches in Belgium are also found to be organizationally complex. 
Deschouwer and Rihoux (2008) established that most party branches maintain a highly 
formalized party structure, with a formal demarcation between the local party-on-the-
ground (nationally registered members), the local party-in-central-office (formally 
elected board of governors presided by a local party president) and the local party-in-
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public-office (council group), including statutory defined interaction procedures. Yet, 
the authors argue that these formal party structures mainly subsist for they are 
inherited from the past, but that local parties are less and less the local fundaments of 
national party organizations. Instead, they would have developed their own local 
political logic, often with a focus on local elections. Furthermore, Deschouwer and 
Rihoux (2008) have established loosening statutory relationships between local party 
branches and national party centres, confirming the evolution towards stratarchical 
party structures. These findings also indicate that the organizational practices of local 
party branches can deviate significantly from the formal arrangements as provided by 
the statutory prescriptions of the national party. 
10.3  ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY OF NON-NATIONAL LISTS 
To assess the organizational strength of non-national lists in Flemish municipalities, I 
will first consider their organizational capacity, referring to their ability to sustainably 
engage in political activities beyond elections and maintain a stable activity level. Two 
aspects of organizational capacity are successively dealt with: the age of the list and 
their activity rate.   
10.3.1 Organizational age 
The age of non-national lists provides a first indication of their organizational capacity 
in terms of stability. The questionnaire asked list headers to indicate when their list 
first participated in municipal elections under their present name. Table 10.1 (left part) 
summarizes the results and indicates that a majority of all three types of non-national 
lists participated for the first time with this label in the most recent municipal 
elections of 2012. Only a small minority of all non-national lists (12,9%) has been 
electorally active for more than three successive elections. The differences between 
associated lists, cartel lists and independent lists are limited and proved statistically 
not significant. At first sight these figures seem to confirm that non-national lists in 
Flanders are predominantly short-term and unstable organizations. However, an 
additional question inquired if a related predecessor of the lists had participated in 
prior municipal elections under a different name. Nearly half of the respondents 
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indicated that this was indeed the case, which offers a very different image of the 
organizational stability of these lists (right side of table 10.1). If we include these 
precursors the share of actually novel lists decreases to about one third of all non-
national lists (33,7%), while nearly 35% have been electorally active since before 2000.  
Table 10.1: First electoral participation of non-national lists in Flanders 
  
forerunners excl. forerunners incl. 
In 2012 
In 2000 or 
2006 
Before 
2000 
In 2012 
In 2000 or 
2006 
Before 
2000 
non-national lists 61,2% 25,9% 12,9% 33,7% 31,3% 34,9% 
Associated lists 67,2% 21,3% 11,5% 33,9% 23,7% 42,4% 
Cartel lists 61,1% 32,2% 6,7% 28,1% 44,9% 27,0% 
Independent lists 57,7% 23,1% 19,2% 38,5% 24,0% 37,5% 
Cramer’s V 0,143 0,157* 
         (N=255, 252) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
Although the differences in age between associated lists, cartel lists and independent 
lists are limited, they proved statistically significant. Independent lists contain slightly 
more recent organizations, while supported lists most often concern older 
organizations which have been electorally active since before 2000. Nearly half of the 
cartel lists have been established in 2000 or 2006. These figures indicate that 
independent lists are less stable than cartel lists and associated lists (V= 0,157*).  
10.3.2 Activity rate 
In addition to the first electoral participation of non-national lists, their organizational 
capacity is determined by the rate of party activities. Hence, I will consider if non-
national lists organize typical party activities and at what frequency. Local party 
activities can vary in nature and target audience. Some only involve a limited group of 
active core members, while other activities address a more inclusive group of (active 
and passive) members or an even wider public of sympathizers or interested citizens 
(political debates, festivities, social events …). Moreover, local parties typically engage 
in diverse communication activities to keep their rank and file informed about their 
political demands and realizations and on upcoming activities. The questionnaire 
included several questions on this diverse range of party activities.  
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The survey results show that not all non-national lists in Flanders do engage in party 
activities beyond election periods. About one out of five of the respondents indicated 
that their lists turns to a non-active state in between election periods. These lists can 
therefore be considered as dormant organizations, following the denomination used by 
Gibson et al. (1985). These dormant organizations occur more frequently in the group 
of independent lists, although these differences proved not significant (table 10.2)  
Table 10.2: Share of dormant non-national lists 
 
dormant lists 
non-national lists 20,6% 
associated lists 15,3% 
cartel lists 18,2% 
independent lists 25,7% 
Cramer’s V 0,110 
            (N=248) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
A large majority of non-national lists does engage in political activities beyond 
elections and thus maintains a certain activity level in between elections. The 
respondents were asked to indicate how frequently their list organizes 1) board or core 
group meetings to prepare council work or organize other party activities; 2) general 
meetings for all (active and passive) members / sympathizers; 3) communication with 
their members through a members magazine (paper or electronic); and 4) public 
activities for members or sympathizers.  
Table 10.3 summarizes the shares of non-dormant lists that regularly organize core 
group meetings (at least once a month), general member meetings (at least once a 
year), public activities (at least two a year) and regularly communicate with their 
members (at least several times a year). These shares demonstrate that a large majority 
of four out of ten of the non-national lists which do engage in political activities in 
between elections regularly organizes core group meetings and communicates with 
their members on a regular basis. A slightly smaller majority of above 60% organizes 
yearly general meetings or at least two public activities a year. The differences between 
associated lists, cartel lists and independent lists are statistically not significant.   
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Table 10.3: Share of non-dormant lists with regular activities 
  
regular core 
group meetings  
regular 
member 
meetings 
regular 
communication 
regular public 
activities 
non-national lists 83,0% 62,0% 82,0% 62,4% 
associated lists 77,3% 65,3% 77,8% 70,0% 
cartel lists 87,5% 57,3% 72,0% 63,9% 
independent lists 82,2% 61,4% 76,6% 56,0% 
Cramer’s V 0,114 0,124 0,115 0,115 
           (N=197) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
The four activity domains have been integrated, allowing to establish the overall 
organizational activity level of the different types of non-national lists and distinguish 
between dynamic organizations with a high and stable activity level (regular activities 
in at least three of the above mentioned activity fields) and relaxed organizations 
which do engage in some party activities in between electoral periods, but on a less 
regular basis - in addition to the previously identified dormant organizations. Table 
10.4 illustrates the distribution of the different types of non-national lists between 
these three organizational types and demonstrates that slightly more than half of all 
non-national lists can be identified as dynamic. Independent lists contain the lowest 
share of dynamic lists, although these differences again proved not statistically 
significant. Additionally, somewhat more than one out of four of the non-national lists 
in Flanders can be identified as relaxed organizations with only a limited level of party 
activity in between election periods.  
Table 10.4: Organizational capacity of non-national lists 
 dormant relaxed dynamic 
non-national lists 20,6% 27,4% 52,0% 
supported lists 15,3% 27,1% 57,6% 
cartel lists 18,2% 26,1% 55,7% 
independent lists 25,7% 28,7% 45,5% 
Cramer’s V 0,088 
            (N = 248) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
The organizational capacity of non-national lists could be influenced by their electoral 
performance and their role in council. It can be assumed that council work is 
considered a priority for local party organizations and that most other party activities 
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relate to their work in council. Core group meetings serve to prepare the council work, 
communication activities report on council work, public activities promote council 
work etc. Without any representatives in council, these party activities have less 
substance and party life risks to fade away together with the lack of tangible political 
leverage. Table 10.5 confirms that non-national lists with representatives in council 
more often have a high activity level, while non-national lists that did not pass the 
representation threshold more often concern dormant or relaxed lists (Cramer’s 
V=0.256***). The difference between lists in opposition and governing lists is less 
pronounced. 
Table 10.5: Organizational capacity and role in council of non-national lists 
 non-national lists 
 dormant relaxed dynamic 
Total 20,6% 27,4% 52,0% 
in government 13,5% 25,8% 60,7% 
in opposition 18,2% 20,9% 60,9% 
not represented 38,8% 44,9% 16,3% 
Cramer's V 0,256*** 
  (N=248) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
The direction of this correlation between non-national lists’ role in council and their 
organizational capacity however is not quite clear as there is also empirical evidence to 
substantiate a positive effect of organizational capacity on electoral results (Audrey & 
depauw, 2016). Hence, it could also be assumed that non-national lists with a low 
activity level are less rooted in the community, attract less votes and encounter more 
difficulties to surpass the representation threshold. More research is needed to delve 
into the specific causes of the low activity levels of non-national lists.  
10.4 ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF NON-NATIONAL LISTS 
To further analyse the organizational strength of non-national lists, this section deals 
with their organizational complexity, considering the formalized nature and the 
delineation of the different organizational faces of the lists. Local party branches are 
generally considered as highly formalized, with formal membership structures and 
formal rules and procedures for interaction provided by the national mother party 
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(Deschouwer & Rihoux, 2008). The questionnaire for non-national list headers 
therefore comprised several questions concerning the character of their membership 
(formal, informal, no members), daily management (formal elected board, informal 
core group of active members or no daily management) and the procedures for 
interaction (formal statutes or not).  
As established above, one out of five respondents have indicated that their list does not 
engage in any party activity in between elections. It can be assumed that these 
dormant lists neither have any organizational arrangements or procedures for 
interaction, as there is no active party life. Hence, these respondents were guided 
beyond the questions relating to the organizational complexity of the list, and not 
included in the tables below.  
Table 10.6 summarizes the formalized nature of the membership, the daily 
management and the procedures for interaction within non-dormant non-national 
lists.  
Table 10.6: Shares of non-dormant lists with formal and less formal organizational arrangements 
 membership daily management statutes 
 formal informal none formal  informal none yes no 
non-national lists 40,7% 42,3% 17,0% 47,4% 38,7% 13,9% 48,7% 51,3% 
associated lists 49,0% 42,9% 8,2% 70,0% 24,0% 6,0% 44,0% 56,0% 
cartel lists 47,2% 34,7% 18,1% 42,3% 49,3% 8,5% 52,1% 47,9% 
independent lists 28,8% 49,3% 21,9% 37,0% 38,4% 24,7% 48,6% 51,4% 
Cramer’s V 0,155 0.239*** 0.063 
         (N=193,194) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
These figures demonstrate that both formal and informal or none organizational 
structures are common. About 40% of the included non-national lists has a formalized 
and paying membership structure, while slightly more maintains an informal lists of 
sympathizers and a minority of 17% keeps no account of any members or sympathizers 
at all. The share of independent lists with a formal membership structure is 
substantially lower than for other list types, although this difference proved not 
significant. The lists with a formal paying membership structure averagely have 167 
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members, while non-national lists with informal accounts indicate an average of 92 
sympathizers. 
A similar general distribution is found for the formalized nature of the daily 
management of non-national lists. 47,4% of the lists have a formal elected board of 
governors, while 38,7% of the lists are led by an informal core group of activists and 
13,9% has no daily management at all. However, these shares vary significantly 
between the different types of non-national lists (Cramers’ V=0.239***).. Associated 
lists more often have a formal board of governors to manage daily party life, while local 
cartel lists more often have an informal core group and independent lists more often 
indicate to have no daily management. Formal management boards averagely contain 
13 board members, while informal core groups are smaller with an average of 9,5 
members. 
In about half of all (non-dormant) non-national lists the procedures for interaction 
between the organizational faces of the list are formalized by statutes. The other half of 
the included lists have no official rules and procedures for interaction and internal 
decision making. No significant differences were found on this aspect between the 
different types of non-national lists.  
These figures can again be integrated allowing to distinguish between bureaucratic 
lists with a high organizational complexity (at least two formal party organs) and 
informal lists with no or only one formal party organ. Table 10.7 illustrates the shares of 
bureaucratic and informal organizations in the different types of non-national lists - in 
addition to the dormant lists which have been identified in the previous section. These 
figures indicate that only 34,7% of all non-national lists are characterized by 
bureaucratic party-like organizational structures. This share varies across the different 
types of non-national lists with scarcely over one out of four independent lists with a 
bureaucratic organization, amounting to one out of three for cartel lists and nearly one 
out of two for associated lists. These differences however are not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 10.7: Organizational complexity of non-national lists 
 dormant  informal  bureaucratic  
non-national lists 20,6% 44,8% 34,7% 
associated lists 15,3% 37,3% 47,5% 
cartel lists 18,2% 47,7% 34,1% 
independent lists 25,7% 46,5% 27,7% 
Cramer’s V 0,123 
    (N=248) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
We have established before that the organizational capacity of non-national lists 
strongly correlates with their position in council. Similarly, it can be assumed that 
non-national lists without representatives in council do not require a complex 
organizational structure and that organizational complexity equally correlates with the 
lists’ position in council. Table 10.8 confirms this assumption, demonstrating that non-
national lists which have not passed the representation threshold are significantly less 
often bureaucratically organized (Cramer’s V= 0.172**).  
Table 10.8: Organizational complexity and role in council of non-national lists 
 dormant informal bureaucratic 
Non-national lists 20,6% 44,8% 34,7 
in government 13,5% 49,4% 37,1 
in opposition 18,2% 42,7% 39,1 
not represented 38,8% 40,8% 20,4 
Cramer's V 0,172** 
         (N=248) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
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10.5 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH 
We can conclude that the organizational strength of non-national lists varies 
considerably between but also within the different types of non-national lists. 
Independent lists more often concern dormant lists and less often have a bureaucratic 
organizational structure. Hence, independent lists least resemble the traditional 
organizational structure of local party branches. Nevertheless, still a substantial part of 
them does demonstrate a high activity rate and a high organizational complexity. 
Similarly, associated lists and cartel lists have varying levels of organizational capacity 
and organizational complexity. This variation can be partly clarified by the council 
position of the lists. Non-national lists with representatives in council are 
organizationally stronger than non-national lists without elected councillors. Yet a 
substantial part of the variation in organizational strength remains unclarified and the 
quantitative analysis leaves us somewhat mystified concerning the extent to which 
non-national lists actually differ or resemble local party branches.  
Particularly the organizational complexity of non-national lists requires further 
qualitative analysis. Several authors have indicated that the de facto modus operandi of 
local parties can deviate significantly from the formal provisions and that formal and 
informal organizational procedures and arrangements can coexist within single local 
party organizations (Fabre, 2010; Reiser & Vetter, 2011). Associated lists and cartel lists 
originate from local party branches who engage in specific alliances with independent 
candidates or other local parties. Hence, we can expect these lists to also combine 
traditional party structures with customized organizational arrangements for these 
local alliances. Yet, the highly structured imperative of the quantitative research design 
does not allow for such nuance and the adopted operationalization of organizational 
strength is highly focused on traditional local party structures. Hence, in the following 
section I will turn to the organizational reality of non-national lists in Flanders and 
analyse the respective role of - and the relation between - traditional and alternative 
organizational arrangements non-national lists in Flanders.  
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10.6 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE 
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN NON-NATIONAL LISTS  
A qualitative analysis of the elite-interviews with list-headers of the 22 selected cases 
allows to refine the quantitative research findings on the organizational strength of 
non-national lists as discussed above. The interviews provide more detailed and 
contextual information on the organizational strength of the cases and allow for a 
more profound analysis of the co-occurrence of and interaction between formal and 
informal organizational arrangements. I will successively discuss the results of this 
qualitative analysis for associated lists, local cartel lists and independent lists in the 
sample. 
10.6.1 Associated lists 
This organizational analysis of associated lists is based on six cases. Associated lists are 
initiated by local party branches aiming to maximize their vote share by involving 
independent candidates and localizing their name. In the previous chapter it was 
established that these independent candidates not merely serve to fill up the lists but 
often get elected and hence are also involved in other (legislative) activities of the 
party. The interviews reveal that most of these cases combine traditional 
organizational party structures with informal organizational arrangements to integrate 
the independent candidates into the party organization.  
Only one associated list in the sample (case 20) did not adapt its traditional party 
structures and maintained a clear and formal demarcation between the different 
organizational faces of the local party (the members, the board and the council group), 
each with their own tasks and settings: ‘Council meetings take place every fourth 
Thursday of the month. We have a council group meeting on the preceding Monday and 
on Tuesday we present our plans to the board of governors which is composed of 
representatives of the local associations of the party. […] The regular members are 
mainly involved through festivities’.  
The other five cases did adapt their original formal party structures to accommodate 
the independent candidates into the party operation. We have distinguished above 
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(chapter 2.5) between the two (divergent) roles of local party branches: one as agency 
of the national mother party and one as political actor in the local political arena. The 
interviews reveal that these two role are organizationally disconnected to integrate 
independent candidates. These independent candidates have only engaged for the 
local political project of the party branch and do not affiliate with the national party or 
support the national party goals. Involving these candidates in the local activities of 
the party while excluding them from national party issues therefore requires the 
detachment of both local party roles. Two organizational strategies can be 
distinguished to disentangle these two local party faces: assimilation and 
differentiation.  
Two cases in the sample (case 10 and case 13) have adopted the first strategy and 
assimilated the independent candidates of the associated list into the party by 
unlocking their formal local party organs. Both cases maintained a bureaucratic party 
structure with registered party members and a formal elected board of governors, but 
these traditional local party organs have been opened up to embrace people from 
outside the party (independent candidates but also other interested sympathizers): ‘If 
people are interested, they can come by and join the board. But what’s in a name, the 
board is just a group of people’ (case 10). Similarly, the local party-on-the-ground has 
been disconnected from the national party membership by unlocking local political 
activities to non-party members. In both cases, the main motivation for this 
assimilation strategy seems to be a general concern for openness and transparency in 
the local policy debate and the ambition to involve non-party members in the 
formulation of local policy preferences. Case 13 even set up a parallel membership 
structure in addition to the nationally registered party members, although with a less 
closed character: ‘Everyone can come to our meetings and become member. Last meeting 
we realized that we forgot to ask a membership fee, but normally we have about 30 
paying members and several non-paying members who regularly attend our meetings’ 
(case 13).  
Supra-local party-political issues are rarely discussed within these parties, but the 
national party members in the municipality do remain involved in national party 
activities through direct communication from the national party centre without the 
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intermediation of the local party branch. Yet, the national party remains connected 
with the associated lists and supports their local political activities. Consequently, the 
national party is considered the ‘rich aunt’ of the associated lists. 
These two cases thus clearly prioritize their latter role as actors in the local political 
arena and they have put their role as national party agency on the backburner. The 
assimilation of non-party members in these cases resulted in an informal 
organizational structure, grafted upon the traditional party organs but discarding the 
clear distinction between the organizational faces of the party. The traditional party 
organs have been unlocked to coalesce into one single group of people with a joint 
political project for the locality: ‘Our representatives do not meet separately. We are an 
open group, we hope that as many people are present to raise questions and hear our 
agenda and participate in the decisions’ (case 10).   
The three other associated lists in the sample adopted a different strategy to 
accommodate independent candidates. They are not willing to neglect their role as 
party agencies for they have a considerable amount of party members and an extensive 
membership operation: ‘We are a large party branch with more than 600 party 
members. We have a vast socio-cultural operation and that’s why people affiliate: an 
excursion, a barbeque, political services, group purchases, information sessions’ (case 
14). Instead of unlocking the traditional party structures and focusing on their role in 
local politics, these cases have split up the two party roles and assigned them to two 
separate structures. The respondents make a clear functional and organizational 
differentiation between the local party and the list, notwithstanding a substantial 
overlap in people. The local party concentrates on its role as agency of the national 
party with a focus on member activities and supra-local party issues, while the lists 
involves all candidates (party-members and independents) and is exclusively 
concerned with local policy issues as illustrated by the following quote:  
‘Interviewer: So there is a difference between the work of the list and that of the party? 
Respondent: Yes, and we try to keep that strictly separated […]. The [local] party will 
never assume a party-political stance on local policy issues but gave its mandate to the 
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list […].The [local] party rather considers strategic, long-term issues and organizes socio-
cultural activities for the members’ (case 14).’  
At organizational level, the local party maintains its formal and closed bureaucratic 
structure with paying members, an elected board of governors and regular general 
meetings. The list on the other hand has a less complex organizational structure 
without members, nor board of governors, but simply containing all candidates on the 
list. Still a distinction can be made between the elected candidates (the council group) 
and the non-elected candidates. Two of these cases (case 19 and case 21) concerned 
successful mayoral lists which were able to deliver a single majority and hence all 
candidates on the list received some office function (mayor, aldermen, councillor, 
social welfare councillor). Hence the list coincides with the council group and 
interaction between the candidates occurs more or less formal in line with the council 
agenda. Case 21 has monthly meetings to prepare council work, while the candidates of 
case 19 hardly ever gathered formally, but frequently interacted through informal 
contacts: ‘We rarely congregated outside the council meetings, but we regularly bumped 
into each other […]. No week could pass without bumping into one another. There were 
so many activities from all sorts of organizations and you always meet people’ (case 19).  
Case 14 was also part of local government but had less office functions to distribute and 
consequently an organizational distinction is made between the council group and the 
non-elected candidates. The council group of this case meets monthly in preparation 
of the council meetings, while the office holders also aim to keep the non-elected 
candidates politically engaged in light of future elections by inviting them on a regular 
basis to discuss past and future work and provide policy input.  
Notwithstanding this clear organizational and functional distinction between the local 
party and the list, these two organizational entities are interlinked through 
considerable personal overlap as the management board of the party contains several 
candidates / office holders. Yet, on local policy issues, the list – and particularly the 
council group - seems to assume a dominant position over the party. The latter is 
mainly considered as a source of input and support for the council group: ‘Some of the 
candidates on the list, like myself, are also part of the local party board, but there are 
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also candidates who are not interested to join the party board […]. If the local party 
perceives any problems, these are passed on to us. The party doesn’t take any decisions. 
[…]. We (the list) take the decisions because we contain alderman and councillors’ (case 
21). Moreover, the autonomous position of the list seems enhanced by a separate 
budget. These three lists organize separate activities and have their own revenues, 
although the party provides a significant part of the campaign resources.  
This functional and organizational separation of the ‘party’ and the ‘list’ seems to allow 
the council group to take local policy decisions without the formal checks and balances 
provided in traditional local party structures. Although the involvement of 
independent candidates is the main argument for this autonomous and dominant 
stance of the council group, the interviews also demonstrate that after a while, 
independent candidates often affiliate to the party: ‘we started out with about 50% 
independent candidates on the list, but elected or appointed candidates soon become 
party members too and integrate in the local party organization, although we never 
urged for this’ (case 14). The pressure on independent candidates to eventually affiliate 
with the party is even clearer in case 21 where all candidates are explicitly expected to 
become a party member.  
We can conclude that involving independent candidates impedes local party branches 
to combine their local political ambitions with their role as party agency within one 
single party organization. Therefore, the associated lists in the sample have adapted 
their organizational structure to meet the specific local needs resulting in a 
combination of formal and informal organizational arrangements. For some cases the 
organizational differentiation between the party and the list seems to provide the local 
council group with substantial autonomy in local policy issues. 
10.6.2 Local cartel list 
The interviews reveal that the local cartel lists in the sample equally combine 
traditional local party structures with specific organizational arrangements to organize 
the local alliance between the different cartel partners. Again, a clear organizational 
distinction can be made between the individual parties and the joint list, although the 
functional differentiation is less clear as for associated lists. The individual cartel 
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partners maintain their own – often bureaucratic organizational structures with a 
formal board of governors, registered party members and formal, statutory procedures 
for interaction. These local party organizations are concerned with both their role as 
party agency and their role in local politics. In addition to the distinct organizational 
structures of the individual cartel partners, the cooperation between these partners is 
structured in an overarching cartel organization with a sole focus on local political 
issues. Most cartel lists also contain some independent candidates but these often have 
no separate formal organizational structure: ‘We actually consist of three parties in one 
cartel and two of them have a separate board, and mandatories, and members paying 
their membership fees, … Only the independents are not organized like that’ (case 7). 
Only in case 15, the independent candidates also have a distinct – though less formal - 
organizational structure with frequent core group meetings: ‘We are a small group of 
about 8 people and we meet monthly. We have no formal board nor anything like that, 
only a president, a secretary and a treasurer, but that’s more an informal matter’ (case 
15).  
Moreover, the organizational features of these alliances alter with the electoral cycle. 
The terms and conditions of the alliances are negotiated by an ad-hoc group with 
representatives of the different (potential) cartel partners. Local party leaders and top 
candidates of the individual cartel partners play a prominent role in these temporary 
negotiating structures. In two cases, these working groups even involved 
representatives of the national party centre to strengthen the position of the 
unexperienced local party representatives: ‘The top candidate of our cartel partner was 
an incumbent councillor but with limited political experience. He was assisted in the 
cartel negotiations by a Flemish MP and the vice-president of his national party’ (case 11). 
These ad hoc structures have no formal structure nor formal procedures for interaction 
but convene intensively during a short period of time prior to the elections to agree on 
the cartel name and the composition of the list, a joint electoral program, the divisions 
of campaigning efforts and possible post-electoral collaboration… They also agree on 
the post-electoral cooperation as cartel lists can exceed a mere electoral alliance and 
obtain a more permanent character. 
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Only one cartel list in the sample merely concerned a joint candidate list with no 
engagements for further cooperation. The privileged relationship between the cartel 
partners ended after the elections and each party refocused on its own role in council. 
The other analysed cartel lists did sustain the cooperation, although the organizational 
structure to cooperate altered after the elections with a shift in both the focus and the 
locus of the alliance. Once the electoral dice was thrown and the elected and 
appointed officials of the list were identified, the respective party leaders took a step 
back and the joint council group became the centroid of the alliance which refocused 
on a joint council strategy – instead of a joint electoral strategy.  
For cartel lists in local government however, this post-electoral collaboration closely 
resembles conventional coalition practices and becomes mainly concentrated in the 
group of executive officials in the College of Mayor and Aldermen. This is especially 
true for the two cartel lists with a single majority who have no other coalition partners 
to consider. The Mayor and Aldermen of these cases meet weekly to decide on local 
policy measures, while the other councillors of the cartel gather prior to the council 
meetings to take notice of the council agenda and receive ‘voting instructions’. The 
collaboration between the councillors from the different cartel partners is limited as 
they have little political levers and are mainly expected to support the decisions of the 
College. In one case the separate council group meetings have even been omitted 
during the course of the legislature and the cooperation between the cartel / coalition 
partners became exclusively located in the College.  
Similarly, the post-electoral collaboration between cartel partners in larger coalitions – 
involving additional parties than only those of the cartel – differs little from 
conventional coalition work and is concentrated in the College. One respondent 
clearly states that his post-electoral relationship within the cartel does not differ from 
his relationship with the other coalition partner in his government because a coalition 
always decides ‘in collegiality’: ‘In a coalition government, all partners support the policy 
decisions. You only bring consensual issues on the council agenda and in the absence of 
consensus the agenda item is postponed’ (case 11). In another governing cartel however 
(case 7) the aldermen of the cartel partners do form a distinctive group and convene 
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separately to prepare the college meetings and align their position towards the other 
coalition partner.  
Although the joint organization of governing cartel partners is mainly centred in the 
college, the local party organizations do keep a close eye on this collaboration. They 
generally attend the joint council group meetings and the local party presidents often 
consult informally if no consensus is found within the college on specific issues. In one 
case the cartel partners even organize occasional joint board meetings to discuss 
specific policy issues.  
For local cartel list with a legislative role in council, the post-electoral cartel 
collaboration is concentrated in the council group and determined by the pace and the 
decisions of the local government:  ‘Council meetings take place every third Tuesday of 
the month and the agenda is made available 10 days before, so we [council group] meet 
on Wednesdays to determine our position and additional agenda items’ (case 22). Again, 
these council group meetings are attended by the respective party presidents and are 
accessible to the non-elected candidates of the lists, although these show limited 
interest (except in the prospect of upcoming elections when new people come forward).  
We can conclude that local cartel lists contain a multilayered organizational structure 
with a clear organizational distinction between the cartel and the distinct cartel 
partners. The local party branches on these cartel lists maintain their own formal 
organizational structure to assume their twofold role as national party agency ánd as 
local political actor. Yet this latter role is shared with the other cartel partners in an 
umbrella structure with a more informal character. The cartel itself has no members, 
nor a formal board of governors, nor formal procedures for interaction. Before the 
elections, the operation of the alliance is focused on a joint electoral strategy with a 
prominent role for the local party organizations. After the elections, the focus of the 
collaboration shifts towards a joint council strategy and the joint council group 
assumes a more prominent position in the local policy issues dealt with by the alliance. 
Still, local party leaders also remains involved from the background. Hence, the 
council group in local cartel lists also has considerable autonomy, though less so as for 
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the associated lists as the functional distinction between the list and the party 
organizations is less clear.   
10.6.3 Independent candidate lists 
In contrast to the other list types discussed above, the independent lists in the 
sample54 assume only one of the two roles generally ascribed to local parties. They 
participate in local political life but are not concerned with supra-local party politics. 
Independent lists have no links to any national party and hence, have no formal 
organizational template at their disposal to structure their local political activities. 
These lists need to develop their own organizational arrangements to organize their 
role in local politics. Most of the analysed independent lists have an informal structure 
with an open character and no clear organizational distinction between members, 
party leaders and councillors. Most respondents therefore do not conceive their 
independent lists as a ‘party’, but rather as a ‘local political association’ composed of an 
active core group of engaged citizens but open to other interested citizens: We are not 
a party, we are a team, an anarchist collective and anyone interested can join us’ (case 
18).   
The size of these list and their position in council seems to influence their 
organizational complexity. The higher their political relevance, the higher the need for 
labour division and internal differentiation, though remaining largely informal. Three 
of the analysed independent lists did not cross the representation threshold and only 
contain about a handful of activists without elected representatives. These lists have no 
active council role but still sustain a constant limited activity level in between elections 
to monitor local policy and preserve some visibility in the municipality: ‘You could say 
that we are a movement with four people in the core and then several sympathizers, 
readers of our pamphlets’(case 8). The small scale of these cases makes any 
organizational arrangements to structure internal interaction redundant55.  
                                                     
54
 The sample contains 9 independent lists, but for one of these insufficient information is available concerning its 
organizational features, which has therefore been omitted from the analysis. 
55
 One case concerns a one man’s list and involves only one person without any interaction. 
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Independent lists with elected representatives in council can assume a more 
comprehensive political role and engage in a broader range of political activities. They 
seem also able to generate more enthusiasm and involve a larger core group of activists. 
Several analysed independent lists have created certain formal positions to organize 
and structure their activities (chairman, treasurer, secretary), yet the allocation of 
these positions is not formalized and the councillors, party leaders and sympathizers 
form one single group with no distinct meetings or activities: ‘We only have a governing 
board to take care of financial management and to implement actions, yet there is no 
elected board of governors for there are no party members (case 18).  
One independent list in the sample however, does resemble more closely to a 
traditional local party organization with a clear differentiation between the party in 
public office and the party in central office. It concerns a longstanding list with 
substantial governing experience which has led to a more formal division of labour:  
‘We do have an organigram, with a core group of seven people - the executive committee 
- which considers the general strategy of the list. This group contains a president and the 
two council group chairpersons and some external persons. Additionally we have a 
broader policy group involving all councillors and some other sympathizers which 
gathers monthly to prepare the council meetings’ (case 3). The first group can be 
considered as a closed party-in-central-office, while the latter group concerns an open 
party-in-public-office. A formal party-on-the-ground is lacking for the list has no 
members, but they can rely on a large informal rank and file.  
We can conclude that independent lists in general are less complex and less formally 
structured than associated or cartel lists which are organized at multiple levels to 
combine their role as party agency with their role in local politics. Independent lists 
are only concerned with local politics and do not require any organizational 
arrangements to combine these two roles. Some independent lists have no 
organizational structure at all, while others have merely a simple informal structure 
and still others have adopted some traditional organizational characteristics. The 
organizational complexity of independent lists seems to vary according to their size 
and position in council.  
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10.7  CONCLUSIONS 
Based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, this chapter has assessed 
the organizational strength of non-national lists in Flanders to contribute to our 
understanding of their partisan character and assess whether these lists should rather 
be considered as short-term, weakly structured political groups or as party-like durable 
and institutionalized local political organizations. The survey results demonstrated 
that both the organizational capacity and the organizational complexity of non-
national lists varies substantially within and between the different types of non-
national lists and confirmed that these lists represent a miscellaneous phenomenon in 
local politics with diverging organizational features.  
The qualitative analysis clearly demonstrated that the organizational structure of non-
national lists often contains a complex and multileveled mixture of formal and 
informal arrangements which is difficult to grasp with a standardized quantitative 
approach. Local cartel lists and associated lists can be considered as organizational 
derivatives of local party branches. Both types are based on traditional local party 
structures which have been excavated by or supplemented with informal customized 
organizational arrangements to combine their role as party agency with their role as 
participants in local politics. They often have a complex, multilayered organizational 
structure, with a less prominent organizational distinction between members, 
councillors and party leadership, while the distinction between local and supra-local 
competences on the other hand is strongly anchored in the adapted organizational 
structures. Supra-local and party political issues remain the exclusive competence of 
the traditional party organizations, while local policy issues are largely detached from 
the national party and assigned to additional (or adapted) - less formalized - 
organizational structures. These customized organizational structures seem to provide 
local party branches with substantial autonomy and attribute a dominant role to the 
council group. Hence, these findings seem to confirm the general evolution towards 
stratarchical party structures (Bolleyer, 2012). Moreover, these findings also confirm 
the concentration of local powers in the local council groups as established by Copus 
and Erlingsson as the local counterpart of the party crisis (Copus & Erlingsson, 2012). 
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Hence, at organizational level, associated lists and cartel lists can be considered as a 
local reflection of the cartelization tendency of political parties. 
Independent local lists on the other hand proved weaker organizations. Their 
organizational structure is less formal and less complex and they demonstrate lower 
activity levels. Yet, a substantial part of the independent lists equally indicate a high 
organizational capacity and concern dynamic, party-like organizations. Their 
organizational strength seems strongly influenced by their electoral success and 
position in council. Without representatives in council, the commitment of activists to 
engage in political activities in between elections is confined and the limited scope of 
non-represented lists does not entail any (complex) organizational structures nor 
broad activity levels. Moreover, it was established above that independent lists in 
Flanders more often fail to surpass the electoral threshold and enter local council, 
while local cartel lists and associated lists have more electoral guarantees when 
entering the electoral arena. Hence, independent lists more often lack the political 
need to organize on a more stable basis.   
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11 PROGRAMMATIC PRIORITIES 
11.1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POSITIONAL COMPETITION 
The general objective of this functional analysis is to establish the partisan character of 
non-national lists in Flanders by assessing the extent to which they implement the 
functions traditionally associated with political parties. The previous chapters dealt 
with candidate selection and organizational strength as key party functions. This 
chapter considers the programmatic priorities of non-national lists as part of their 
programmatic party functions. Political parties identify and prioritize public concerns 
and translate these into a coherent party program to mobilize the electorate and 
influence the political agenda. These programmatic party functions are generally 
inspired by a broader vision on society which is crystalized in the party ideology 
involving ‘a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized 
political action’ (Heywood, 2003). Party ideologies are relatively constant in time and 
place and represents the core identity of political parties. They contain a diagnosis of 
the present society with its prevailing problems, a vision on how society should be 
organized and political strategies to achieve this ‘good society’ (Heywood, 2003). Based 
on these shared views on how society is and should be organized a distinction can be 
made between several party families across nation states: liberal parties, conservative 
parties, socialist parties, social democratic parties, Christian democratic parties, green 
parties, right-wing parties, … (Volkens & Klingemann, 2002; Ware, 1996).  
Many party ideologies – and the associated party families - can be traced back to the 
central societal conflicts of the beginning of the 20th century. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
identified two revolutions associated with the modernization of society (state 
formation and industrialization) which have resulted in four main social cleavages 
from which political parties have developed. These cleavages concern the conflict 
between the centre and the periphery; the state and the church; agriculture and 
industry; and labour and capital. These conflicts from earlier times have been ‘frozen’ 
into the party systems and continued to structure political competition in modern 
societies (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Further modernization and social changes 
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(secularization, globalization, urbanization …) however, have altered the relative 
salience of these traditional cleavages and brought about new social conflicts. These 
modern conflicts have developed in additional politicized cleavages such as the divide 
between universalism and particularism or between material and post-material values 
(Steyvers, 2014). Traditional parties did not (sufficiently) adopt these new cleavages 
and the emergence of new parties with novel party ideologies (left-libertarian, 
nationalist parties) indicated a partial ‘defrost’ of the traditional party systems.   
Of these different, interwoven societal cleavages in Western democracies, the socio-
economic conflict between labour and capital is generally considered as the most 
prominent one (Bouteca, 2011; Dalton, 1996; Lijphart, 1999). The versatile ideological 
space in which party competition occurs is often translated into one single left-right 
dimension to reflect this dominant traditional class-based conflict. This one-
dimensional left-right divide is a recognizable and widely applied scale which helps the 
electorate to locate parties vis-à-vis each other and to select the party that comes 
closest to the individual preferences. Moreover, it allows party elites to relate to each 
other on substantive grounds and much comparative party research equally relies on 
the ideological classification of parties on this left-right scale. Yet, the emergence of 
post-modern social cleavages has complicated the interpretation and application of 
‘left’ and ‘right’ and calls the relevance of these ideological references into question. 
Several authors advocate to complement the socio-economic dimension of the left-
right scale with a socio-cultural dimension to include non-economic, non-class based 
concerns (Inglehart, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1998). 
The salience of this left-right dimension is also called into question by contemporary 
party theories indicating the fading out of ideological differences between political 
parties. Centrifugal party competition has been replaced by more centripetal 
competition for the median voter as a result of social and political modernization and 
corresponding changes in the electorate (diminishing class-based identities, 
secularization, dealignment…). The ideological convergence of political parties was one 
of the main characteristics of the catch-all party model described by Kircheimer (1966) 
in succession to the traditional mass-party model. The catch-all party is characterized 
by reduced attention for ideological issues in favour of more technical issues and 
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personalities. This ideological convergence is equally ascribed to the ensuing cartel 
party with a further decrease of the political competition as parties increasingly form 
power cartels (Katz & Mair, 1995). Other scholars however have countered this 
assumed ideological convergence and argue that moments of convergence and 
divergence alternate (Bouteca, 2011; Budge & Klingemann, 2001). 
Party programs represent the operational component of party ideologies. The party 
ideology serves as a political compass to interpret topical political issues and 
determine policy proposals and party programs. These general ideas on society provide 
the party leaders, but also voters and activists with a conceptual map to understand 
political situations and reduce the information costs associated with sorting out party 
positions on a multitude of concrete issues (Vassallo & Wilcox, 2006). In a traditional 
rational choice perspective, party competition has been studied from a confrontational 
approach in which parties defend different standpoints and assume diverging positions 
in the policy space (proximity model). However, several authors have argued that 
parties not only compete on positional issues, but also on valence issue (Budge & 
Klingemann, 2001). These valence issues concern political subjects that strongly move 
the electorate but for which no alternative policy positions occur across different 
parties. Still, these issues are positively or negatively linked to certain parties and 
consequently parties compete by emphasizing those themes that belong to their core-
business and benefit their competitive position (saliency model of party competition). 
Consequently, party programs can be studied based on the direction or the intensity of 
policy preferences (Bouteca, 2011).  
Local parties assume similar programmatic party functions and equally take position in 
societal conflicts to formulate local policy proposals and demands based on their view 
of a ‘good’ society. The role of national ideological cleavages in the articulation and 
prioritization of local interests is less clear however. In most Western democracies, the 
local political arena is dominated by national party branches and thus national party 
ideologies trickle down to the local level. Yet, local politics largely concerns specific 
local issues which are difficult to interpret from a national ideological perspective and 
Copus et al. (2008) even assume that national party ideologies prevent local party 
branches to develop a distinct programmatic profile on specific local controversies: 
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‘mainstream [local] parties increasingly fail to reflect the diverse range of views and 
interests that make up the local political dynamic’ (Copus, Clark, & Bottom, 2008). The 
dominant ideological predispositions of local party braches would thus prevent them 
to focus on specific local cleavages in the electorate which are more relevant to local 
politics.  
Non-national lists on the other hand could be less constrained by this ideological bias 
as several authors have argued that these lists enrich local politics with a specific local 
discourse and a locally oriented programmatic profile (Boogers & Voerman, 2010; 
Breux & Bherer, 2013; Elmendorf & Schleicher, 2012). By invoking specific local 
cleavages, non-national lists could thus respond more closely to the interests of the 
local electorate. Boogers and Voerman (2010) have analysed the programmatic profile 
of independent local candidate lists in the Netherlands and identified three types of 
independent lists, based on the local cleavages they introduce in local politics: 1) 
localist parties emphasize the contrast between municipal interests and regional / 
national interests. These parties assume a non-political profile with a general focus on 
the quality of the local administration and local democracy. Moreover, these localist 
parties stress that traditional party branches are influenced by supra-local political 
pressures distracting them from a pure local focus; 2) protest parties are driven by the 
opposition to a municipal plan or a more general dissatisfaction with municipal 
administration. They expose a dividing line between establishment and anti-
establishment by accentuating the poor responsiveness of party branches in local office; 
3) interest parties stress geographical and demographic divisions and promote the 
interests of specific groups of residents.  
In the following sections, I will analyse the programmatic priorities of non-national 
lists in Flemish municipalities and the role of national and local cleavages. After 
discussing existing, but outdated insights on the programmatic priorities of local party 
branches, I will analyse the survey results from list headers of non-national lists to 
assess the role of national party ideology in the prioritization of local policy issues. 
Different from the previous chapters, this quantitative section not only implicates 
primary data collected from list headers of non-national lists, but also secondary data 
made available by the PARTIREP consortium concerning the policy preferences of 
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local party branches. An additional empirical section based on a nominal analysis of 
the list names adopted by non-national lists, aims to provide a more general picture of 
the local cleavages introduced by non-national lists. Subsequently, the results from 
these quantitative analyses are complemented with a qualitative analysis of the 
interviews with list headers of non-national lists to develop a more detailed 
understanding of the role of specific local cleavages in the programmatic priorities of 
non-national lists.  
11.2 COMPARING THE PROGRAMMATIC PRIORITIES OF LOCAL PARTY BRANCHES 
AND NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN FLANDERS 
11.2.1 Previous research findings 
The most recent and rather confined research findings on the programmatic priorities 
of local party branches in Belgium date from 2008. Based on a survey among local 
party presidents, Buelens, Dumont, Rihoux, and Heyndels (2008) have demonstrated 
that local party branches can be considered as highly policy-seeking for they are highly 
commited to their programmatic party functions. Realizing the party manifesto is 
considered of prior importance by all party families, although different accents have 
been established in the prefered path towards policy influence. The traditional party 
families (CD&V,VLD and to a lesser degree SPA) demonstrate a more pragmatic 
approach to local policy making, with higher office-seeking ambitions, while more 
recent political formations (Green, extreme right and regionalist parties) proved more 
idealist in their pursuit of policy goals and assess participation in government as less 
essential.  
Additionally, the authors established that the programmatic priorities of local party 
branches are strongly guided by national ideological cleavages. Local party branches 
situate themselves practically on the same position on the left-right scale as their 
mother party and hence they unambiguously adopt the ideological profile of the 
national party. Moreover, the local programmatic priorities are found to be higly 
similar to the thematic priorities of the respective national parties and the authors 
conclude that local party branches first and foremost belong to their mother party and 
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only in the margins apply some local accents (Buelens, Dumont, et al., 2008). Comparing 
the programmatic priorities of non-national lists and local party branches. 
11.2.2 Relating two data sources 
This section aims to establish similarities and differences in the programmatic 
priorities of different types of non-national lists in Flanders and local party branches 
based on a combined analysis of two distinct data sources. The survey among list 
headers of non-national lists contained several questions concerning the ideological 
position and programmatic priorities of non-national list. The resulting data are 
comparable with survey-data gathered from presidents of local party branches by the 
Belgian Interuniversity Attraction Pole PARTIREP56.  This survey contained similar 
questions concerning the ideological profile and programmatic priorities of local party 
branches57 and hence allows to compare the policy preferences of non-national lists 
and local party branches. It should be noted however that both surveys were 
conducted in a different stage of the electoral cycle. The Partirep questionnaire was 
distributed in full local campaign period, just prior to the municipal elections of 2012, 
while the survey among non-national lists headers was conducted in 2014, also in a 
campaign period but for supra-local elections (just prior to the coinciding regional, 
federal and European elections of 2014). However, the questions concerning the 
programmatic priorities in both surveys referred to the situation during the electoral 
campaign of 2012 and hence it can be assumed that distortions caused by the time 
lapse are limited.   
In order to allow comparison between the two data-sources, the Partirep-data have 
been confined to Flemish party branches and required some additional data-cleaning 
to avoid distortions58. Moreover, the individual local party branches were linked to the 
data concerning the decisional autonomy of local candidate lists to distinguish 
                                                     
56
 More information concerning the research design of this survey can be found on the website of the consortium 
(www.partirep.eu) or in the result of their joint research effort on local party branches in Belgium (K. Deschouwer 
et al., 2013) 
57
 The specific data concerning the ideological position and policy priorities of local party branches have not (yet) 
been analyzed by the Partirep research team. 
58
 Several party branches occurred more than once in the data-file. In that case, one was selected based on the 
completeness of the questionnaire. Moreover, Antwerp is overrepresented in the PARTREP-data for district-parties 
are included. These have been omitted from the file. 
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between party branches which have participated in the 2012 municipal elections with a 
national party lists and those with a non-national list to avoid overlap with the data 
from the non-national list headers. Table 11.1 demonstrates the distribution of the 
relevant Partirep-data across the different party families and the different types of lists. 
The socialist and Green party family are less represented in the group of national party 
lists as these more often engaged in local cartel lists. 
Table 11.1 Distribution of PARTIREP data across the different party families and different list types 
 N 
type of list in 2012 
party list cartel list associated list no list 
CD&V 155 81,3% 11,5% 7,1% 0,0% 
N-VA 200 89,0% 9,5% 0,5% 1,0% 
Open VLD 127 69,3% 15,0% 14,9% 0,8% 
Groen 112 47,3% 44,7% 1,8% 6,3% 
Vlaams Belang 75 90,7% 0,0% 2,7% 6,7% 
SP.A 144 53,5% 38,9% 7,7% 0,0% 
Total 813 72,6% 20,0% 5,7% 1,8% 
To avoid overlap between the two datasets, the following analysis of the programmatic 
priorities of local party branches will be confined to the 587 (72,6%) party branches 
with a pure national party lists, as non-national lists are addresses by the survey among 
list headers. 
These two available data sources will be analysed separately and the results are related 
afterwards. I will first assess the ideological profile of local party branches and non-
national lists and then consider differences in programmatic priorities. 
11.2.3 Ideological profile 
The presidents of the local party branches were asked to situate both their local party 
branch ánd their national party on a left-right scale between 0 (left) and 10 (right). 
Table 11.2 summarizes the average scores on this ideological scale both for the local 
party branch (own position) and for the national party.   
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Table 11.2: Ideological position of local party branches and their national party on left-right scale 
 own position national party 
 x̅ σ x̅ σ 
Groen 2,3 1,240 2,3 1,203 
SP.A 2,7 1,649 3,1 1,680 
CD&V 5,4 0,851 5,4 0,843 
Open VLD 6,5 1,248 6,3 1,215 
N-VA 6,8 1,246 7,0 1,058 
Vlaams Belang 9,4 1,027 9,5 0,851 
Eta² 0.74*** 0.76*** 
         (N=472) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
The small discrepancies between the ideological profile of the local partiy branches 
and the perceived ideological position of the national mother party – in combination 
with the small standard deviations – confirm earlier findings that local party branches 
easily transpose the national ideological policy space to the local political context and 
adopt the ideological profile of their mother party (Buelens, Dumont, et al., 2008). 
Local party branches of Groen can be situated most to the left with an average position 
of 2,3, closely followed by SP.A branches with an average of 2,7. Vlaams Belang is 
situated at the extreme right of this ideological scale with an average close to ten and 
the other party families fluctuate in between closer to the center. Hence, the national 
cleavage between leftwing and rightwing parties is transposed to the local political 
context and it can be assumed that this ideological affiliation of local party branches 
strongly affects their local programmatic priorities.  
A similar analysis of the ideological position of non-national lists on this ideological 
ten-point scale reveals that associated lists and independent lists situate themselves 
right in the middle of this divide with an average score of five, while local cartel lists 
are located more to the left with an average score of 3,9 (table 11.3). The latter score can 
again be atttributed to the overrepresentation of local cartel lists involving Groen 
and/or SP.A-branches. The high standard deviations - especially for associated lists and 
cartel lists - further indicate quite some variation along the ideological spectrum 
within the different categories of non-national lists.  
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Table 11.3: Average ideological position of non-national lists 
 x̅ σ 
associated lists 5,0 2,480 
cartel lists 3,9 2,557 
independent local lists 5,0 2,017 
Total 4,7 2,375 
Eta² 0.045** 
                      (N=248) (***p<.001; **p<.005; *p<.05) 
Figure 11.1 illustrates that independent lists are more closely distributed around the 
center of the left-righ divide with a substantial share of them (nearly 40%) right in the 
center of the left-right divide. Local cartel lists and associated lists are more widely 
distributed along this scale, with a skewness towards the left side for local cartel  scale.  
11.1: Ideological position of non-national lists 
 
We can conclude from these figures that most political actors in the local political 
arena have no problems to relate themselves to the national ideological divide between 
left and right which is straightforwardly translated to the local political context, 
although this ideological perspective is assumed to be less relevant in local politics 
(Boogers & Voerman, 2010; Breux & Bherer, 2013; Elmendorf & Schleicher, 2012). Only 
independent lists seem more reluctant to associate with this national cleavage as a 
substantial share are situated right in the middle. This might indicate that 
independent lists are less influenced by national ideological considerations to identify 
programmatic priorities for local politics.  
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11.2.4 Programmatic priorities 
Both local party presidents and list headers of non-national lists were asked to rate the 
importance of a range of local policy fields in their party manifestos. Local party 
presidents did so on a scale of importance from 0 to 10, while list headers of non-
national lists applied a scale from 1 to 5. Based on the average scores of importance, the 
different policy matters have been ranked in order of priority for the different party 
families and for the different types of non-national lists. These rankings allow to 
compare the programmatic priorities of local party barnches and non-national lists.  
Table 11.4 summarizes the order of importance of the different policy fields for the local 
party branches, categorized by party family. Table 11.5 below does the same for the 
different types of non-national lists. In each table, the three top priorities are marked 
in grey and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient in the last column specifies how the 
indicated importance of the policy fields correlate with the indicated ideological 
position on the left-right scale to assess the influence of national party ideology on the 
policy preferences. Only the bold coefficients signify a significant (positive or negative) 
correlation.  
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Table 11.4: Ranking of programmatic priorities of local party branches and correlation with ideological position 
 
all local 
party 
branches 
CD&V N-VA 
Open 
VLD 
Groen 
Vlaams 
Belang 
SP.A 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
with ideology 
Transport 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 -0,051 
Road safety 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 0,017 
Decent political conduct 3 8 3 5 7 2 7 ,203** 
Spatial Planning 4 4 5 11 4 10 9 0,018 
Public participation  5 10 4 7 5 8 8 0,042 
Social policy 6 5 10 15 6 13 3 -,175** 
Trade and Economy 7 9 6 3 14 7 15 ,353** 
Ageing 8 7 11 8 10 9 4 ,096* 
Local associations 9 3 7 12 12 14 10 ,145** 
Employment 10 13 9 9 11 4 5 ,185** 
Environment 11 11 13 14 2 16 6 -,172** 
Taxes 12 14 8 4 17 12 14 ,339** 
Sports 13 6 14 10 16 15 11 ,169** 
Criminality 14 15 12 6 18 1 16 ,447** 
Language use 18 20 17 19 20 6 19 ,429** 
Development cooperation 19 17 19 18 8 20 18 -,339** 
Religion 20 19 20 20 19 18 20 ,207** 
The figures above indicate that the top priorities for local party branches are quasi 
similar across the different party families. Transport and road safety are generally 
indicated as the most important local policy fields irrespective of the ideological 
position on the local parties. Only Vlaams Belang has other local priorities, with a 
prime concern for criminality, while environment is also a top priority for Green party 
branches. In addition to the two common top priorities of transport and road safety, 
the relative importance of other local policy fields strongly varies across the party 
families. Most other priorities of local party branches correspond with the 
programmatic priorities of their national mother party. The last collumn in the table 
(Pearson’s correlation with ideology) indicates how these local policy fields correlate 
with the ideological position of the party branch on the left-right scale. Leftish party 
branches attach significantly more importance to social policy, environment and 
development cooperation, while decent political conduct, trade and economy, taxes, 
criminality and language are considered more important by party branches at the right 
side of the ideological scale. This confirms that local party branches adhere to the 
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thematic priorities of their national mother parties (Buelens, Dumont, et al., 2008), 
although the main local programmatic priorities of transport and road safety are 
shared across party borders, irrespective of ideological cleavages. 
Table 11.5 below summarizes a similar analysis of the relative importance of different 
programmatic policy fields for non-national lists, though with a slightly more limited 
number of policy fields. As for local party branches, road safety and transport are 
generally indicated as the two most important policy fields, though with some 
difference between the three categories of non-national lists. Associated lists and cartel 
lists follow a similar pattern as established for local party branches with road safety 
and transport as two main priorities, while independent lists deviate from this general 
party-pattern. These lists have indicated decent political conduct and public 
participation as top programmatic priorities, closely followed however by the shared 
concern for road safety and transport. 
Table 11.5: Ranking of programmatic priorities of non-national lists and correlation with ideological position 
 
non-national 
lists 
associated 
lists 
cartel lists 
independent 
lists 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
with 
ideology 
Road safety 1 1 2 3 -0,107 
Transport 2 2 1 4 -0,122 
Public participation  3 3 3 2 -0,035 
Decent political conduct 4 5 6 1 -0,007 
Spatial Planning 5 6 5 5 -,172** 
Taxes 6 4 8 6 ,235** 
Environment 7 7 4 8 -,386** 
Local associations 8 9 7 7 -0,074 
Trade and Economy 9 8 10 9 ,143* 
Ageing 10 11 9 12 -0,074 
Employment 11 10 11 13 -0,072 
Sports 12 12 12 11 -0,021 
Criminality 13 13 13 10 ,284** 
The top four of programmatic priorities of non-national lists is not influenced by the 
ideological position of the lists on the left-right scale as indicated by the insignificance 
of pearson’s correlation with ideology. Yet the ideological position on the left-righ 
scale does influence the relative importance of the secondary policy fields, as has also 
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been established for local party branches. Crimality, taxes and trade/economy are 
more important to non-national lists situated on the right side of the ideological 
spectrum, while environment and spatial planning are more important to those on the 
left side. This correlation between ideological profile and indicated importance of 
policy fields however dissapears if we only consider the group of independent lists. 
These lists are less influenced by national ideological considerations as they show less 
variation on the left-right scale and are more closely concentrated in the center.  
These figures thus reveal that the programmatic priorities of local party branches and 
the role of national ideological considerations show strong similarities with those of 
associated lists and cartel lists. They share a principal concern for road safety and 
transport, irrespective of the ideological position on the left-right scale while 
secondary programmatic priorities are determined by national party ideology. 
Independent local candiate lists show a slightly different order of policy priorities with 
a prior concern for decent political conduct and public participation in local policy. 
Furthermore, these lists are less influenced by party ideology in determining the 
relative importance of local policy fields in their manifestos, also for policy fields of 
secondary importance.  
11.2.5 Interim conclusions 
This section has focussed on differences in the programmatic priorities of local party 
branches and non-national lists in Flemish municipalities and the influence of national 
ideological cleavages on these priorities. The results indicate that local party branches 
and derivative non-national lists are guided by a combination of local and national 
concerns in the prioritization of local policy fields. Party ideology does influence their 
local programmatic priorities, but only for secondary issues, while transport and road 
safety are considered as prior local policy concerns across the ideological party families. 
Hence, the assumption that national ideological considerations would distract local 
party branches from the general interests of the municipality seems only valid to a 
limited degree. Local party branches (and derivative non-national lists) emphasize the 
positional issues associated with the core business of their mother party only in 
secondary instance, while they share their prior concern for specific local policy issues. 
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Independent local candiate lists deviate somewhat from this general pattern. These 
lists have a prime concern for decent political conduct and public participation in the 
municipality and thereby seem to invoke additional local cleavages in local politics 
with a greater concern for local democratic values. As the survey data do not allow to 
further investigate the specific nature of these additional local cleavages introduced by 
independent lists (or other non-national lists), the following section turns to the 
electoral database of the Agency of Internal Affairs59 as an additional source of data to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of the programmatic priorities of non-national 
lists and the role of local cleavages. Based on an analysis of nominal clues in the lists 
names adopted by non-national lists in Flanders, I will try to establish the prominence 
of different local profiles within the different types of non-national lists.  
11.3  LOCAL PROFILES OF NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN FLANDERS 
Several authors have argued that party names can provide useful informational clues 
concerning the political values and programmatic priorities of political parties 
(Boogers, 2008; Kam, 2005; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Hence, I will analyze the names of 
all non-national lists in Flanders that have participated in the municipal elections of 
2012 to identify different local programmatic profiles and establish the prevealence of 
these local profiles among non-national lists in Flemish municipalities. Based on the 
nominal clues in the list names, non-national lists were clustered into six local profiles, 
partly inspired by the programmatic profiles distinguished by Boogers and Voerman 
(2010)60.  
1) Candidate lists with a localist profile use nominal references to stress their 
exclusive 61  concern for the general interests of the municipality and its 
inhabitants without the interference of national or ideological concerns. The 
most common list name to indicate this priority of municipal interests is 
‘Gemeentebelangen’. Other list names in this cluster refer to the specific 
                                                     
59
 www.vlaanderenkiest.be/verkiezingen2012 
60
 One single list can be assigned to different clusters as a list name might combine different nominal clues. 
61
 Several non-national lists combine references to national ideological cleavages with the concern for the local level. 
Yet, these lists are not included in the cluster of localist profiles, which concerns lists with an exclusive focus for 
local issues. 
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municipality concerned – often combined with a prefix or a qualifyer such as 
‘Voerbelangen’, ‘Pro Bilzen’, Voluit Zonhoven’, …. Also the inhabitants of the 
municipality are often mentionned in the names of localist lists 
(‘Brasschatenaren’, ‘Burgerbelangen’).  
2) Personal lists aim to mobilize the electorate based on the personal 
characteristics of individual candidates. It often concerns mayoral lists (‘Lijst 
van de burgemeester / LVB ) or lists which have adopted the first name or 
surname of a prominent candidate.  
3) Consensual lists emphasize the group aspect of the list and refer to the local 
political practice of collaboration beyond party borders. Nominal clues such as 
such as ‘samen’, ‘open’ ‘plus’ and ‘eendracht’ indicate a consensual approach to 
local politics. Also the combination of different party labels in cartel lists refer 
to this practice of cross-party cooperation. 
4) Candidate lists with a protest profile explicitely distance themselves from 
traditional party practices by using terms like ‘anders, ‘beter’, ‘alternatief’, 
‘onafhankelijk’. These lists present themselves as democratic alternatives for the 
poor democratic performance of traditional local parties and assume a clear 
anti-establishment stance. 
5) Political conduct lists can equally be situated on the establishment/anti-
establishment cleavage, yet with a less explicit opposition to conventional 
political practices. They focus on local political conduct and use nominal 
references to specific political practices which are considered as beneficial to 
the functioning of local democracy. They advocate a specific way of conducting 
local politics as reflected in terms like ‘visie’, ‘participatie’, ‘respect’, ‘bewust’.  
6) Issue lists to conclude refer to specific geographical, demographic or issue 
cleavages in the municipality by using terms as ‘jong’ or by adopting a French 
name to refer to the interests of linguistic groups in the municipality 
(‘Partie/Union francophone’). 
The results of this nominal analysis are summarized in table 11.6 indicating the 
pertinence of these local programmatic profiles for the different types of non-national 
lists across Flanders in 2012.   
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Table 11.6: Occurrence of different local programmatic profiles among non-national lists in Flanders 
 
consensu-
al profile 
localist 
profile 
personal 
profile 
protest 
profile 
conduct 
profile 
issue 
profile 
associated lists 38,2% 28,2% 10,7% 4,6% 10,7% 0,8% 
cartel lists 79,5% 11,9% 4,0% 4,5% 5,1% 5,7% 
independent local lists 10,5% 52,6% 7,7% 17,2% 21,1% 3,8% 
total 41,1% 32,6% 7,2% 9,7% 13,0% 3,7% 
(n=516) 
These figures demonstrate that a consensual profile is most prevalent among non-
national lists in Flanders. While the traditional partisan interpretation of local politics 
generally focuses on the expression, competition and reconciliation of partisan 
interests as key to local politics, the prominence of the consensual profile indicates 
that these lists rather emphasize the need for consensual politics instead of ideological 
polarization. As cartel lists have implemented this idea of consensual politics in their 
practices, this group of non-national lists contains the largest share of consensual 
profiles (79,5%). Yet, also a substantial part of the associated lists (38,2%) and a 
minority of one out of ten independent lists clearly profile themselves as consensual 
local partnerships.  
Secondly, a substantial part of 32,6% of the non-national lists in Flanders have adopted 
a localist profile emphasizing their exclusive focus on the interests of the municipality. 
Independent lists contain the highest share of localist profiles (52,6%) but also 
associated lists often stress their exclusive concern for local concerns (28,2%). This is 
less the case for local cartel lists with only 11,9% localists profiles. 
The other distinct local profiles are less widespread among non-national lists in 
Flanders. 13% nominally emphisize their vision on appropriate political conduct, 
though occuring more frequently by independent lists with a share of one out of five. 
17,2% of these independent lists can be identified as protest lists for they explicitely 
advocate a different political behaviour. This protest profile is again less widespread in 
the category of cartel lists and associated lists. Personal lists and issue lists are rare 
among non-national lists in Flanders with general shares far beneath 10%. Yet personal 
lists occur more frequently in the group of associated lists.   
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This nominal analysis thus demonstrates that the different types of non-national lists 
profile themselves on specific local cleavages in addition to the national ideological 
cleavage invoked by local party branches. We could therefore conclude that non-
national lists indeed enrich local politics with a specific local discourse as argued by 
Boogers and Voerman (2010). Non-national lists often emphasize their focus on the 
local level without interference of national ideological considerations and stress the 
need for consensual decision-making and alternative political conduct as opposed to 
the party polarization and established conduct of traditional party politics.  
Yet, it can be questionned if these local profiles actually reflect positional differences 
and represent a different conception of local politics or merely concerne valence issues 
claimed by non-national lists as a unique selling proposition. These local profiles might 
be merely emphasized to appeal to the local electorate without much further 
difference in programmatic priorities. In the subsequent qualitative section, I will 
examine the rationales behind these local profiles and interpret the meaning of the 
invoked local cleavages. 
11.4 LOCAL CLEAVAGES IN LOCAL POLITICS 
The interviews with the top candidates of the 22 selected non-national lists amply 
dealt with programmatic issues and political priorities and allow to gain a deeper 
understanding of the meaning of the local profiles adopted by non-national lists in 
Flanders. A qualitative analysis of these interview data allowed for a more profound 
examination – beyond the mere nominal clues in the list names - of the local cleavages 
on which the selected cases profile themselves and their meaning in local politics.  
The respondents focussed on four main cleavages on which their list competes with 
other political actors in local politics. In addition to the local cleavages between 
municipal and national interests, and between establishment versus anti-
establishment as also identified by Boogers and Voerman (2010) for independent 
parties in the Netherlands, the case analysis provides evidence for an additional 
cleavage between consensual politics and party polarization and for personal rivalries 
to structure local political competition. In contrast to the Netherlands however, the 
interviews provided no evidence for any geographical or demographic cleavages. 
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Table 11.7 summarizes for each analysed case which of these four local antagonisms are 
emphasized and demonstrates that different local cleavages are often combined. 
Table 11.7: Local cleavages invoked by the analysed cases 
 municipal 
interests 
(vs. national 
interests)  
consensual 
character          
(vs. polarization) 
democratic 
quality (vs. 
undemocratic 
establishment) 
personal 
rivalries 
case 1 x   x 
case 2 x   x 
case 3 x  x  
case 4  x   
case 5 x  x  
case 6   x  
case 7  x   
case 8   x  
case 9    x 
case 10 x x   
case 11  x   
case 12  x   
case 13   x  
case 14 x x   
case 15 x  x  
case 16 x  x x 
case 17   x  
case 18  x x  
case 19 x x   
case 20  x   
case 21  x   
case 22  x x  
I will successively discuss the meaning of and the rationale behind these different local 
antagonisms and their potential to enrich local politics with a distinctive political 
conduct. 
11.4.1 Municipal versus national interests  
The interviews demonstrate the pronounced relevance of the opposition between 
municipal and national interest for the programmatic profile of the analysed cases. 
Most cases in the sample stress the fundamental difference between local and national 
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politics and argue that local policymaking is mainly about managing the locality and 
pursuing the general interests of the municipality. Across the different list types, 
national ideological sensitivities are considered of limited relevance in local politics 
and several respondents argue that party programs merely differ in ‘comma’s and 
accents’: ‘Whatever is left or right about a speed limit in the streets, or a zebra crossing, 
or about constructing a sports hall. I mean, that has relatively little to do with traditional 
conflicts between left and right or between religious and secular’ (case 17). National party 
ideological cleavages are thus considered of little relevance to identify the common 
interests of the municipality. 
Some respondents though nuance this general observation by adding that ideological 
preferences do come into play when considering some specific local policy issues, 
especially those involving financial matters. Moreover, the role of party ideology is 
assumed to increase with the size of the municipality as central cities are considered a 
different category in this respect: ‘I don’t really believe in ideological differences at 
municipal level. I am not talking about cities, but in municipalities, local politics concern 
a venue for festivities, childcare, road infrastructure… Of course, ideological differences 
will enter the discussions now that we are starting the financial analysis of the 
municipality’ (case 22). These findings confirm that party-ideology only moderately 
influences the programmatic priorities in local politics.  
While most respondents agree on this fundamentally different scope of local and 
national politics and the confined role of party ideology at local level, there is more 
dissidence concerning the potential detrimental effect of party ideology in local policy 
preferences. Some respondents argue that national ideological considerations distract 
the political focus from local priorities and obstruct the pursuit of municipal interests. 
Local political commitment is considered most effective without any national or 
ideological concerns. Especially independent lists in the sample assume this outmost 
position, but also some associated lists support an exclusive focus on municipal 
concerns, as demonstrated by the following quote stemming from an associated lists: 
‘True commitment to the community does not require any party name. You can achieve 
much more at local level without a national party’ (case 6).  
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Other respondents on the other hand stress that national ideological considerations do 
not inhibit a true commitment to the interests of the local community: ‘Party ideology 
does have its repercussions at local level, but local politics is completely different from 
national politics […] We all defend the interest of our city’ (case 7). These respondents 
content that local party branches with national party ideologies can as well pursue the 
general interests of the municipality. Moreover - although the relevance of party 
ideology in the formulation of local policy preferences is doubted - several respondents 
consider their (implicit or explicit) party affiliation as essential to structure the 
electoral competition as it offers informational shortcuts to the voters. The local 
electorate is not always familiar with local policy issues or prepared to sift and compare 
all party programs and the ideological clues offered by a national party label might 
help them to interpret the local party system and situate different candidate lists in a 
familiar ideological policy space. Hence, ideological considerations are rather 
considered important to guide the electoral choice of the voter than to guide the policy 
preferences of local party elites. 
These findings suggest that the local cleavage between national and local concerns is a 
rather artificial opposition and not the prerogative of localist list or non-national lists 
in general. Indeed nothing indicates that local party branches would be less concerned 
with the general interest of the municipality. 
11.4.2 Consensual politics versus ideological polarization 
Several analysed cases across the different list types emphasize the need for consensual 
politics as opposed to ideological polarization. This cleavage is closely related to the 
opposition between municipal and national concerns, but rather focuses on the right 
people in local politics instead of any ideological predispositions. Personal skills and 
cooperation are considered more important than the ideological affiliation of local 
politicians and it is argued that local policymaking requires harmonic collaboration 
beyond party borders. This is clearly illustrated by case 22 (an extended party cartel), 
who presents her list as a cross-party team of politicians with the right skills to jointly 
prioritize local needs and manage the community: ‘Our shared project transcended the 
party borders. We worked together to achieve a common goal’ (case 22).  
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Again this cleavage between consensual politics and ideological polarization seems no 
prerogative for non-national lists. Cross-party cooperation is an inherent feature of the 
proportional representation system of (local) politics in Flanders and cannot be 
considered as a distinctive character of non-national lists. Most local political actors 
with office-seeking ambitions need political partners to acquire local power. Only 
those who are capable of attracting an absolute majority of the votes might govern 
alone. Local cartel formation is but one sign of this consensual approach. Research has 
shown that pre-electoral coalition agreements are equally a common feature of local 
politics in Belgium. Local party branches often engage in negotiations on potential 
coalitions long before the elections to reduce risks (J. Ackaert, Dumont, & De Winter, 
2008; Wille & Deschouwer, 2012). 
11.4.3 Establishment versus non-establishment 
Several cases in the sample also invoke a cleavage between establishment and anti-
establishment. These lists reproach conventional local parties to be locked in a 
perverse logic of power, which is detrimental to local democracy. Local politics is 
associated with ‘profiteers’, ‘favouritism’ or ‘fake democracy’ and established office 
holders are deemed little responsive to the needs of the electorate once they are 
elected. Local policy decisions are considered unsubstantiated and based on 
inadequate personal estimations: ‘Council decisions were based on power and not on 
competence or issue knowledge […]. Power corrupts, becomes so self-evident that they 
take decisions without properly listening to the arguments’ (case 6). These cases 
emphasize the need for more citizen participation and more transparency in the local 
policy making process and position themselves as a democratic alternative to 
established local parties. They advocate a fundamentally different way of ‘doing 
politics’, with more responsiveness to the needs of the citizens. Moreover, several anti-
establishment lists in the sample refuse to think of themselves as a local party, but 
explicitly profile themselves as ‘local political associations’ for establishment is equated 
with party politics. Other cases though assume a less extreme position on this local 
cleavage, conceiving themselves as ‘parties’ but still with a specific concern for the 
quality of the local democratic process and providing a democratic alternative to the 
established local powers.   
Chapter 11 
174 
 
However, this anti-establishment cleavage is not necessarily new to (local) politics in 
Flanders and it can neither be claimed that this local cleavage is the prerogative of 
non-national protest lists. Dissatisfaction with traditional party mechanisms and the 
unresponsiveness of their leaders was an important element in the programmatic 
profile of national ‘New Politics Parties’ which have emerged since the 1980’s in 
Western democracies (Ignazi, 1996; Müller-Rommel, 1989; Poguntke, 1989). These New 
Politics Parties are considered a reaction to the cartel-like tendencies in European 
parties and the waning capacity of traditional parties to exert their expressive function 
and to canalize the demands of the citizenry into policy programs.  
Moreover, the local cleavage between establishment and anti-establishment seems 
often to coincide with a traditional dividing line between the opposition and the 
governing majority in local politics. Parties in an opposition role more often assume an 
anti-establishment profile, although the following citation illustrates that traditional 
opposition parties can equally be considered as part of this establishment: ‘The other 
parties were only concerned  with party interests. Those in opposition aimed to acquire 
power and those in government to maintaining power. This is detrimental at local level 
and resulted in complete political inertia’ (case 17).  
Additionally, case 6 demonstrates the unsustainable character of an anti-establishment 
profile. This case started out as an independent list with a clear anti-establishment 
discourse opposing the perceived arbitrary (ill-founded) and undemocratic nature of 
mainstream politics in the municipality. However, this anti-party profile was 
attenuated once they got invited to join a governing majority: ‘Political success also 
urges you to modify your political ideas somewhat, to make room for new things more in 
the direction of the centre’ (case 6). Other cases have equally mitigated their anti-
establishment discourse as their office-seeing ambitions grew. This indicates that the 
anti-establishment cleavage is a relevant dividing line to introduce new non-national 
lists into local party systems, but afterwards entails a difficult balance between 
opposing traditional party conduct and aiming to fit in and become part of the party 
political game. This seems to confirm the idea of anticipatory adaptation. Several 
authors have indicated that new parties increasingly adopt office-seeking goals, 
notwithstanding the costs of governing. In order to be perceived as credible potential 
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coalition partners, they gradually renounce their initial outsider status and establish 
rhetoric, programmatic and organisational modifications (Bolleyer, 2008; Poguntke & 
Scarrow, 1996). 
11.4.4 Personal rivalries 
In addition to the three discussed local cleavages introduced by non-national lists in 
local politics, the interviews reveal that non-national lists also introduce personal 
rivalries in local politics. This can hardly be considered as an additional local cleavage, 
but still signifies an additional local dimension to structure local political competition. 
Several respondents indicate that they attach little importance to substantial 
programmatic issues, but build a local profile on the central role of prominent 
individuals in local politics. They stress that local politicians need specific personal 
skills to reconcile different needs and demands and decide what is best for the 
municipality. They emphasize the importance of the right person in the right place and 
hence introduce personal rivalries by promoting individual characteristics and the 
esteemed governing capacity of the leading candidate(s): ‘You need people who can 
listen, think and decide on the greatest common divisor’ (case 19). Such personal 
rivalries are especially evident in the competition between candidate mayors. Case 1 for 
example concerns a constituency list in support of the incumbent mayor to whom the 
list was named after and who was profiled as a ‘burgomaster’ with a natural sense for 
the common good. The campaign slogan of this list was ‘Mayor with heart and soul’ 
referring to his personal capacities to decide on what is good for the community.  
However, it can again be assumed that this personal dimension in local politics is no 
prerogative of non-national lists. As for the first two local cleavages discussed above 
(municipal versus national interests and consensual versus ideological policy making), 
personal rivalries represent a common feature of local politics rather than a new 
dimension of party competition introduced by non-national lists. Local politics in 
general is highly personalized and local political competition is often structured 
around personal dividing lines between political opponents. Especially mayors assume 
a key ‘presidential’ role in local politics, but also other top candidates are often pushed 
forward in local campaigns and assume a dominant position in several aspects of local 
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political life (Rodenbach, Wouters, & Steyvers, 2015). Hence, these personal profiles are 
an extension of the candidate-centred character of local politics, especially in small 
municipalities where voting behaviour is largely guided by individual politicians and 
less by substantive policy programs: ‘the people were appealed by the person who said 
and did the things here’ (case 1).  
11.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has considered if and how non-national lists differ from traditional party 
branches in their programmatic priorities as a third part of the functional analysis to 
establish the partisan character of non-national lists in Flanders. A combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods allowed to assess and compare the role of 
national ideological cleavages and specific locally-oriented cleavages in determining 
the programmatic priorities of non-national lists and traditional local party branches. 
The analysis revealed that national ideological cleavages only partially influence the 
programmatic priorities of local party branches and derivative non-national lists 
(associated lists and cartel lists). Local party branches share a principal concern for 
local transport and road safety, irrespective of their party family or ideological position 
on the left-right scale. Party ideology however does influence the relative importance 
of  secondary local priorities which largely correspondent with the policy issues ‘owned’ 
by the national party. We can therefore conclude that the influence of national party 
ideologies does not imply a distraction from the general interests of the municipality. 
Independent lists are not influenced by these national ideological considerations. They 
are more reluctant to associate with the traditional ideological cleavage between left 
and right and situate themselves right in the centre. Their local programmatic 
priorities differ slightly from the other lists with a greater concern for decent political 
conduct and public participation, though closely followed by a similar concern for road 
safety and transport.  
In addition to these traditional ideological cleavages, non-national lists introduce some 
specific local cleavages to structure the political competition in local politics. They 
adopt specific local profiles to differentiate themselves from traditional party politics. 
These local profiles emphasize their principal focus on local interests, their concern for 
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democratic values and consensual approach to local politics and the persons involved 
in these lists. Yet, it was argued that these specific local profiles of non-national lists 
are no prerogatives of these lists and do not necessarily diverge much from the 
priorities of traditional party branches. Although these specific local priorities are 
claimed by non-national lists, they can be identified as valence issues (in contrast to 
positional issues) as they are largely shared by all local political actors. Consequently, 
these local cleavages invoked by non-national lists rather reflect a common local 
political paradigm in which local concerns prevail, democratic post-material political 
values compete with traditional socio-economic values and cross-party cooperation 
between individuals is stimulated. Although these local cleavages do not reflect 
fundamentally different programmatic priorities, they seem to confirm Saward’s (2008) 
argument that the decline of political parties is associated with a changing nature of 
political representation (cfr. Chapter 2.3). As the legitimacy of political parties is 
challenged and representative democracy has increasingly depoliticized, he argues that 
parties increasingly switch from a partisan representative claim to a more reflexive 
representative claim. Parties would increasingly present themselves as open and 
flexible political actors who emphasize procedural values and aim for local alliances 
around specific value-driven goals to connect with diverse communities. Our findings 
concerning the programmatic priorities of non-national lists fit closely with this 
observation and indicate that non-national lists in Flemish municipalities reflect this 
change in the representative claims made by political parties in reaction to the decline 
of parties. With this reflexive representative claims non-national lists might appeal to 
dealigned voters and potentially (re)integrate them in the local political system.  
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12 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
Non-national candidate lists are an omnipresent phenomenon in Western local 
democracies, but still academic interest in these lists remains confined. Only few 
scholars have engaged in this subject, generally adopting a dichotomous approach to 
distinguish local from national lists in municipal elections (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008). 
This simplified binary distinction however is flawed as it ignores the large 
heterogeneity of non-national lists as well as the substantial grey zone in between local 
and national lists. This unwarranted generalization of local versus national lists 
inhibits a comprehensive understanding of the role non-national play in local politics 
and hampers academic knowledge building of local party systems in general. As a 
result, current academic insights on non-national lists are often superficial or even 
contradictory. Some authors consider these lists as relics of a political past (Back, 2003; 
Rokkan, 1966), while others regard them as prolocutors of a new, depoliticized future 
as they can be linked to recent party evolutions indicating the alleged decline of 
political parties (Aars & Ringkjob, 2005; Boogers & Voerman, 2010). Yet, both 
assumptions remain largely hypothetical as empirical research is scant and distorted by 
the conceptual vagueness of local candidate lists.  
With this dissertation I hope to have contributed to this underdeveloped research field 
by refining the concept of non-national lists and exposing the variation within this 
variegated group of candidate lists in Flanders to assess their differentiated role in local 
politics. More specifically I have focused on the variation in actual independence of 
non-national lists and in the degree to which they behave like political parties. These 
two dimensions have been identified in literature as crucial differentiation dimensions 
to examine local candidate lists (Reiser, 2008; Steyvers et al., 2008). Moreover, I have 
related the established variation within and between non-national lists in Flanders to 
existing insights on party change, thereby offering a captivating and innovative 
perspective on the local component of system-level party evolutions and the stake of 
non-national lists herein.  
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A pragmatic research paradigm was adopted combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods to develop a multi-faceted perspective on the differentiated role of non-
national lists in Flanders’ local politics. Primary data (survey-data and interview-data 
collected from list headers of non-national lists) and secondary data (election 
database, press-database, survey-data from Partirep consortium) have been analysed 
with different analytical methods each providing specific and complementary insights 
on the role of non-national lists in Flanders. This mixed methods approach allowed to 
formulate substantiated answers to the four research questions formulated at the 
outset of this book: 
- What is a relevant classification model to differentiate non-national lists? 
- How independent are non-national lists in Flanders? 
- How partisan are non-national lists in Flanders? 
- How are non-national lists related to party change? 
 
1) WHAT IS A RELEVANT CLASSIFICATION MODEL TO DIFFERENTIATE NON-
NATIONAL LISTS?  
A thorough understanding of non-national lists’ role in local politics requires 
empirically founded knowledge-building based on practicable and relevant 
classification tools. I have followed Reiser’s (2008) suggestion to differentiate non-
national lists based on their actual independence or decisional autonomy. As the 
occurrence of non-national lists in Belgium is partly attributed to the success of local 
cartel lists62, a distinction was made between the vertical autonomy (influence from 
national party centres) and the horizontal autonomy (influence from other local 
parties) of local candidate lists. Combining these two dimensions generated an 
innovative and contingent typology for local candidate lists, differentiating four ideal-
types of solitary lists (party lists, extended party lists, supported lists, independent 
lists) and four ideal-types of cartel lists (party cartel, extended party cartel, localized 
cartel, independent cartel) all varying in their level of autonomy regarding the national 
                                                     
62
 pre-electoral alliances between two or more local parties in the form of joint candidate list 
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party level. The systematic application of this compound model to the local political 
reality in Flemish municipalities is unique in local political science research and 
yielded a significant source of original and comprehensive data, enabling further 
analysis of the differentiated role of these distinct sub-types of non-national lists. This 
classification model proved especially valuable for a cross-sectional analysis of the 
occurrence and the political relevance of the different types of non-national lists. 
Moreover, the vertical dimension of the model proved highly relevant to refine existing 
academic insights on local party system nationalization allowing for a more fine-
grained assessment and clarification of the place-bound partisan assemblage of local 
party systems in the electoral and parliamentary arena.   
A simplified version of the initial DA (Decisional Autonomy)-typology has been 
applied for the further analysis of the partisan character of non-national lists. Some 
related ideal types were merged, resulting in a more practicable classification model 
distinguishing between the four most relevant categories of local candidate lists: party 
lists, cartel lists, associated lists and independent lists. These four categories still 
contain a very heterogeneous load but they substantially differ from each other on 
some crucial aspects concerning origin and composition. Both classification models 
based on the horizontal and vertical decisional autonomy of local candidate lists have 
been developed in a Belgian context, yet it can be assumed that they are equally 
relevant to discern different types of local candidate lists in other institutional settings 
with a comparable list system (proportional representation system, low threshold for 
candidacy …), .  
Other differentiation dimensions have been suggested in literature in addition to the 
actual independence of non-national lists. Steyvers et al. (2008) proposed to 
differentiate non-national lists based on the degree to which they behave like political 
parties and fulfil the functions generally accorded to them. As the partisan character of 
non-national lists is a miscellaneous theoretical concept with various sub dimensions, 
it would be problematic to use this dimension as basis for categorization. Therefore, it 
was considered more relevant to scrutinize the partisanship of non-national lists as 
dependent variable rather than reducing it to a classification dimension.  
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2) HOW INDEPENDENT ARE NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN FLANDERS 
In the traditional dichotomy between local and national lists it is assumed that local 
lists are independent from national parties, although scholars acknowledge the 
occurrence of border cases referred to as hidden party lists or pseudo-local lists 
(Dudzinska, 2008; Göhlert et al., 2008; Steyvers et al., 2008). The DA-typology allowed 
to differentiate local candidate lists based on their actual independence. Applying this 
typology to all local candidate lists in Flanders that have participate in the municipal 
elections of 2006 and 2012 revealed that over one out of four candidate lists can be 
identified as non-national lists. About half of these non-national lists are actually 
independent from national party politics, while the other half maintains implicit or 
explicit links to the national party level (pseudo-local or pseudo-national lists).  
Moreover, it was established that the different types of non-national lists significantly 
differ in political relevance. While independent lists are most relevant in the pre-
electoral phase of municipal elections, they obtain significantly lower vote shares and 
significantly less seats in council. Hence, they easily enter the local electoral 
competition, but have more difficulties to cross the representation threshold and 
establish themselves in the local legislative arena. Once passed this representation 
threshold however, the differences in political relevance between independent lists and 
other local candidate lists fade out. A substantial part of the independent lists equally 
manage to play along in the highest echelons of local politics, indicating that the gap 
between political relevance and political irrelevance is harder to bridge for 
independent local lists than for the other types of local candidate lists. 
A qualitative analysis of the rationales of these different types of non-national lists 
revealed that pseudo-local and pseudo-national lists reflect the electoral strategies of 
local party elites who aim to maximize the vote share of the list by engaging in specific 
local partnerships with independent candidates or with other local parties and (partly) 
conceal the links to national parties. Several internal factors (organizational 
constraints, leadership style and preferences) and external factors (local and national 
competitive position, local party system fractionalization, dealignment of the 
electorate, Imperialy system) have been identified to clarify specific strategic decisions 
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resulting in changes in the decisional autonomy and the occurrence of the different 
types of non-national lists.  
Moreover, a more close-knit measure of local party system nationalization was 
proposed based on the actual independence of local candidate lists. The proposed 
electoral and parliamentary indexes of local party system nationalization in Flanders 
reflect the weighted ratio between local, pseudo-local, pseudo-national and national 
lists in the electoral and the parliamentary arena. These indexes were calculated for all 
Flemish municipalities and confirm a tendency of relative local party system 
nationalization, which is even more outspoken in the parliamentary arena. However, 
the analysis also confirms that the party politicization process remains incomplete as 
also established by other authors (Aars & Ringkjob, 2005) and allows to refine current 
explanations for this incomplete politicization. We have argued that exclusive 
nationalization is not only inhibited by the presence of independent local lists as 
commonly presumed, but also by the presence of pseudo-local and pseudo-national 
lists who deliberately distance themselves from the national party by (partly) 
concealing party links. In contrast to the traditional image of a nationally driven and 
almost teleological process of local party politicization, a more dynamic image arises. 
Incomplete nationalization rather reflects the dynamic nature of local political actors 
instead of indicating the lagging behind of local party system where national parties 
will eventually yet catch up.   
3) HOW PARTISAN ARE NON-NATIONAL LISTS IN FLANDERS? 
To assess the partisan character of non-national lists, I have examined differences and 
similarities in the functional behaviour of the different types of non-national lists and 
local party branches. Inspired by the functional approaches of several reputable party 
theorists and the conception of parties as tripartite systems of interaction engaging in 
the electorate, in government, and as organizations, I have focussed on three defining 
party functions: candidate selection, organizational strength and policy preferences. 
(Fiers, 1998; Key, 1964; King, 1969; Sorauf, 1972; White, 2006):  
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This functional analysis of non-national lists revealed substantial differences in the 
extent to which - but also the way in which - these different party functions are 
assumed both within and between the different types of non-national lists. The list 
composition process of local political actors proved largely determined by collective 
vote-seeking ambitions. Both party selectors and independent selectors value similar 
recruitment criteria related to the electoral potential of the candidates. In a local 
context, the supply of eligible candidates is confined and selectors often face 
difficulties to attract adequate candidates. To cope with these common recruitment 
problems, selection demands are modified and party selectors can decide to involve 
independent candidates while independent selectors also involve party affiliated 
candidates. These modified selection demands results in significantly varying shares of 
independent and party candidates.  
Yet, the notion of independent candidates needs some further qualification as the 
interviews revealed that the independent character of individual candidates can 
change over time. Independent candidates frequently have a party background but 
have seceded this party because of specific circumstances - often related to party-
internal conflicts and thwarted personal ambitions. Hence, independence not always 
refers to a nonpartisan background, but often indicates the mere fact that these 
candidates no longer belong to a party. Consequently, independent candidates should 
not be equated with nonpartisan candidates. As eligible candidates (with the right 
skills and ambitions) are scarce and highly coveted in local politics, their (party-
)background seems no decisive factor in the selection process, while inflammation 
with the ‘political microbe’ is pivotal. 
Independent candidate lists differ most from traditional party branches in the 
selection of candidates. They not only contain the largest share of independent 
candidates, but also more often submit incomplete candidate lists and are less able to 
recruit candidates from the local associations which function as main recruitment 
source for other list types. The lower recruitment ability of independent candidate lists 
could signify that these lists have most difficulties to overcome the encountered 
recruitment problems, but could also indicate lower vote-seeking ambitions.  
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The organizational strength of non-national lists equally diverges substantially 
between and within the different categories confirming that non-national lists 
represent a miscellaneous phenomenon in local politics with diverging organizational 
features. While local party branches are generally considered as bureaucratic 
organizations, the different types of non-national lists deviate substantially from this 
traditional partisan picture. Local cartel lists and associated lists can be considered as 
organizational derivatives of local party branches demonstrating a complex, multi-
layered structure. They adopt specific organizational arrangements to combine their 
role as local agencies of national parties with their role as actors in the local political 
arena and to accommodate independent candidates and other parties. Different from 
the traditional partisan counterparts, these organizational derivatives distinguish less 
between members, councillors and party leadership, but clearly discriminate between 
local and supra-local party functions. Local policy issues are largely detached from the 
national party and assigned to additional (or adapted) - less formalized - 
organizational structures, while supra-local and party political issues remain the 
exclusive competence of the traditional party organizations. Independent lists again 
deviate most form traditional party organizations with less formal and less complex 
organizational structures and more often demonstrating low activity levels. This 
limited organizational capacity can be attributed to their lower political relevance. As 
they more often fail to cross the representation threshold, they also more often lack 
the political need to organize on a stable basis and develop any active party life.  
The third component of the functional analysis of non-national lists concerned their 
programmatic priorities. Comparing the programmatic priorities of non-national lists 
with local party branches revealed that local party branches and derivative non-
national lists (associated lists and cartel lists) are guided by a combination of national 
and local concerns in determining the saliency of local policy fields. Irrespective of 
ideological preferences, local party branches share a similar concern for transport and 
road safety. National party ideology only comes into play to determine the relative 
importance of secondary priorities. This indicates that ideological considerations does 
not to distract local party branches from pursuing the general interests of the 
municipality. 
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Additionally, non-national lists adopt specific local programmatic profiles to structure 
the local political competition. They invoke four local cleavages: 1) between a 
municipal focus and a national focus; 2) between consensual cross-party cooperation 
and polarizing party politics, 3) between established parties and anti-establishment 
and 4) they introduce factional personal rivalries in local politics. Notwithstanding this 
emphasis on alleged local antagonisms, these local profiles of non-national lists can be 
mainly considered as electoral discourse on valence issues as these issues do not 
represent new or alternative policy priorities. These local cleavages rather emphasize a 
common local political paradigm with a shared concern for municipal interests, and 
personalised, consensual politics. There are no indications that local party branches 
would care less for these local concerns, are less candidate-centred or less compelled to 
cooperate beyond party borders. Although the anti-establishment cleavage has more 
potential to enrich local politics with different programmatic priorities, this cleavage 
can neither be considered as a new local dividing line introduced by non-national lists. 
The opposition between establishment and anti-establishment  is grafted on the 
familiar post-materialist ideological cleavage, commonly represented by left libertarian 
or new politics parties. Moreover, this local anti-establishment cleavage is found to 
largely follow the traditional divide between the opposition and the governing majority 
in local politics. As for national new politics parties, a local anti-establishment profile 
seems prone to the concept of anticipatory adaptation as the data suggest that protest 
lists increasingly adopt office-holding ambitions and gradually renounce their initial 
outsider status to become part of the party political game. Although non-national lists 
emphasize specific local valence issues, the programmatic priorities of non-national 
lists and local party branches strongly are found to be similar. 
4) HOW ARE NON-NATIONAL LISTS RELATED TO PARTY CHANGE? 
Since several decades, national parties are under increasing pressure in a rapidly 
transforming society and their role in representative democracies has altered 
fundamentally. Contemporary partisan politics is increasingly characterized by the 
erosion of partisan loyalties both in attitudes (partisan dealignment, low confidence in 
parties) and behaviour (turnout decline, electoral volatility, decreasing membership) of 
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the electorate. In a reaction to this flexible electoral environment, parties have become 
more candidate centred and more flexible in their issues program. They increasingly 
adopted vote-maximizing strategies aiming for the median voter with centrist politics 
(Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). An often cited blueprint for this contemporary political 
party is the cartel party model as described by Katz and Mair (1995). The cartel party is 
characterized by a centralized and professionalized party organization with a weak 
party-on-the-ground and a dominant party-in-central-office. The dominant party 
leadership is counterbalanced with democratic organizational impulses and with 
increased interdependence and mutual autonomy of the different party subunits 
(Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004). Moreover, cartel parties engage state resources as 
alternative source of funding and are argued to jointly form a ‘cartel’ to enhance their 
autonomy and power position in the legislative process. Newcomers in the party 
system are fended off by institutional barriers (Katz & Mair, 1995). In many European 
and non-European party systems cartel-like tendencies have been observed (Bolleyer, 
2009). This transformation of traditional mass parties to contemporary cartelized 
parties which increasingly act as agencies of the state than as agencies of society has 
been indicated as a decline of parties. Cartel parties would no longer be able to 
perform some traditional representative functions and consequently questions arose 
concerning the responsiveness of political parties and their legitimacy in the 
democratic process (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000).  
Local party competition is equally affected by these changing societal circumstances 
and the changing role of parties. Non-national lists have been associated with these 
system-level party evolutions as they have been depicted as prolocutors of a new, 
depoliticized future (Boogers & Voerman, 2010). Traditionally however, independent 
local lists have long been considered as relics of old-style political system. This 
polygonal analysis of the differentiated role of non-national lists in Flanders indicates 
that non-national lists are not the alleged independent relics of an ancient nonpartisan 
political logic which persist in peripheral localities. They are strongly intertwined with 
local parties as they have similar goals and face similar challenges and contextual 
paradigms. They form an undeniable part of the highly politicized local party systems 
across Flemish municipalities and have more or less adopted a partisan logic. In many 
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aspects non-national lists behave similar to traditional local parties and a substantial 
part of them maintains implicit or explicit links to national parties. 
Yet, they can be linked to the party crisis as the erosion of partisan loyalties has 
increased the difficulties to attract adequate candidates. Local cartel lists and 
associated lists result from local party strategies to cope with the dealignment of the 
electorate. By engaging in specific local partnerships with independent candidates or 
with other political actors these non-national lists extend the supply of eligible 
candidates beyond the party supporters or reduce the required recruitment efforts to 
compose a complete list. Moreover, by assuming a non-national profile they dissociate 
themselves from traditional party politics and appeal to candidates and voters who 
have turned their back to conventional (local) party politics. Hence, they can (re-
)mobilize a disaffected electorate and as such increase the legitimacy of the local party 
system. 
Moreover, the different categories of non-national lists adopt specific local profiles to 
dissociate themselves from traditional party politics. These local profiles seem to 
correspond to the traditional conception of non-national lists as a-political, consensual 
political actors. Yet, the analysis suggests that these specific local programmatic 
concerns reflect a changing nature of political representation which has been 
associated with the party crisis. Non-national lists emphasize local and issue-based 
positions and cross-party cooperation based on pragmatic and flexible policy programs 
and often stress their concern for procedural values such as openness and 
responsiveness. Their programmatic claims correspond with the observation that 
traditional partisan modes of representation - based on ex ante bottom-up mandates – 
are gradually transforming into a reflexive mode of party representation (Saward, 2008; 
Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014). Saward (2008) argues that representative democracy 
has increasingly depoliticized with a more explicit focus on the general or public 
interest and the integration of non-party actors. This transformation would be 
reflected in decentralized party organizations with substantial autonomy for local 
figures, who include stakeholders and citizens in governmental decision-making.  
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We can conclude that the locally-oriented programmatic profiles of non-national lists 
and the local cleavages they invoke highly correspond to this reflexive mode of party 
representation. Non-national lists can therefore be considered as reflections of the 
changing representative claims which is associated with the party crisis. Yet this seems 
not to imply that non-national lists herald a party decline as the analysis clearly 
demonstrates the adaptive character of partisan politics. Non-national lists first and 
foremost are the contingent result of strategic decisions made by political 
entrepreneurs who pursue the path of least resistance to realize their political goals. A 
range of external and internal factors at local and national level are considered, 
including the dealignment of the electorate and national party change.    
Also at organizational level, non-national lists reflect some features of cartel-like 
parties. The prevalence of local cartel lists and associated lists indicates that local party 
branches enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy to interact with the local context and 
respond to local pressures by engaging in specific local alliances with independent 
candidates or other local parties. This confirms the mutual autonomy and 
interdependence between the organizational  subunits of contemporary parties and 
reflects a stratarchical imperative (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Katz & Mair, 1995). 
Moreover, these derivative lists seem to encourage the concentration of local powers in 
the council group.  Their organizational structure contains a complex and multileveled 
mixture of formal and informal arrangements to combine their role as party agency 
with their role as participants in local politics. These customized organizational 
structures provide substantial autonomy to the group of candidates – often reduced to 
the office-holding candidates - in local policy decisions. These findings confirm Copus 
and Eringsson’s (2013) in their concern for elitism and power concentration in the 
council group of local parties as a local counterpart of the national party crisis.  
5) SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Traditionally, a simplified distinction is made between local and national components 
in municipal elections. This research project was ambitious in its aim to conceptualize 
local candidate lists beyond this traditional dichotomy and assess the differentiated 
role of non-national lists in the multi-partisan context of local politics in Flanders. This 
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differentiated approach is highly innovative in political science for nowhere before 
non-national list have been studied this meticulously, distinguishing between different 
types of non-national lists. The research results clearly demonstrate the added value of 
such a differentiated approach and it would be very interesting to apply the elaborated 
analytical tools to study non-national lists also in other national contexts and develop 
a comparative perspective on the differentiated role of these lists across different 
institutional settings.  
It was demonstrated that the occurrence of the different types of non-national lists in 
Flanders cannot be dissociated from national party evolutions. The occurrence of 
specific non-national lists in Flanders designate the adaptive character of local parties 
and their autonomy from national party centres. Moreover the reflexive claims made 
by non-national lists seem to indicate a change in the representative role of (local) 
parties. These research findings call for a more focused investigation into the local 
dimensions of the national party crisis. Party change/decline is generally considered 
from a national perspective but the repercussions of these national party evolutions on 
local party branches need further scrutiny. More research is needed to assess how local 
party branches are affected by the declining membership figures and the changing 
power relations within the national party and how these local party branches cope 
with these changes. Moreover, further analysis is required to expose the different 
dimensions of the versatile relationship between local and national party levels in 
multilevel parties and how this relationship is influenced by national party changes.   
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